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Introduction 
  
Each year firefighters from career and volunteer agencies across Australia respond 
to wildfires that impact the urban interface.  When such an event occurs during a period 
of intense fire behavior, the conditions are often incompatible with life for persons either 
caught in the open or those seeking refuge in a vehicle.  In order to improve firefighter 
safety and operational effectiveness during landscape scale wildfires, as well as 
providing sound engineering guidance to improve community resilience to wildfire 
impacts, this textbook forms part of the lead author’s PhD and examines critical 
components of wildfire response.  These components are the wildfire fighting strategies 
and tactics applied during a landscape scale wildfire event; the procedures and 
protective systems utilised in the event of burnover; operational risk management; and 
wildfire resilient urban design.  A Handbook of Wildfire Engineering (the Handbook) 
provides firefighters, engineers and town planners with detailed technical approaches 
and analysis to enhance the resilience of communities in areas prone to wildfire impacts, 
and enhance the safety and effectiveness of wildfire suppression at the urban interface 
during catastrophic wildfire conditions.  
Each chapter of the Handbook is designed to build upon the previous, providing a 
holistic approach to understanding vegetation and wildfire basics before exploring 
evidence based wildfire suppression.  The critical linkage between wildfire suppression, 
firefighter safety and urban design is also explored.  Whilst the primary focus of this 
Handbook is wildfire suppression, there are many aspects applicable to urban designers 
and policy makers.  These are summarised at the conclusion of each chapter. 
During the preparation of this book, Australia was suffering from catastrophic wildfires 
on both the west and east coasts and, tragically, civilians and firefighters alike were 
injured or killed. The lead author was deployed as a Strike Team Leader from Western 
Australia and was tasked with wildfire suppression and property defense near Walcha, 
New South Wales.  In addition to his own local experiences in Margaret River in 2011 and 
Yarloop 2016, during the 2019 NSW deployment he witnessed first-hand the devastating 
effects of wildfire on firefighters and the communities, survived near miss entrapments 
and nights spent on the fireground cut off by fire behaviour and falling trees. This book is 
dedicated to all those affected by wildfires, particularly for the firefighters of all 
backgrounds and jurisdictions who put themselves in harm’s way to protect life, property 
and the environment.  May the guidance provided in this book help firefighters return 
safely to their loved ones and provide enhanced protection of communities in wildfire 
prone areas. 
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1. Wildfire Fuels 
1.1 Introduction 
For frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and Incident Management Teams alike, 
understanding how vegetation type and structure affects wildfire behaviour is critical to the 
planning and execution of safe and successful suppression strategies.  Just as important is the 
understanding of how vegetation is represented in the empirical and physics based models 
used to predict wildfire spread. During mega-wildfires that occur in catastrophic fire weather 
conditions, wildfire behaviour through vegetation of even moderate density may be near 
impossible to suppress.  Conversely, over or under representing fuel structure and density when 
completing wildfire behaviour predictions may result in fire behaviour being incorrectly 
quantified and inappropriate suppression strategies being recommended.   
For urban planners and decision makers reviewing planning applications at the Rural 
Urban Interface, including those using AS3959 Construction of buildings in bushfire prone areas 
(SAI Global, 2018) and the relevant bushfire planning guidelines in each jurisdiction, it is equally 
as important to understand how vegetation contributes to wildfire behaviour.  When 
considering the benefits and costs of development in Bushfire Prone Areas, misunderstanding 
the vegetation related limitations and inherent assumptions of Deemed To Satisfy (DTS) or 
simplified planning / construction standards and guidelines can have significant and costly 
impacts.  Whilst under calculating wildfire behaviour and impacts may result in avoidable loss 
of life (of both the public and the firefighters who defend them) and property, inappropriate 
identification of fuel structures and resultant calculation of potential wildfire behaviour can 
stifle safe and appropriate development and lead to unnecessary expenditure of potentially 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in over engineering and redundant infrastructure.   
This chapter explores how vegetation structure not only contributes to wildfire behaviour, 
but also how it is represented in the models used to predict it on both the fireground and in the 
urban planning context.  It should be considered the introductory preparation for firefighters 
as it represents the first step in “knowing the enemy”. 
 
1.2 Vegetation structure  
Wildfire fuel is the vegetation consumed by a fire burning in vegetation regardless of the 
size of the fire itself. The term wildfire fuel applies to vegetation involved in a 10m2 fire in the 
same manner as the vegetation involved in a 100,000m2 wildfire.   Often referred to as fuel 
load, wildfire fuel is defined by its physical structure and density.  The extent to which fuel load 
needs to be defined is dependent on the model used to predict wildfire behaviour.  In order 
to demystify the concept of wildfire fuels this chapter first discusses the concept of fuel load 
and subsequently discusses how this is considered within common empirical and physics based 
wildfire models.  Understanding the classification of wildfire fuels and how they are represented 
in wildfire modelling is the first stage of interpreting modelling outputs and their application in 
assessing the suitability of wildfire suppression strategies, construction requirements and land 
use planning decisions. 
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Figure 1.1: Fuel load by strata  
As detailed in Figure 1.1, four main fuel strata layers and the bark layer are considered 
(Hines et al., 2010; Gould et al., 2007) when describing wildfire fuels.  These are canopy; 
elevated; near-surface; and surface fuels as well as the bark.  The height of each layer is not 
considered in the forest, woodland or grass fuel empirical models of Australian Standard 3959 
– Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas (subsequently referred to as AS3959)1 but is 
relevant for heath or scrub fuels and the empirical model of (Gould et al., 2007).  Each layer 
and description are provided in the list below: 
• Canopy fuel is contained in the forest crown. The crown encompasses the leaves and 
fine twigs of the tallest layer of trees in a forest or woodland. Crown involvement may 
lead to erratic and extreme fire behaviour and contributes to spotting distances. 
• Elevated fuel includes shrubs, scrub, and juvenile understory plants up to 2–3m in 
height, however, canopy of heights less than 4m can be included when there is no 
identifiable separation between the canopy and lower shrubs. The individual fuel 
components generally have an upright orientation and may be highly variable in 
ground coverage. Elevated fuels influence the flame height and rate of spread of a 
fire whilst also contributing to crown involvement by providing vertical fuel structure. 
• Near-surface fuels include grasses, low shrubs, and heath, sometimes containing 
suspended components of leaves, bark, and twigs. This layer can vary from a few 
centimetres to up to 0.6m in height. Near-surface fuel components include a mixture 
of orientations from horizontal to vertical. This layer may be continuous or have large 
gaps in ground coverage and influences both the rate of spread of a fire and flame 
height. 
 
1 Introduced after the devastating 2009 Victorian Bushfires, AS3959 not only details the 
construction enhancements to the Buliding Code of Australia in order to enhance a dwelling’s 
resilience to wildfire impacts, it also details the methodology and equations for calculating 
wildfire radiant heat flux across all Australian vegetation structures.  Bushfire is the Australian 
colloquial equivalent of the term ‘wildfire’. 
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• Surface fuel includes leaves, twigs, and bark on the forest floor. Surface fuel (or litter) 
components are generally horizontally layered. Surface fuel usually contributes the 
greatest to fuel quantity and includes the partly decomposed fuel (duff) on the soil 
surface. This fuel layer influences the rate of spread of a fire and flame depth as well 
as contributing to the establishment of a fire post initial ignition. 
• Bark fuel is the flammable bark on tree trunks and upper branches that contributes to 
transference of surface fires into the canopy, embers and firebrands, and subsequent 
spot fires. 
 
The consideration of Vegetation Height is only considered in the empirical models of 
shrubland, scrub and heath fuel structures and the dry eucalypt forest fire model (DEFFM) of 
Gould et al. (2007).  The effects of vegetation height on fire line intensity and flame length are 
discussed in the following section of this report.  For treed structures, whilst vegetation height 
has some bearing on the deemed fuel loads assigned within AS3959, it is not considered in the 
empirical model itself.   For grasslands structure, the effect of vegetation height is not 
considered in any form in AS3959.   
The “Framework for an Australian fuel classification to support wildfire management” 
(Hollis et al., 2015) provides enhanced taxonomy for fuel classification with greater emphasis 
on fuel attributes (composition, geometry, density and physical aspects) within each stratum.    
Unfortunately the corresponding fuel load data sets and attributes for each stratum remain 
the subject of potential future research.  The full potential of the framework may also be limited 
by empirical wildfire models which consider binominal fuel structure (understory and total) as 
opposed to incorporating the detailed fuel load data presented by (Hollis et al., 2015). 
Appropriate definition and consideration of wildfire fuel is essential as it directly affects 
calculated wildfire outputs including head fire rate of spread, fire line intensity, flame height 
and radiant heat outputs.  The manner and detail with which wildfire fuel is considered is largely 
dependent on the model applied.  The forward Rate of Spread (RoS) and intensity of an active 
front of a fire, known as the head fire, is dependent on the fuel available for consumption in 
the active flaming front (Alexander, 1982; Alexander & Cruz, 2016). This is incorporated into 
existing empirical wildfire models of AS3959 through the consideration of available fuels within 
a 1ha assessment area, representative of the active fire area directly behind the head fire. 
Typically driven by wind direction, the head fire is the main component of a wildfire 
contributing to the RoS and fire behaviour intensity. Subsequently, it is the focus when 
calculating radiant heat flux for the purposes of determining the appropriate standard of 
bushfire resilient residential construction in AS3959. In landscape scale wildfire scenarios, being 
those greater than 1ha, the 1ha area of assessment falls within the greater active fire area, 
whilst in sub-landscape scale wildfire scenarios the active fire area instead falls within the 1ha 
assessment area. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2.  
A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020 
 
1-4 
   
 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 1.2. (a) Landscape scale wildfire scenario; and (b) sub-landscape scale wildfire 
scenario. 
1.3 Consideration of wildfire fuel in empirical models 
Wildfire fuels are represented in empirical models through numerical inputs in wildfire 
behaviour equations including Rate of Spread (RoS), fire line intensity (I) and flame length (Lf). 
AS3959 (cB3) states the appropriate surface (understory) fuel load (w) and overall fuel load 
(W) must be determined and that “both the understory and the canopy should be considered 
in the assessment. The rate of spread for forest fires should be determined using the understory 
fuel loads. Flame heights should be determined on the basis of both the combined understory 
and canopy fuels (overall fuel loads) for forest fires.”  Further, AS3959 (c1.5.27) defines the 
understory as “the vegetation beneath the overstory” whilst AS3959 (c1.5.20) defines the 
overstory as “the canopy, being the tallest stratum of the vegetation profile.”  This two layered 
classification of fuel load requires the surface fuel load to also incorporate all fuel layers below 
the canopy as illustrated in Figure 1.1.   
Mathematically this broadly assumes that despite the complex structure and geometry of 
fuel below the canopy, all fuel below the canopy will contribute to fire behaviour as a single 
fuel unit, resulting in the assumption of cell dimensions for treed fuel structures illustrated in 
Figure 1.33.  Cell dimensions for all other fuel structures are identified in Figure 1.4 and consider 
understory and total fuel load as the same value.   
This two layered mathematical simplification does not necessarily provide true 
consideration of the influence of the fuel layers and their contribution to wildfire behaviour, 
especially where fires occur in small pockets of vegetation that do not support the 
development of a 100m head fire (detailed in section 2.2.3 of this report).  Greater 
consideration of the impact of wildfire fuels by strata on wildfire behaviour is considered in 
Hines et al. (2010) and Gould et al. (2007), however when applied to the models identified in 
AS3959, the two layered fuel load classification requires fuel loads to be simplified back to 
understory and total fuel density only.  The alternative lies in developing new empirical models 
that have greater consideration of fuel strata or using physics based models discussed later in 
this report. 
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Figure 1.3: Cell dimensions treed fuel structures 
 
Figure 1.4: Cell dimensions non-treed fuel structures – scrub, shrub and grassland 
 
Case Study 1 – Models used in Australian Standard 3959 
 
Despite significant variance in fuel structure between vegetation species throughout 
Australia, only four empirical models are suggested in AS3959 to quantify wildfire behaviour.  
These empirical approaches consist of a wildfire behaviour model enabling calculation of the 
physical parameters of wildfire behaviour (each model unique to the classification of 
vegetation structure); and separate view factor model, otherwise known as configuration 
factor, which details the calculation of the receiving body’s resultant radiant heat flux (the 
same view factor model is used regardless of vegetation structure and resultant fire 
behaviour).  Each of these models assume that all wildfire has attained a quasi-steady rate of 
spread (RoS) and are of landscape proportions. 
 
The six wildfire behaviour models detailed in AS3959 are: 
• Noble et al (1980) used for all treed fuel structures subsequently classified as Group A 
Forest, Group B Woodland and Group F Rainforest;   
• Cruz et al (2013)  shrub, scrub and heath vegetation structures subsequently classified 
as Group C Shrub, D Scrub and E Mallee/Mulga;  
• Purton, (1982) for grassland fuel structures subsequently classified as Group G 
Grassland;  
• Marsden-Smedley et al (1995) for Tussock Moorland subsequently classified as Group H 
Grassland specific to Tasmania. 
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Alternate models that may be also be suitable are: 
• Forest & Woodlands - Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model or DEFFM (Gould et al, 2007); 
• Anderson et al (2015)  for scrub and heath vegetation structures; and 
• Cheney et al (1998) for various vegetation within the identified Rangelands 
geographical areas 
 
  The empirical models are reliant on prescribed fuel load densities measured in tonnes per 
hectare which equates to large cell sizes of a minimum 1ha land area (fuel height may vary).  
Further, AS3959 prescribes set fuel load densities for each vegetation structure regardless of 
the actual geometry of the vegetation involved in the wildfire or the amount of vegetation 
consumed during the fire scenario.  This results in fires burning through small areas of vegetation 
being modelled as landscape scale fires as opposed to scenario specific heat release rates 
that consider the geometry and volume of the fuel consumed.  Subsequently the use of 
landscape scale models detailed in AS3959 for predicting sub-landscape scale fires (road 
reserves, verges, landscaped gardens, vegetation adjacent to rivers etc.) or where there is 
restricted fire run potential, limited fuel loads are consumed or substantial boundary walls are 
present, may not be appropriate as currently applied and may significantly over estimate 
radiant heat flux. 
Defining fuel load and structure is perhaps the most critical input of existing empirical 
models.  It not only determines which mathematical model is applied, each model being 
specific to a broad vegetation type (AS3959; Noble, Bary & Gill, 1980; Catchpole et al, 1998; 
Marsden-Smedley & Catchpole, 1995), but when used for determining construction standards 
for buildings in wildfire prone areas, it also determines which prescribed fuel load is assigned.  
The vegetation descriptors with fuel load and fire behaviour model are detailed in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1. Vegetation descriptors with fuel load and fire behaviour model (adapted from 
AS3959, Table 2.3). 
Fire Behaviour 
Model 
Vegetation 
Classification 
Vegetation Type Description Assigned 
fuel load 
(t/ha) 
Noble et al/ 
Note: DEFFM is also 
suitable as an 
alternative 
A 
Forest 
Tall open forest 
Tall woodland 
• Trees over 30m high;  
• 30-70% foliage cover (may include 
understory ranging from rainforest 
and tree ferns to low trees and tall 
shrubs); 
•  Found in areas of high reliable 
rainfall. Typically dominated by 
eucalypts. 
w = 25 
W = 35 Open forest 
Low open forest 
• Trees 10-30m high;  
• 30-70% foliage cover (may include 
understory of sclerophyllous low 
trees and tall scrubs or grass).  
• Typically dominated by eucalypts. 
Pine plantation 
• Trees 10-30m in height at maturity;  
• Generally comprising Pinus 
species or other softwood species, 
planted as a single species for the 
production of timber. 
 
 
 
 
Noble et al / 
Note: DEFFM is also 
suitable as an 
alternative 
B 
Woodland 
Woodland 
Open woodland 
• Trees 10-30m high;  
• 30-70% foliage cover (may include 
understory of sclerophyllous low 
trees and tall scrubs or grass).  
• Typically dominated by eucalypts. 
w = 15 
W = 25 
Low woodland 
Low open woodland 
Open shrubland 
• Low trees and shrubs 2-10m high;  
• Foliage cover less than 10%.  
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• Dominated by eucalypts and 
Acacia.  Often have a grassy 
understory or low shrubs. Acacias 
and Casuarina woodlands grade 
to Atriplex shrublands in the arid 
and semi-arid zones; 
• Low open woodland is classified 
on the basis of the understory 
present. 
Catchpole et al C Shrubland 
Closed heath 
Open heath 
• Found in wet areas and/or areas 
affected by poor soil fertility or 
shallow soils.   
• Shrubs 1-2m high often comprising 
Banksia, Acacia, Hakea and 
Grevilea.  
• Wet heaths occur in sands 
adjoining dunes of the littoral 
(shore) zone. Montane heaths 
occur on shallow or water logged 
soils. 
w = 15 
W = 25 
Low shrubland 
• Shrubs <2m high;  
• greater than 30% foliage cover.  
• Understory may contain grasses. 
Acacia and Casuarina often 
dominant in the arid and semi-
arid zones. 
Catchpole et al D Scrub 
Closed scrub 
• Found in wet areas and/or areas 
affected by poor soil fertility or 
shallow soils;  
• >30% foliage cover.  
• Dry heaths occur in rocky areas.  
• Shrubs >2m high.  
• Typical of coastal wetlands and 
tall heaths 
w = 25 
W = 25 
Open scrub 
• Shrubs greater than 2m high;  
• 10-30% foliage cover with a mixed 
species combination 
Catchpole et al 
E 
Mallee / 
Malga 
Tall shrubland 
• Vegetation dominated by shrubs 
(especially eucalypts and 
acacias) with a multi-stemmed 
habit; 
•  usually greater than 2m in height;  
• <30% foliage cover.  
• Understory of widespread to 
dense low shrubs (acacias) or 
sparse grasses. 
w = 8 
W = 8 
Noble et al 
 
F 
Rainforest 
Tall closed forest 
Closed forest 
Low closed forest 
•  >90% foliage cover;  
• understory may contain a large 
number of species with a variety 
of heights; 
• Not dominated by eucalypts 
w = 10 
W = 12 
Purton G Grassland 
All forms, including situations with shrubs and trees, if the 
overstory foliage cover is less than 10% 
w = 4.5 
W = 4.5 
Marsden-Smedley 
et al 
H 
Grassland 
Tussock Moorland • All forms of vegetation where the 
overstory is dominated by the 
species Buttongrass.  Only occurs 
as a significant vegetation type 
in Tasmania. 
w = 17 
W = 17 
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Some of the confusion regarding wildfire fuel can be attributed to the multiple 
inconsistencies between the qualitative and pictorial descriptions of the classifications of 
vegetation in AS3959 and the quantified inputs such as vegetation height and foliage cover 
used in the calculations (AS3959; DOP, 2016; FPA, 2016).  Several of the more significant 
inconsistencies that cause confusion regarding wildfire fuels are summarised in Table 1.2.     
 
Table 1.2: Discrepancies of fuel classification in AS3959 
Discrepancy in Fuel Classification in AS3959 Effect on Empirical Modelling 
Table 2.3, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 requires classification 
of treed vegetation structures on the basis of 
foliage cover (defined as the proportion of the 
ground that would be shaded by foliage when 
the sun is shining directly overhead, expressed as 
a percentage for each stratum or identifiable 
layer of vegetation [AS3959, c1.5.17]): 
• 30-70% for Group A Forest 
• 10-30% for Group B Woodland 
• 10-30% for Group B Open Woodland 
(subsequently classified on the basis of 
the understory vegetation) 
 
Table B2 identifies the same amount of wildfire 
fuel above the surface strata (being 10t/ha) for 
both Forest and Woodland vegetation structures 
regardless of foliage cover. 
 
Figure 2.4(B) illustrates Open Woodland as being 
a single tree in a field, however the suggested 
foliage cover may be interpreted as 30%, the 
same as that required for Group A Forest. 
 
Figures 2.4(A) and 2.4(B) illustrate significant 
overlap between understory fuel structures as 
densities with an almost total absence of 
understory fuel for the Low Open Forest 
classification. 
 
Table 2.3 Note 2 states “Overstorys of open 
woodland, low open woodland, tall open 
shrubland and low open shrubland should be 
classified to the vegetation type on the basis of 
their understorys; others to be classified on the 
basis of their overstorys.” 
 
This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface 
fuel load inputs being utilised between Group A 
(25t/ha), Group B (15t/ha) and Group F (10t/ha) 
vegetation structures. 
 
In the case of confusion between Group B 
Woodlands and Group B Open Woodlands, the 
incorrect empirical model being applied for 
Group C Shrubland, Group D Scrub or Group G 
Grassland understories.   
 
These discrepancies can ultimately result in 
significantly different fire engineering outputs 
including flame angle, view factor and radiant 
heat flux as shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6. 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 “Tall woodland” has the same 
qualitative description and classification as 
Group A Forest resulting in wildfire modelling 
reflective of Group A Forest fire behaviour as 
opposed to reflecting the reduced understory 
fuel structure that defines ‘woodland’ wildfire 
fuels. 
This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface 
fuel load for Group B Woodland (15t/ha) as 
opposed to the greater Group A Forest (25t/ha) 
being applied. 
 
These discrepancies can ultimately result in 
significantly different fire engineering outputs as 
shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6. 
 
Table 2.3, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 requires classification 
of all treed vegetation greater than 10m in height 
and a foliage cover in excess of 90% to be 
classified as Group F Rainforest regardless of 
climate or species. 
 
 
This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface 
fuel load inputs being utilised between Group A 
(25t/ha), Group B (15t/ha) and Group F (10t/ha) 
vegetation structures. 
 
Wildfire behaviour through dense Eucalypt forest 
matching the descriptions in AS3959 Table 2.3 and 
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 AS3959 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 will consume significant 
fuels and result in the highest magnitude of 
wildfire intensity.  
 
Empirical modelling using the Group F Rainforest 
fuel loads will significantly underestimate radiant 
heat flux where treed fuel structures are dense 
and significant. 
 
For modelling the effect is variable fuel load inputs 
which result in significantly different engineering 
outputs as shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6. 
Table 2.3 describes Group C Shrubland as shrub 
vegetation less than 2m in height potentially with 
foliage cover greater than 30% whilst Group D 
Scrub is identified as shrub vegetation greater 
than 2m in height, potentially with foliage cover 
greater than 30% 
 
 
Table B2 defines the vegetation height for Group 
C Shrubland as 1.5m and the vegetation height 
for Group D Scrub and Group E Mallee Mulga as 
3m.  B2 identifies the ‘fuel type’ for all three 
classifications as “Shrub and Heath.” 
The variance in qualitative descriptions of 
vegetation height from that of the empirical 
inputs result in potential discrepancy between 
vegetation classification and calculated wildfire 
behaviour.  The discrepancy in fuel type 
description between “shrub and “heath” may 
introduce further confusion. 
 
This inconsistency can result in incorrect surface 
fuel load inputs being utilised between Group C 
(15t/ha), Group D (25t/ha) vegetation structures.  
It can also result in the incorrect vegetation height 
input being used. 
 
These inconsistencies can ultimately result in 
significantly different fire engineering outputs as 
shown in figures 1.7 to 1.10. 
 
 
Using Figures 1.5a-1.5b as a case scenario, the ambiguity surrounding fuel classification 
using the qualitative descriptions in AS3959 become apparent.  The vegetation structure in the 
case scenario could arguably be considered Group A - Low Open Forest or Group B – Open 
Woodland as the foliage cover, defined as the “proportion of the ground that would be 
shaded by foliage when the sun is directly overhead, expressed as a percentage of each 
stratum or identifiable layer of vegetation” (AS3959, c1.5.17), exceeds 30%.  Further, the surface 
and near surface fuel layer do not clearly fit the description for either category and arguably 
does not satisfy the definition of minimal fuel condition, defined as “insufficient fuel to 
significantly increase the severity of wildfire attack (recognizable as short-cropped grass for 
example, to a nominal height of 100mm)” (AS3959, c2.2.3.2(f)) required to be considered low 
threat vegetation and excluded from consideration for calculation of wildfire impacts in 
accordance with AS3959.   
The effect of these variable fuel load inputs for the scenario examined results in 
significantly different wildfire outputs as shown in Figures 4 to 10.  The outputs detailed were 
calculated using the detailed methodology detailed in AS3959; assuming flat site and 
effective slopes; and standard inputs of AS3959 appropriate to each fuel classification. 
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Figure 1.5. (a) Case study; and (b) Case study surface fuel. 
 
In accordance with the vegetation descriptions provided in AS3959 the vegetative fuel in 
the case study could be qualitatively classified as being Group A Forest, Group B Woodland 
or Group F Rainforest (being low closed forest) depending on the individual assessor.  Whilst 
the same empirical model (McArthur) is applied to each of these vegetation structures, the 
associated assigned fuel loads vary significantly.  A result is the fire behaviour outputs and 
subsequent radiation modelling outputs are vastly different as illustrated in Figures 6-12.  
Subsequently, the associated construction responses required under the Building Code of 
Australia (ABCB, 2015) for a typical residence could vary by over a hundred thousand dollars 
(FPA, 2016) and result in significant over engineering in situations where landscape scale fire 
behaviour is not possible.  These inconsistencies also facilitate the opportunity for consultants 
and home owners alike to underestimate potential wildfire impact in order to reduce 
construction costs, leaving houses potentially vulnerable where landscape scale wildfire 
impacts occur. This subsequently highlights the need for comprehensive understanding of 
wildfire engineering with greater analysis of fuel loads where landscape scale fire behaviour is 
not possible, typically within the urban and peri-urban area, as opposed to blind reliance on 
the broad qualitative descriptions and simplified radiant heat flux tables detailed in AS3959.   
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Figure 1.6.  Flame angle as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed fuel 
structures 
 
Figure 1.7.  View factor as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed fuel 
structures 
 
 
Figure 1.8.  Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed fuel 
structures 
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Figure 1.9.  Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison – Woodland 
and open woodland structures (open woodland modelling based on the understory structure) 
 
Figure 1.10.  Flame angle as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub, scrub 
and grassland 
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88 92 96 100
Ra
di
an
t h
ea
t f
lu
x 
(k
W
/m
2)
Separation from head fire (m)
Radiant heat flux comparison between vegetation classifications
Class B Woodland Class C Shrubland Class D Scrub Class G Grassland
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88 92 96 100
Fl
am
e 
an
gl
e 
(d
eg
re
es
)
Separation from head fire (m)
Flame angle comparison between vegetation classifications
Class C Shrubland Class D Scrub Class G Grassland
A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020 
 
1-13 
 
Figure 1.11.  View factor as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub, scrub 
and grassland 
 
Figure 1.12.  Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub, 
scrub and grassland 
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Case Study 2 – Project Vesta and Hazard Ratings 
 
Two of the aims of Project Vesta, perhaps the most significant research project into fire 
behaviour through dry eucalypt forest of recent times, were to (Gould et al., 2007, piii): 
i. develop new algorithms describing the relationship between fire spread and 
wind speed, and fire spread and fuel characteristics including load, structure 
and height; and 
ii. develop a fuel hazard assessment guide that provides quantitative description 
of fuel hazard and its effects on fire behaviour. 
The published results have subsequently been adapted to other jurisdictions including 
Victoria (Hines et al., 2007) and South Australia (DENR, 2011).   
 
Unlike the two layered  fuel structure incorporated by the models suggested in AS3959, 
the dry eucalypt model of Gould et al. (2007) considers three fuel layers contributing to head 
fire rate of spread being surface, near-surface and elevated fuels (illustrated in Figure 1, with 
bark fuels being used to estimate potential spotting distances.  Using the approach of Gould 
et al. (2007) fuels in each strata are assigned hazard scores based on qualitative descriptions 
and the assessor’s inspection.  If the approach of Gould et al. (2007) is used, fuel loads are first 
assigned hazard ratings which are then converted to the required hazard scores shown in 
Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3. Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores (Gould et al., 2007, Table 9.3, reproduced with permission 
from L.McCaw on behalf of  CSIRO and the Department Environment and Conservation) 
Vesta Fuel Hazard Score 
Fuel Hazard Rating Surface Near-surface Elevated Bark 
Low 1 1 1 0 
Moderate 2 2 2 1 
High 3 3 3 2 
Very High 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 
Extreme 4 4 4 4 
 
The assigned scores are subsequently utilised in the head fire rate of spread equation (see 
Chapter 2).  The approach of Gould et al. (2007) not only provides greater consideration of 
wildfire fuel structure than the empirical methods detailed in AS3959, but also provides a guide 
to potential spotting behaviour resulting from fire brands.  Specific to dry eucalypt forest with 
litter and shrub understory, Gould et al., (2007) does not allow assessment of fuel loads or fire 
modelling in woodland, shrub, or grassland fuel structures.  Perhaps the main benefit of Gould 
et al. (2007) is the ability to vary fuel loads on the basis of ground truthing and field 
interrogation, even if this is somewhat subjective and constrained by the assumptions of 100m 
head fire width and sufficient vegetation geometry to sustain landscape scale wildfire 
behaviour.   The calculated rates of spread and flame heights from the model can 
theoretically be combined with the view factor model of AS3959 to calculate radiant heat 
flux, however there is no evidence within the literature to support one approach over the other. 
 
1.4 Consideration of sub-landscape scale vegetation geometry 
Within the urban environment, wildfire growth in road reserves, urban parklands, and 
similar scenarios can be restricted by the geometry of the available fuel beds. Current 
approaches of AS3959 suggest modification of the head fire width may be appropriate in 
these instances. However, whilst the width of the head fire is a vital component in determining 
radiant heat flux, head fire widths greater than 40m resulted in negligible differences between 
the view factor and radiant heat flux within 30m of the flame front (Penney, 2017). Through 
analysis of heat release rates, the same study identified that reduction of head fire width alone 
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without further consideration of fuel bed geometry was not suitable in scenarios where the fuel 
bed geometry restricted fire growth. It was subsequently identified that: 
1. Regardless of the actual geometry and coverage of fuel within the assessment area, 
AS3959 assumes landscape scale wildfire behaviour with a 100% homogenous fuel loading 
within the assessment area and a head fire width of 100m;  
2. When fuel bed geometry prevents a 100m head fire or quasi-steady RoS  being obtained, 
failure to adjust wildfire fuel inputs may result in significant overestimation of wildfire 
impact, particularly radiant heat flux; and 
3. In order to more accurately model wildfires in fuel beds that restrict fire growth, it is 
necessary to calculate available fuel loads that will contribute to fire behaviour over the 
area being assessed using the vegetation availability factor equation as described below.  
 
As previously published (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), whilst the head fire flame width 
should be considered as the width of the continuous fuel contributing to the active fire front, 
the area covered by potential fuel load available for contribution to the RoS and intensity of 
the active fire as a fraction of the total assessment area is defined as the vegetation availability 
factor (VF), given by 
𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 (𝑚𝑚2)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 (𝑚𝑚2) (1.1) 
where the fuel cell area is the coverage of vegetation present within a 100 m by 100 m 
assessment area directly in front of the receiving body. The available surface fuel load wA 
(t/ha), and the available total fuel load WA (t/ha), are then defined as 
𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 = 𝑤𝑤 × 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 (1.2) 
and  
𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = 𝑊𝑊 × 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 (1.3) 
where 𝑤𝑤 and 𝑊𝑊 are respectively the surface fuel load and total fuel load sourced from 
relevant jurisdictional data sets.  
The calculated fuel loads can then be applied to the relevant fire behaviour equations of
RoS , fire line intensity, and flame length for the purposes of determining the suitability of wildfire 
fighting strategies and tactics or for calculating the radiant heat flux on receiving bodies in the 
path of the head fire. Where models do not consider the fuel load when calculating RoS , the 
vegetation availability factor can still be applied for the purposes of calculating radiant heat 
flux, fire line, and intensity. 
 
Individual Trees and Small Garden Beds 
 
Where individual vegetation or small vegetation beds are present that would result in an 
isolated fire but would not facilitate the type of fire propagation present during wildfire events, 
it is appropriate to model those instances accordingly.  This is discussed in further in Chapter 2. 
 
1.5 Consideration of wildfire fuel in physics based modelling 
As opposed to empirical models derived from statistical data, physics based wildfire 
modelling involve computational models that considers interaction of atmosphere, fire and 
vegetative fuel using partial differential equations to solve for filtered fire spread.  Physics based 
models predict the wind flow through and above the fuel strata, incorporates ‘chemical 
kinetics’ to describe the drying and pyrolysis and simplified combustion equation to predict 
combustion of the vegetation in defined time steps.  
Significantly more complex than empirical approaches, physics based models such as 
Firestar require both atmospheric quantities and vegetation inputs (Finney & McAllister, 2011; 
Pimont et al., 2006) to be defined on a two or three-dimensional spatial grid.  Some models 
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including the Wildland Fire Dynamic Simulator (WFDS) allows the resolution of the grid to be 
altered to suit the specific scenario with fine grid sizes as small as 1.6m x 1.6m x 1.4m (Pimont 
et al., 2006), allowing vegetation structures and fires of almost all scales to be modelled.  This 
enables enhanced analysis of potential wildfire behaviour compared to traditional empirical 
models by accounting for each mechanism of heat transfer (conduction, convection and 
radiation) (Porterie et al., 2005; Finney & McAllister, 2011; Finney et al., 2015) but subsequently 
requires powerful computers and extended analysis durations (Cruz et al., 2014).  Whilst the use 
of physics based models is widely accepted in traditional fire engineering analysis (ABCB, 2005; 
SFPE, 2008) its use in the prediction of wildfire behaviour in Australia remains in its relative 
infancy in part due to the complex computational analysis required (Cruz et al., 2014).    
One of the main characteristics of physics based wildfire modelling is the requirement to 
input spatial and physical characteristics for each fuel type and structure within the cell to be 
analysed.  This permits the modelling and evaluation of heterogeneous fuels in a single 
simulation (Cruz et al., 2014; Parsons, Sauer & Linn, 2010).  The result of the analysis is a fire ‘map’ 
with outputs including fire line intensity, temperature and radiant heat flux captured at set 
timed intervals in a separate spreadsheet.      
Physics based models categorise wildfire fuel into two separate layers being surface and 
raised fuels.  Unlike empirical approaches however, the two categories of fuel are not simply 
modelled as two distinct fuel layers.  Fuel structures within each layer are represented as 
individual fuel units within the confines of the grid resolution (Cruz et al., 2014; Parsons, Sauer & 
Linn, 2010).  A comparison between the two approaches is illustrated in Figure 1.13 and 
enables individual trees to be considered separately as opposed to the empirical approach 
of an entire forest being modelled as a single fuel unit. 
 
 
Figure 1.13.  Empirical (left) compared to WFDS (right) wildfire fuel cells 
Input parameters for surface fuels including grasses and litter are the descriptors of the fine 
fuels, which are vegetation with a diameter or thickness of approximately 6 mm or less. If the 
surface vegetation is not uniform in size then the loading in each representative size class (i.e., 
surface-to-volume ratio) can be inputted. Grasses, for example, are more likely to be 
sufficiently represented by one value of the surface-to-volume ratio and the fuel loading would 
be for that size class. However, litter may be better represented using more than one surface-
to-volume ratio.  Input parameters for raised fuels include trees and shrubs that are large 
enough to be resolved on the computational grid. For example, if the grid cells are 1 m cubes 
and the shrubs are 0.5 m tall, then they are not resolved. Where raised fuels are not considered 
due to grid resolution they are modelled as surface vegetation. 
Similar to WFDS, FIRETEC is a three dimensional physics based model for fires through 
vegetation.  It relies on the formulations of physics and chemistry to model the fire behaviour 
through vegetation in cells of horizontal grid resolution as small as 2m and fine fuel grid 
resolution as small as 0.05m (Pimont et al., 2006). 
WFDS has two distinct ways of modelling vegetative fuels, being the Fuel Element (FE) 
model for vegetation that occupies a specified volume such as trees (for example, Douglas fir 
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trees are modelled as cones), and the Boundary Fuel (BF) model for surface fuels such as 
grasslands.   
In the FE model thermally thin vegetation is represented on a three-dimensional grid.  
Porterie et al. (2005, p573) describes the gas phase grid as the pyrolised fuel vapour leaving 
the fuel material, diffusing with the available oxidizer and forming a combustible mixture 
ahead of the flaming edge that is subsequently ignited by the flame itself.  The gas phase grid 
requires sufficient resolution so that temperature gradients and conjugate heat transfer 
between the gas and solid phases in the fuel bed can be calculated to an acceptable level.  
As a result, it is regarded as providing better predictions than the BF model if adequately 
resolved, however it is also both computationally intensive and time consuming.   
The BF model utilises a vertical grid with sufficiently high spatial resolution to capture 
vertical radiant heat transfer.  A horizontal grid is also utilised similar to the FE model, typically 
however with larger resolution.  The underlying assumptions of the BF model are most consistent 
with landscape scale fires in which the majority of heat release and radiant emission occurs 
vertically above the thermally degrading surface fuel bed. 
Two models may be utilised for thermal degradation of wildfire fuel, ‘Linear’ or ‘Arrhenius’, 
both derived from empirical studies.  The Linear model assumes a two-stage endothermic 
thermal decomposition (water evaporation and then solid fuel pyrolysis). In contrast, the 
Arrhenius model considers a three-stage endothermic thermal decomposition being water 
evaporation, solid fuel pyrolysis and subsequent char oxidisation (Morvan & Dupuy, 2014).  Solid 
fuels are represented as a series of layers that are consumed from the top down until the solid 
mass reaches a predetermined char fraction at which point the fuel is considered consumed 
(Cruz et al., 2014).  The model then continues the process throughout the fuel structures in 
predetermined time intervals providing illustrative and tabularised outputs. 
 
1.6 Use of existing data to advance physics based models 
The structural framework provided by Hollis et al. (2015) includes several of the fuel 
characteristic inputs required for physics based modelling.  By combining datasets when 
information becomes available, improvements to both empirical and physics based models 
may be achieved.  Table 1.4 summarises the status of fuel attributes within existing data sets 
and how they correspond to physics based inputs. 
 
Table 1.4. Fuel attributes  
Fuel Attribute from Hollis 
et al. 
Equivalent Attribute for 
physics based models 
Notes 
Mass Mass Mass is not currently considered in empirical 
models which rely on density in (t/ha). 
Compactness Density Compactness is not currently considered in 
empirical models. 
Mineral content -  Not considered in either form of model. 
Heat content Specific heat  Considered in empirical models through 
Heat of combustion, being 18600kJ/kg.  This 
would be altered in physics based models to 
suit the individual fuel.  Data sets from physics 
based models could be applied to empirical 
scenarios. 
Density Density Empirical models utilise t/ha, however 
physics based models would rely on density 
in 3 dimensions. 
Horizontal continuity Fuel geometry Existing empirical models do not consider 
horizontal continuity due to the 1ha grid size.  
For physics based models the fuel geometry 
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can be manually inputted to suit the specific 
scenario. 
Particle shape and size Fuel geometry Empirical models do not consider particle 
size due to the 1ha grid size.  Particle size is 
captured in physics based models through 
enhanced definition of fuel geometry. 
 
The shape of the fuel (cylindrical, conical or 
cubic for instance) can also be considered. 
Surface area Fuel geometry Empirical models do not consider surface 
area.  Surface area is captured in physics 
based models through enhanced definition 
of fuel geometry. 
Height to base of 
canopy 
Fuel geometry Whilst empirical models use canopy height 
as a guide to selecting vegetation fuel load 
inputs, they do not consider height to base 
of canopy in the calculation of fire 
behaviour itself.  Physics based models can 
capture this through detailed fuel geometry 
inputs. 
-  Drag coefficient A coefficient derived from empirical 
correlation for laminar or turbulent flow 
around a simplified shape.  Individually 
imputed for each specific scenario and 
affects physics based modelling of fire 
behaviour.  Not considered in empirical 
approaches. 
-  Char component Determines the point at which the fuel is 
considered completely consumed in physics 
based models and value depends on 
individual scenario.  Not considered in 
empirical models. 
-  Pyrolysis range When the pyrolysis starts and finishes, 
assessed in set time steps in physics based 
modelling.  Not considered in empirical 
models. 
 
Existing data sets are limited, however combining the accepted empirical two layered 
fuel loads detailed in AS3959 with analysis of fuel strata detailed in (Hines et al., 2010; Gould et 
al., 2007; Hollis et al., 2015) may provide a suitable starting point for vegetation fuel inputs 
required for physics based modelling.  Tables 1.5 to 1.8 detail suggested bulk densities for initial 
analysis and comparison against existing empirical models (Penney, 2017).   
The suggested fuel loads in Tables 1.5 to 1.8 have been determined by adapting the 
existing data sets identified for the associated empirical models to the three-dimensional t/m3 
from the existing two-dimensional t/ha that may be suitable in the absence of other data.  In 
the absence of other data they may provide suitable inputs. 
 
Table 1.5. Suggested bulk density Forest 
Fuel Strata Bulk Density in tonnes per hectare Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3 
(Overlap will occur between strata if 
height is less than 1m) 
AS3959 (Hines et al., 2010) 
Surface 
25 
2-20 
25A Near Surface 1-8 
Elevated 0-8 4 
Bark 0-7 1 
Canopy 10 n/a 1B 
A Surface and near surface strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell 
B Assuming 100% foliage cover 
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Table 1.6. Suggested bulk density Woodland  
Fuel Strata Bulk Density in tonnes per hectare Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3 
(Overlap will occur between strata if 
height is less than 1m) 
AS3959 (Hines et al., 2010) 
Surface 
15 
2-20 
10A Near Surface 1-8 
Elevated 0-8 2 
Bark 0-7 1 
Canopy 10 n/a 0.3B 
A Surface and near surface strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell 
B Assuming 30% foliage cover 
 
Table 1.7. Suggested bulk density Scrub  
Fuel Strata Bulk Density in tonnes per 
hectare (AS3959) 
Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3 
 
Surface 
25 
15A 
Near Surface 
Elevated 
Bark 0 
Canopy 0 10B 
A Surface, near surface and elevated strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell 
B Assuming 100% foliage cover 
 
Table 1.8. Suggested bulk density Shrub  
Fuel Strata Bulk Density in tonnes per 
hectare (AS3959) 
Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3 
 
Surface 
15 
10A 
Near Surface 
Elevated 
Bark 0 
Canopy 0 5B 
A Surface, near surface and elevated strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell 
B Assuming 100% foliage cover 
 
 
 
1.7 Implications for frontline firefighters and IMT’s 
Vegetation structure plays a critical role in the development and severity of wildfires.  
During periods of elevated fire weather conditions, mega-wildfires in through continuous 
vegetation structures (particularly in forest and woodlands), no amount of resources or water 
(see Chapters 4-6) will be able to suppress the head fire.  Firefighting strategies in these 
situations should therefore focus on areas of opportunity where vegetation structure, 
particularly surface, near surface and elevated fuels are limited and the vegetation geometry 
does not support a continuous wildfire front.  The removal of fuel immediately adjacent to 
assets and communities through ‘dry’ firefighting strategies such as backburning (see Chapter 
4) may need to be considered early in firefighting campaigns. 
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1.8 Implications for frontline fire behaviour specialists and urban planners 
To partially address the issues identified in AS3959 and increase the accuracy of modelled 
wildfire outputs the following is recommended: 
i. Classification of vegetation based solely on qualitative descriptors should not over-
ride the wildfire behaviour model applied to the scenario without due 
consideration of the wildfire behaviour expected to occur through the vegetation.  
Using the case study previously provided as an example, whilst the vegetation 
could reasonably be classified as Class A Forest or Class B Woodlands, applying 
the Noble et al wildfire behaviour model to either of these options without 
modifying the deemed fuel loads would significantly result in over-estimation of 
wildfire outputs.  In urban areas where vegetation geometry restricts wildfire 
growth, a more appropriate and accurate approach is to assess the fuel load 
utilising Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores and apply the correct vegetation availability 
factor.  Further guidance on this can be found in Chapters 2 and 3; and 
ii. Practitioners (both from fire services and land use planning perspectives) involved 
in modelling wildfire and calculating potential impacts require a sound 
understanding of the respective models and their limitations.  Caution should be 
applied when attempting to ‘simplify’ complex equations, models or engineering 
concepts in standards, guidance material or documents for use by lay persons or 
in land use planning decisions.  The profession of wildfire engineering is in its infancy 
and job titles do not necessarily equate to the knowledge and skills required to 
complete the required technical analysis or make informed and accurate 
decisions.  This can be in part be remedied by professionalization / accreditation 
of the sector and greater recognition of the role of fire safety engineers with wildfire 
backgrounds in it. 
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2. Modelling Wildfire Behaviour  
2.1 Introduction 
Understanding how wildfire behaves and how this behaviour is modelled is the next step 
for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists IMT’s and urban planners. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the relationship between wildfire inputs and the empirical wildfire behaviour models and the 
radiation view factor model adopted throughout Australia.  This chapter discusses each of the 
empirical wildfire components, whilst the radiation model is explored in the next chapter.  
Accurately modelling wildfire behaviour is important as it is used to assist determine the 
suitability of wildfire suppression strategies and tactics (Chapter 4), as well as for determining 
the suitability of development in bushfire prone areas.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Relationship between bushfire and radiation models 
 
2.2 Fire Weather 
The influence of weather on wildfire behaviour and the potential difficulty of wildfire 
suppression is considered through the use of fire danger indices (Dowdy et al., 2009).  In 
Atmospheric conditions selected (Fire Danger 
Index or Wind Speed)
Vegetation classification (fuel structure, fuel load, empirical 
model)
Site parameters (slope under vegetation and 
site slope)
WIldfire behaviour outputs empirically 
calculated (Rate of Spread, Flame Length, 
Intensity) 
Reciever inputs determined (Height of 
receiver, distance to receiver)
Geometry of the radiant heat panel determined from bushfire 
behaviour outputs (Flame Angle, Flame Height, Flame Width)
View factor calculated 
Radiant heat flux calculated
Empirical Wildfire 
model 
 
Inputs include: 
• Empirical model  
• Fuel load 
• Vegetation height 
• Wind speed 
• Slope 
 
Outputs include: 
• Rate of Spread 
• Intensity 
• Flame length 
Radiation model 
 
Inputs include: 
• Head fire width 
• Separation 
between receiver 
and head fire 
 
Outputs include: 
• Flame angle 
• View factor 
• Radiant heat flux 
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Australia, the McArthur Forest Fire Danger Index (FDI) is used to account for the effect of 
weather on forest wildfires. The FDI is calculated by (Nobel et al, 1980): 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 2𝐹𝐹(−0.45+0.987𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹)−0.0345𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅+0.0338𝑇𝑇+0.0234𝑉𝑉) (2.1) 
Where: 
DF is drought factor (given as a number between 0 and 10 representing the influence of 
recent temperatures and rainfall events on fuel availability) 
RH is relative humidity (%) 
T is temperature (C) 
V is wind speed at 10m (kph) 
 
For grassfires, the Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) is calculated by (Cruz et al, 2015) GFDI= 2exp (−23.6 + 5.01 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶) + 0.0281𝑇𝑇 − 0.266√𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 0.633�𝑈𝑈10 (2.2) 
where: 
C is degree of curing (%) 
T is air temperature (°C) 
RH is relative humidity (%) 
U10 is average wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1) 
 
Whilst Dowdy et al. (2009, Figure 2, p10) report the 95th and 99th percentile FDI’s throughout 
Australia from 2000 to 2007, future projected changes in FDI forecast widespread increases in 
the severity of near-surface fire weather throughout Australia (Dowdy, 2018; Dowdy et al., 
2019) as illustrated in Figure 2.2.  Alternatively, AS3959 provides alternate FDI datasets, 
summarised in Table 2.1.   
 
Figure 2.2. The 99th (upper panel) and 95th (lower panel) percentiles of the FDI. (image from Dowdy 
et al. 2009, used with permission from the Bureau of Meteorology) 
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Table 2.1: FDI and GFDI (excluding alpine areas) 
Jurisdiction Forest Fire Danger Index Grassland Fire Danger 
Index 
Australian Capital Territory 100 130 
New South Wales 80-100 110-130 
Northern Territory 40 50 
Queensland 40 50 
South Australia 80 110 
Tasmania 50 70 
Victoria 100 130 
Western Australia 80 110 
 
During extreme wildfire events strong and deep convection can occur within the fire 
plume (Dowdy et al., 2019).  This phenomenon is termed pyroconvection.  Condensation of 
moisture within the fire plume can release latent heat, resulting in enhanced convection and 
the formation of clouds known as pyrocumulus.   In severe cases thunderstorms, (known as 
pyrocumulonimbus), and pyrogenic lightning may result in multiple additional wildfire ignitions.  
The feedback processes involved in such extreme weather events includes significant 
variations in surface wind speed and direction that results in unpredictable and dangerous 
wildfire behaviour and directional changes (Peace et al. 2017; Potter, 2012).  The Continuous 
Haines index (CH) is a numerical index between 0-13 which provides an indication of how dry 
and unstable the atmosphere is above the surface and therefore the potential for the 
formation of dangerous pyroconvective processes (Dowdy et al, 2019; Mills & McCaw, 2010; 
Potter, 2012; Potter, 2018).  Values of 10 or more are considered significant and require 
additional vigilance to be exercised during wildfire suppression efforts.  
The CH is calculated by (Dowdy et al, 2019; Mills and McCaw, 2010): 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 = 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (2.3) 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 = 0.5(𝑇𝑇850 − 𝑇𝑇750 − 4) (2.4) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹850 − 3)3  (2.5) 
if 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 > 5, then 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 5 + 0.5(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 5) (2.6) 
 
Where: 
CA is the Stability Score based on the temperature difference T850 – T700, where T850 and 
T700 are the temperatures at 850 hPa and 700 hPa, respectively. 
CB is the Humidity Score based on the 850hPa dew point depression (DD850): equal to 
T850 – DP850, where DP850 is the dew point temperature at 850 hPa. 
 
2.3 Rate of Spread 
During the initial stages of a wildfire only a few particles on the top of the surface fuels will 
be involved, with flame spread influenced by the direct contact of the flames with surrounding 
unburned fuel (Cheney & Gould, 1997).   As the fire size grows, convective preheating of 
surrounding fuels occur and flame height increases resulting in more fuel becoming available.  
McAlpine (1988) suggests that, influenced by both the wind and topography, the fire continues 
to grow in size and accelerate until it achieves a quasi-steady rate of spread (RoS).   
In point source accelerating fire scenarios, whereby the developing fire originating from 
a single ignition point is yet to grow sufficiently to reach the quasi-steady 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 required to 
support the assumptions used in landscape scale wildfire behaviour, the accelerating head 
A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020 
 
2-4 
 
fire rate of spread 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 (km/h) in forest and woodland fuels is given by (McAlpine, 1998; Van 
Wagner, 1985): 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(1 − 𝐹𝐹−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽) (2.7) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the equilibrium/potential head fire rate of spread (km/h), t  is the time since 
ignition (h), and β (h−1) is a constant related to how rapidly the head fire accelerates. A 
reasonable first estimate for β can be established using the assumption that the fire will 
accelerate to 90% of the equilibrium rate of spread in 30 minutes (i.e., 0.5 h) for treed 
vegetation structures, including forest and woodlands. The attainment of the 90% equilibrium 
rate of spread 30 minutes post ignition within treed fuel structures is supported by the findings 
of Gould et al (2007); Kucuk et al (2007); Van Wagner (1985); and Cheney (1981). 
Stevenson (Penney & Stevenson, 2019) identified that applying this to Equation (1) gives 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
= 0.9 and t = 0.5, as illustrated below to solve the fire acceleration parameter (𝛽𝛽): 
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It is worth noting that the value of 𝛽𝛽 = 0.0768 stated in previous work by McAlpine (1998) is 
in units of (min−1). This would only be appropriate in the current setting if the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 were 
considered in km/min rather than km/h. 
For modelling purposes, the time since ignition may not be known, therefore the ability to 
determine the rate of spread of an accelerating fire in terms of distance travelled since ignition 
is required. As 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 is the rate of change of distance D (km) with respect to time, it follows that 
aRoSdt
dD
= . 
By integrating Equation (2.7) with respect to time, and setting D(0) = 0, the distance 
travelled post ignition can be expressed as: 






−+=
−
ββ
β 1tetRoSD  (2.8) 
From Equation (7) we know that 





 −−=
RoS
RoSt a1ln1
β
, 
which when inserted this into Equation (2), enables distance travelled post ignition to be 
written as: 


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 (2.9) 
or alternatively as: 


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


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
 −+−=
RoS
RoS
RoS
RoS
RoS
D aa 1lnβ  (2.10) 
Equation (10) can be used to determine the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 of an accelerating head fire 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 at a 
specified distance D from the point source ignition with the equilibrium rate of spread. The 
problem is that it is not possible to re-arrange Equation (10) to express 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 as a function of D. 
To resolve this issue a plot of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 is numerically generated against 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 which can be used to 
approximate the ratio 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 (and hence 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎) for a given value of the ratio 
𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
. Such a plot is 
given in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3. Plot of the ratio 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 against 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
. 
Head fire spread distance at a given time can be calculated using the equation McAlpine 
(1988, Eqn 5):  
 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �𝐴𝐴 + 𝐹𝐹−0.0768𝛽𝛽0.0768 − 10.0768� (2.11) 
 
Where: 
D is the head fire spread distance at time t  
RoS is the potential head fire rate of spread 
t is the elapsed time since ignition 
 
The fire will continue to accelerate with an increasing forward RoS until it attains a quasi-
steady rate.  Whilst Cheney and Gould (1997) report this may not occur in forest fuels until a 
head fire width of approximately 150m is reached, Penney (2017) identifies the more 
conservative figure of 100m, which is subsequently consistent with the calculations of Van 
Wager, is adopted for modelling purposes by both AS3959-2009 Construction of buildings in 
bushfire prone areas (AS3959) and NSWFRS (2016).  During catastrophic bushfires, the scale 
and intensity of the bushfire itself can result in air-flow and wind conditions generated by the 
fire itself (Dold & Zinoviev, 2009) and subsequently ‘explosive’ bushfire behaviour similar to 
flashover phenomena experienced in structural firefighting response (Chatelon, 
Sauvagnargues, Dusserre, & Balbi, 2014). 
 
 
 
RoS is calculated in treed fuel structures of forest, woodland and rainforest using (Noble et 
al, 1980 cited in AS3959): 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0.0012 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 × 𝑤𝑤 (2.12) 
Where: 
RoS is the potential rate of spread (kph), also simply referred to as rate of spread 
FDI is Fire Danger Index (dimensionless) 
w is surface fuel load (t/ha) 
 
Alternatively, for dry eucalypt forest, potential quasi-steady rate of spread (RSS) can be 
calculated using the Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores (Gould et al, 2007) discussed in Chapter 1: 
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𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = �𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽 + 𝑏𝑏0(𝑉𝑉10 − 𝑉𝑉𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏1𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝑏𝑏2𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅ℎ���∅𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓�̇ �∅𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓�̇  (2.13) 
where:  
Rss is the potential quasi-steady rate of spread (m/h) 
Rt is the threshold rate of spread of 5kph at the threshold wind speed (Ut)  
V10 is mean wind speed at 10m in the open (kph) 
Vt is threshold wind speed 5kph 
Sfhs is surface fuel hazard score 
NSfhs is near surface fuel hazard score 
NSh is near surface fuel height 
b0 – b4 are regression constants b0 = 1.132; b1 = 0.904; b2 = 0.279; b3 = 0.611; b4 = 0.013 
ØMf is fine fuel moisture function 
ØSf is slope function 
 
And (Gould et al., 2007, Eqn. 5)  
∅𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 = �𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓−1.495� 0.0545⁄  (2.14) 
 
where: 
Mf is fine fuel moisture content (%) 
And ∅𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓  is calculated by (Gould et al., 2007, Eqn. 6)  
 
∅𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(0.069𝜃𝜃) (2.15) 
 
where: 
Ɵ is slope of the ground (degrees) 
 
 
 
For shrubland and scrub, RoS is calculated by Anderson et al, (2015): RoS = 5.67(0.67 U10)0.91 H0.22 e (-0.076MC) (2.16) 
 
where: 
H is height of the fuel bed (m) 
U10 is average wind speed at 10m out in the open 
MC is moisture content 
 
Alternatively, it may be calculated using Cruz et al (2013): RoS = 0.023𝑉𝑉1.21𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅0.54 (2.17) 
where: 
VH is the average height of the classified vegetation (m) 
V is average wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1) 
 
 
 
For grassland, RoS is calculated by Putron (1982): 
 RoS = 0.13𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 (2.18) 
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Corrections for slope 
 
When using equations 8 and 12-14, RoS can be corrected for the effects of slope by 
(AS3959):  
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹(0.069 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  (2.19) 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹(−0.069 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  (2.20) 
where: 
Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h) 
R is the forward rate of spread determined  
slope is the slope (degrees) 
 
Cruz et al (2015) however suggest this approach will grossly over-estimate the effect of 
slope and subsequently will result in an under-prediction of downslope RoS.  To address this 
downslope RoS should be corrected by: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅 exp (−0.069𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹)2 exp(−0.069𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹) − 1  (2.21) 
where: 
Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h) 
R is the forward rate of spread determined  
slope is the slope (degrees)  
 
2.4 Flame front residence time 
Residence time is defined as the time the flaming zone takes to pass over a given point.  
There is some variance in the literature regarding typical residence time in forest fuels.  Fire 
service literature (DFES, 2014) suggests in forest fuels a figure of between 45 to 60 seconds can 
be expected.  During the development of firefighting vehicle crew protection systems, Nichols, 
Canderle, Knight and Leonard (2003, p2) identified it was reasonable to expect “residence 
times of several minutes,” however the peak of the burover intensity will last between 15-30 
seconds as the fine bushfire fuels are consumed.  This is consistent with the findings of Linton 
(2016) in her report into the burnovers experienced during the 2012 Black Cat Creek Fire. 
Wotton, Gould, McCaw, Cheney and Taylor (2012, p270) reported longer periods as the 
“average flame-front residence time for eucalypt forest fuels was 37 seconds and did not vary 
significantly with fine fuel moisture, fuel quantity or bulk density.”  Poon (2003) describes a 
significantly longer flame residence time as lasting 1-2 minutes and mainly involving the fine 
fuels of twigs, ground litter and foliage, yet in the same report he identifies a residence time of 
60 seconds as being appropriate for modelling purposes.   Smith (2013) identifies residence 
time may be calculated using: 
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 = 𝐹𝐹
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 (2.22) 
 
Where: 
TR is residence time (minutes) 
D is flame depth (m) 
RoS is rate of spread (m/hr) 
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2.5 Flame length and height 
Flame length (Lf) will increase as the fire develops from ignition to a bushfire of landscape 
proportions.  It is also affected by numerous other factors influencing the fire behaviour 
including fuel structure, wind speed and topography.  Flame height is the vertical height of the 
flame above the ground as illustrated in Figure 2.4 and will vary depending on the inclination 
of the ground, the flame length and the flame angle.  Whilst Linton (2016) reports flame heights 
of between 8-10m during the fatal Black Cat Creek bushfire, Cruz et al. (2012) reports flame 
heights 10-20m above the crowns of trees were experienced during the Black Saturday Kilmore 
East fire.  The flame heights experienced by crews on Black Saturday are also consistent with 
reports of flames encountered by crews during the 2016 Yarloop Waroona fire in Western 
Australia. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Flame length and height 
Flame length (LF) in treed fuel structures including those involved in Australian bushfire 
events can be calculated using the equation (AS3959, Eqn B2): 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 = 13𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹 + 0.24𝑊𝑊2  
 
(2.23) 
where: 
Lf is flame length (m) 
W is the total fuel load (t/ha) 
Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h) 
 
Flame height can also be calculated using the assigned hazard scores (Gould, 2007, Eqn. 
7):  
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 0.0193 × 𝑅𝑅0.723 × 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�0.64𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓ℎ� (2.24) 
 
where: 
Hf is flame height (m) 
R is head fire rate of spread 
Efh is elevated fuel height (m) 
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2.6 Fire line intensity 
Current vehicle protection systems utilised in Western Australian fire service vehicles have 
been tested against fire line intensities of between 2.5-10MW/m and designed to withstand 
7.5MW/m (Nichols, Gould, Knight, Leonard, & Brown, 2005).  Comparatively, Cruz, et al. (2012) 
report average fire line intensities experienced during the Black Saturday Kilmore East Fire in 
2009 of 88MW/m.   Dold, Zinoviev and Leslie, (2011) describe bushfires as eruptive and unstable 
combustion involving a process of dynamic interaction between RoS and fire line intensity (I).  
A critical component of the fireline intensity is the heat of combustion, defined as the amount 
of heat released when a unit quantity of fuel is oxidised completely to yield stable end 
products (SFPE, 1-93).  Common values for H are identified in Table 2.2.  AS3959 details that I, in 
kW/m and corrected for slope, is calculated using Byram’s fireline intensity equation.   
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠/36 (2.25) 
Where: 
H is the heat of combustion (kJ/kg), shown in table 2.2 
W is total fuel load (t/ha) 
 
Table 2.2. Heat of Combustion 
Fuel Heat of Combustion (kJ/kg) Source 
Wood (European Beech) 19500 SFPE Table 1-5.3 
Wood (Ponderosa Pine) 19400 SFPE Table 1-5.3 
Australian vegetation 18600 AS3959 
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2.7 Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s  
This chapter covers the basic modelling of wildfire development and behaviour.  As the 
suitability of firefighting strategies are gauged against these inputs it is essential that all 
firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s alike not only understand the presented models, 
but are effective in accurately applying them.  Incorrect predictions may result in 
inappropriate strategies being devised, leaving frontline personnel exposed to overwhelming 
wildfire conditions with potentially fatal consequences (see Chapters 5 and 7).  Whilst fire 
behaviour specialists are required to accurately and competently predict wildfire behaviour, 
all personnel from firefighters to the IMT should be able to verify predictions thereby increasing 
the margin for safety for both firefighters and the community. 
 
2.8 Implications for urban planners 
Perhaps the greatest implications for urban planners apply to assessments of potential 
wildfire behaviour in urban areas where the landscape scale wildfire behaviour assumed in 
AS3959 and many of the planning guidelines is not possible.  Where vegetation fuel bed 
geometry (refer back to Chapter 1) prevents the development of a quasi-steady RoS (refer to 
section 2.3 of this chapter), as reported in recent studies (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), failure to 
adequately adjust inputs may result in the significant over-calculation of potential wildfire 
behaviour.  This can be in part be remedied by deference in such instances to suitably 
qualified fire safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds that can provide quantified analysis 
and an appropriate level of fire safety engineering rigor to design solutions. 
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3. Wildfire radiant heat flux 
3.1 Introduction 
Thermal radiation is the energy emitted from a body due to the internal temperature of 
the surface that is transported by photons capable of traveling through a perfect vacuum 
(Massoud, 2005).  The rate of transfer of radiation across a given surface is known as radiant 
heat flux.  Humans can only be exposed to relatively small levels of radiation before feeling 
pain and suffering other debilitating effects, hence it becomes a crucial factor in determining 
tenability on the fireground (see Chapter 5).  Even prior to the attainment of a quasi-steady 
Rate of Spread (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅), radiation quickly becomes the primary mechanism of heat transfer from 
a bushfire and impacts the receiving body well before direct flame impingement occurs 
(Leonard, 2009; Sullivan, Ellis, & Knight, 2003; Wotton, Gould, McCaw, Cheney, & Taylor, 2012).  
This chapter builds upon Chapter 2, discussing the calculation of radiant heat flux from wildfires 
and other vegetation fires occuring in small fuel beds.  Understanding wildfire radiant heat flux 
is critical as it has impacts on firefighter and civilian tenability, as well as signficant implications 
for land use planning and construction in areas prone to wildfire in Australia. 
 
3.2 Radiant heat flux 
In order to empirically calculate the radiant heat flux during a bushfire event the chaotic 
flame front is geometrically represented by a uniform parallelepiped black body radiant heat 
panel (Sullivan, Ellis & Knight, 2003; Tan, Midgley & Douglas, 2005; Mendham, 2013) as illustrated 
in Figure 3.1.  The horizontal position of the panel in relation to the flame is determined to be 
directly below the middle of the extended flame panel (Sullivan, Ellis & Knight, 2003) as shown 
in Figure 2.  Both the flame temperature and emissivity are assumed to be consistent across 
the panel, whilst AS3959 also assumes the receiving body is perpendicular to the approaching 
fire front.   
 
Figure 3.1: Geometrical representation of the flame front. 
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Figure 3.2: Geometrical representation of the flame front – side view. 
 
Radiant heat flux is calculated using the equation:  
𝑞𝑞 = 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸 (3.1) 
where 𝑞𝑞 is the radiant heat flux in kW/m2, 𝜏𝜏 is the atmospheric transmissivity, 𝐸𝐸 is the flame 
emissive power in kW/m2 and 𝜏𝜏 is the view factor.  
 
3.3 Atmospheric transmissivity 
With reference to Figure 3.3, atmospheric transmissivity (τ) is calculated using the following 
steps: 
Calculate path length (𝐿𝐿):  If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐, then 𝐿𝐿 = 0 (3.2) 
or If 𝑑𝑑 > 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐, then 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 (3.3) 
 
where 𝑑𝑑 is the distance between the fuel bed and the receiver (m), 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the flame length 
(m) and 𝑐𝑐 is the flame angle (in degrees) that maximizes the view factor, calculated in 
accordance with the algorithm shown in Figure 3.4 (AS3959). 
The atmospheric transmissivity is then calculated as follows: If  𝐿𝐿 =  0, then 𝜏𝜏 =  1 
or If 𝐿𝐿 ≠  0, then 𝜏𝜏 =  𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎2𝐿𝐿2 + 𝑎𝑎3𝐿𝐿3 + 𝑎𝑎4𝐿𝐿4 (3.4) 
 
where 𝐿𝐿 is the path length and 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 is the coefficient calculated by 
𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝐶𝐶1𝑙𝑙 + 𝐶𝐶2𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 + 𝐶𝐶3𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 + 𝐶𝐶4𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (3.5) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 is the ambient temperature, 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 is the flame temperature, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the relative 
humidity; and 𝐶𝐶1𝑙𝑙, 𝐶𝐶2𝑙𝑙, 𝐶𝐶3𝑙𝑙 and 𝐶𝐶4𝑙𝑙 are constants defined in Table 3.1 (AS3959, Table B3, 
reproduced with the permission of SAI Global on behalf of Standards Australia). 
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Table 3.1: Constants used in Equation 3.5. 
n C1n C2n C3n C4n 
0 1.486 -2.003 × 10-3 4.68 × 10-5 -6.052 × 10-2 
1 1.225 × 10-2 -5.900 × 10-5 1.66 × 10-6 -1.759 × 10-3 
2 -1.489 × 10-4 6.893 × 10-7 -1.922 × 10-8 2.092 × 10-5 
3 8.381 × 10-7 -3.823 × 10-9 1.0511 × 10-10 -1.166 × 10-7 
4 -1.685 × 10-9 7.637 × 10-12 -2.085 × 10-13 2.350 × 10-10 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Typical building and fire front configuration. 
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Figure 3.4: Flame angle algorithm (Copied by Greg Penney with the permission of SAI Global on behalf 
of Standards Australia). 
3.4 Flame temperature  
Drysdale (2011) identifies that flames emit radiation within the visible spectrum with a dull 
red glow at approximately 823K.  As the flame temperature (𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓) increases, the flame colour 
changes as detailed in Table 3.2.  Poon (2003) identifies that the predominantly ‘reddish-
orange’ colour of bushfire flames suggests a flame temperature of approximately 1273K, which 
is supported by Rossi, Simeoni, Moretti and Leroy-Cancellieri (2011) who report a flame 
temperature of 1200K is appropriate for large wildland fires.  AS3959 (2009) adopts a flame 
temperature of 1080K and assumes a uniform temperature across the flame surface.  
Conversley, the approximate maximum flame temperature reported in the research by 
Wotton, Gould, McCaw, Cheney and Taylor (2012) was 1373K.    
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Table 3.2: Visual colour of flame. 
Temperature (K) Appearance 
823 Red glow 
973 Dull red 
1173 Cherry red 
1373 Orange 
1673 White 
 
3.5 Emissivity 
Emissivity (𝜀𝜀) is the ratio of the energy of radiated from a material’s surface to that radiated 
from a blackbody (perfect emitter) at the same temperature and wavelength and under the 
same conditions (NPL, 2014).  It is a dimensionless number between 0 (a perfect reflector) and 
1 (a perfect emitter).  During small scale experiments representative of a bushfire in the early 
stages of development, Boulet et. al. (2009) reported emissivity of up to 0.74 in flames lengths 
of 4m.  AS3959 (2009, CB10.2) adopts a flame emissivity of 0.95 across the flame surface using 
the justification that “bushfire flames under design2 fire weather scenarios are generally 
optically thick (𝜀𝜀~1). "  This value is consistent with the findings of Agueda, Pastor and Perez, 
cited in Rossi, Simeoni, Moretti and Leroy-Cancellieri (2011) who report the emissivity of large 
wildland fires as being able to be considered close to the emissivity of a perfect emitter and 
assigned an emissivity of 0.90.  Poon (2003, p26) however, suggests the use of “an emissivity 
close to 1 may not be a reasonable approximation of the emissive power from the flame front” 
and subsequently assumes a flame emissivity of 0.6 justifying this figure as “equivalent to a 
flame depth of about 5m” (Poon, 2003, Table 12, p38).   
 
The flame emissive power (𝐸𝐸) is calculated by: 
𝐸𝐸 = 𝜎𝜎ɛ𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓4 (3.6) 
 
where 𝜎𝜎 is the Stefan-Boltzman constant of 5.67x10-11 kWm-2K-4, 𝜀𝜀 is the flame emissivity and 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 
is the flame temperature. 
 
3.6 View factor 
The view factor (𝜏𝜏) is a geometrical factor ranging from 0 to 1 which is related to the extent 
that the fire front fills the field of view looking from the site toward the flame. A value of 𝜏𝜏 = 1 
indicates that the entire field of view consists of flame (i.e. not even sky), while a value of 𝜏𝜏 = 0 
indicates that the fire front is completely out of view. As such, it is the view factor that must 
incorporate the impact of non-combustible obstructions on the radiant heat flux. To address 
this issue, this section proposes an alternate view factor model to that presented in AS3959. 
In the absence of shielding bodies and referring to Figure 3.3, calculation of the view 
factor in the wildfire context is expressed as: 
 
If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐) then 
𝜏𝜏 = 1  (3.7) 
otherwise, if 𝑑𝑑 > 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐) then 
 
2 A design fire scenario is a specific fire scenario on which the analysis will be conducted, 
and a design fire is a quantitative description of assumed fire characteristics within the design 
fire scenario.  
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𝜏𝜏 = 1
𝜋𝜋
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑋𝑋1
�1 + 𝑋𝑋12 tan−1 � 𝑌𝑌1�1 + 𝑋𝑋12� + 𝑌𝑌1�1 + 𝑌𝑌12 tan−1 � 𝑋𝑋1�1 + 𝑌𝑌12� +                           𝑋𝑋2
�1 + 𝑋𝑋22 tan−1 � 𝑌𝑌2�1 + 𝑋𝑋22� + 𝑌𝑌2�1 + 𝑌𝑌22 tan−1 � 𝑋𝑋2�1 + 𝑌𝑌22�⎭⎪⎬
⎪
⎫
 (3.8) 
where 
𝑋𝑋1 = 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 sin(𝑐𝑐) − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos(𝑐𝑐) tan(𝜃𝜃) − 𝑑𝑑 tan(𝜃𝜃) − ℎ𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐)  (3.9) 
𝑋𝑋2 = ℎ + �𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐)�tan (𝜃𝜃)𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐)  (3.10) 
𝑌𝑌1 = 𝑌𝑌2 = 0.5𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐) (3.11) 
 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the flame length (m), 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 is the flame width/head fire width (m), 𝑐𝑐 is the flame angle 
(degrees), 𝜃𝜃 is the slope of the land between the site and vegetation fuel bed (degrees), 𝑑𝑑 is 
the horizontal distance between the site and the base of the vegetation fuel bed (m), and ℎ is 
the elevation of the receiver (m). Figure 3.3 provides an illustration of these variable in relation 
to a typical site and fire front. In order to consider the worst case scenario, the view factor is 
maximised with respect to the flame angle 𝑐𝑐. To do this, the optimization algorithm in Figure 4 
(AS3959) is used. 
 
 
 
Within the urban environment, substantial non-combustible structures may stand between 
the receiving body and the fire front. For modelling purposes, these structures include 
significant walls or buildings, but not tin fencing or the like. Ignoring the impact of these 
structures on view factor may result in significant over estimation of wildfire impacts (Penney & 
Richardson, 2019). In order to incorporate the impact of non-combustible obstructions, the 
total combined view factor of the obstructions must be calculated and then subtracted from 
the unobstructed view factor given by Equations (3.7–3.11). This approach may be suitable for 
empirical calculation of radiant heat flux when firefighters are seeking shelter behind a 
substantial structure, however it is not suitable for use where firefighters are sheltering behind a 
fire appliance as the fire front will be significantly wider than the shielding body.  Flames may 
also travel underneath and over the top of an appliance, drawn down the far side by an eddy 
caused by flame and air movements (Mangan, 1997).   
In describing the details of this approach, Penney and Richardson (2019) generalise 
Equations (3.7–3.11) and re-write them as follows: 
1. Equations (3.8) and (3.11) impose the assumption that the site is horizontally central 
with respect to the fire front. This assumption will be relaxed to allow the calculation 
of view factors for obstructions and fire fronts which are not centrally aligned to 
the site. 
2. Equations (3.7–3.11) are formulated in terms of parameters specifically referencing 
the fire front (not an obstruction). Furthermore, although convenient from a 
computational perspective, they are not presented in a means that offers 
significant geometrical insight. The equations will be reformulated in terms of view 
angles from the site to the fire front or obstruction(s). 
The first step is to generalise and amend the existing view factor model. The second step 
is to consider the effect of shielding obstructions.  
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Figure 3.6 displays a generalised geometrical representation of the side view of a fire front 
and site. Consistent with the view factor calculation assumptions of AS3959, an inclined flame 
is approximated by a vertical flame with the same height as the inclined flame (height 
measured vertically from the highest point of the flame to the ground directly below) and 
located in the middle of the inclined flame. 
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Figure 3.6: Geometrical representation of the side view of the site and vertical approximation 
of a fire front. 
With reference to Figure 6, and Equations (9) and (10), it becomes evident that:  
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖) 
�1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2 = sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖) 
 
for 𝑓𝑓 = 1,2. 
 
Figure 3.7 displays a generalised geometrical bird’s-eye view of the fire front and site. 
Equation (8) enforces the assumption that the site is horizontally central with respect to the fire 
front by setting 𝑊𝑊1 = 𝑊𝑊2 = 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓2 , however wildfires may not be centered with respect to the 
receiving structure. To reflect this, Figure 9 represents a generalised asymmetrical case. 
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Figure 3.7: Geometrical representation of the birds-eye view of the site and vertical 
approximation of a fire front. 
With reference to Figure 7, and Equation (11), it becomes evident that: 
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) 
�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2 = sec(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) 
 
 
for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2. 
 
Figure 3.8 displays a three dimensional representation of the upper-left quadrant of the 
fire-front relative to the site, and the four angles 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑓𝑓 = 1,2, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2. The indexing 
of quadrants is summarised in Table 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.8: Geometrical representation of the upper-left quadrant of the fire front relative to 
the site. 
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Table 3.3: Indexing of quadrants. 
𝒊𝒊 𝒋𝒋 Quadrant 
1 1 Upper-left 
1 2 Upper-right 
2 2 Lower-right 
2 1 Lower-left 
With reference to Figure 3.8, it becomes evident that: 
  
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
�1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2 = tan�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗�sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖) = tan�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2 = tan(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖)sec�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗� = tan�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�  
   
for 𝑓𝑓 = 1,2.  
  
 
Accordingly, the generalised view factor for a rectangular approximation to a fire front or 
obstruction that does not pass through the site can be expressed as: 
𝜏𝜏 = 12𝜋𝜋��
⎝
⎛ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
�1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2 tan−1 � 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗�1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2� + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2 tan−1 ⎝⎛ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2⎠⎞⎠⎞
2
𝑗𝑗=1
2
𝑖𝑖=1
 
= 12𝜋𝜋���tan(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖)sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖) tan−1�tan�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�� + tan�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗�sec�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗� tan−1�tan�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗���2𝑗𝑗=12𝑖𝑖=1  = 12𝜋𝜋���sin(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖)𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + sin�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�2
𝑗𝑗=1
2
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
(3.12) 
where the angles 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑓𝑓 = 1,2, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2 are as defined in Figures 3.8–3.10. 
Consistent with Equation (3.7), if the vertical approximation to the flame front lies on or behind 
the site (relative to the direction of travel of the fire front) the view factor is assigned the value 
𝜏𝜏 = 1. 
 
 
 
The method for calculating the view factor of a flame front that is at least partially 
obstructed by non-combustible structures incorporates greater complexity than the existing 
model of AS3959 which does not consider the impact of obstructions on radiant heat flux. To 
assist with the discussion we describe the method with reference to the (𝑎𝑎,𝛽𝛽, 𝜈𝜈) coordinate 
system illustrated in Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9: The (𝑎𝑎,𝛽𝛽, 𝜈𝜈) coordinate system. 
The 𝑎𝑎 component is the distance from the site measured in the 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑦𝑦 plane, 𝛽𝛽 is the angle 
in the 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑦𝑦 plane measured anticlockwise from the positive 𝑒𝑒-axis when viewed from above 
(i.e. 𝑧𝑧 > 0), and 𝜈𝜈 is the vertical angle measured from the 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑦𝑦 plane with positive values for 
𝑧𝑧 > 0, and negative values for 𝑧𝑧 < 0. 
The view factor calculation method is based on a discretisation of the fire front with 
respect to 𝛽𝛽 as illustrated in Figure 3.10. 
 
Figure 3.10: The discretisation of the fire front with respect to 𝛽𝛽 using 6 uniformly distributed 
values {𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=16  looking from above. Note that 𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2,𝛽𝛽3 > 0 while 𝛽𝛽4,𝛽𝛽5,𝛽𝛽6 < 0. 
The discretisation consists of a total of  𝐴𝐴 uniformly distributed values {𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=1𝑙𝑙 , with minimum 
value  𝛽𝛽1 corresponding to the leftmost edge of the flame front (looking from above), and 
maximum value 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 corresponding to the rightmost edge. 
Consider the vertical rectangle illustrated in Figure 3.11. 
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Figure 3.11: Any rectangle specified by a set of angles 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, 𝜈𝜈𝑈𝑈, and 𝜈𝜈𝐿𝐿 will have the same 
view factor relative to the site. Note that  𝜈𝜈𝑈𝑈 > 0 and 𝜈𝜈𝐿𝐿 < 0, while 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 > 0 and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 > 0. 
In order to calculate the view factor of the Figure 3.11 rectangle using Equation (3.12), the 
angles are set as follows: 
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 (3.13) 
A single flame front with top edge coordinates denoted {(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈)}𝑖𝑖=1𝑙𝑙  and bottom edge 
coordinates denoted {(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿)}𝑖𝑖=1𝑙𝑙  is illustrated in Figure 3.12. 
 
Figure 3.12: A flame front with top and bottom edge coordinates ��𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹, 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓, 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈��𝑓𝑓=14  and 
��𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓
𝐹𝐹, 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓, 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿��𝑓𝑓=14  respectively. 
We now consider a collection of 𝑀𝑀 obstructions with top edge coordinates denoted 
��𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈��𝑖𝑖=𝑙𝑙1𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙2𝑗𝑗  and bottom edge coordinates denoted ��𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿��𝑖𝑖=𝑙𝑙1𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙2𝑗𝑗  for  𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀. Note 
that 1 ≤ 𝐴𝐴1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝐴𝐴 for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀 since the obstruction(s) may not span the full horizontal 
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angular extent of the fire front when viewed from the site, and any part of an obstruction lying 
beyond the angular extent of the fire front does not impact the view factor calculation. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3.13. 
 
Figure 3.13: An obstruction may only partially obstruct the fire front and will only obstruct 
the fire front if it lies within the angular region. 
The calculation of the view factor 𝜏𝜏 subject to shielding obstructions proceeds as follows: 
If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐) (i.e. the center of the inclined flame is directly above or behind the site, so 
the vertical approximation to the fire front is on top of the site) then 
𝜏𝜏 = 1, 
otherwise 
1. Calculate the view factor 𝜏𝜏𝐹𝐹 of the unobstructed vertical approximation to the fire 
front by setting 𝑓𝑓 = 1, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴, 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈1𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈 and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 = 𝜈𝜈1𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 in Equation (3.13), and then 
substituting the resulting angles into Equation (3.12). 
2. In order to accommodate non-rectangular obstructions, the obstructed view 
factor 𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂 is calculated by approximating the obstructions using thin rectangles 
defined within the angular increments from 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 to 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1 for 𝑓𝑓 = 1,2, … ,𝐴𝐴 − 1. For each 
angular increment, the obstructed view factor 𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖  is calculated by determining the 
maximum value of 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 and minimum value of 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿 for the obstructions that lie 
between the flame front and the site. If 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 > 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈, then 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈 is used to denote the 
top of the obstructing rectangle, as any part of the obstruction extending above 
the flame front does not actually block the view of the flame front. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3.14. 
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Figure 3.14. (Left) Obstruction 2 completely blocks the fire front from the site, so 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈  as the part of 
Obstruction 2 that extends above the view line of the top of the fire front does not contribute to blocking 
the fire front. (Right) Obstruction 1 partially blocks the fire front from the site, so 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1𝑈𝑈. 
Similarly, if 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿 < 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿, then 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 is used to denote the bottom of the obstructing 
rectangle. Denoting the angle to the top and bottom of the obstructing rectangle 
on increment 𝑓𝑓 as 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 respectively, it follows that  
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴{𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈} 
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴{𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿} 
 
where  
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈 = max�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�: 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖� 
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 = max�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�: 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖� 
𝐹𝐹(𝑒𝑒) = �0, 𝑒𝑒 < 01, 𝑒𝑒 ≥ 0 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = �𝑗𝑗:𝐴𝐴1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑓𝑓 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2𝑗𝑗� 
The obstructing view factor 𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖  for each angular increment 𝑓𝑓 = 1,2, … ,𝐴𝐴 − 1 is 
calculated by setting 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑓𝑓 + 1 in Equation (3.13), and then substituting the resulting 
angles into Equation (3.12). 
3. Calculate the total obstructed view factor 
 
𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂 = �𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙−1
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
4. Calculate the view factor of the partially obstructed flame front 
𝜏𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏𝐹𝐹 − 𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂. 
 
 
In order to consider the worst case view factor with respect to the flame angle in this 
approach, four modifications need to be made to the optimisation algorithm illustrated in 
Figure 4: 
1. In the original algorithm the initial value (lowest value) of the flame angle 
considered in is the site slope 𝜃𝜃. This is not a valid angle in the case that an 
obstruction exists between the flame front and the site, as it effectively allows the 
fire front to penetrate the obstruction. To avoid this situation it is necessary to set 
the initial flame angle such that the fire front would clear the obstruction. This 
amounts to setting 
𝑐𝑐0 = tan−1 �tan(𝜃𝜃) + max � ℎ𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)
𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂
𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)� :𝐴𝐴1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑓𝑓 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀� 
when  𝑒𝑒 > min�𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖):𝐴𝐴1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑓𝑓 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀�. Note that 𝜃𝜃 denotes the site slope, and 
ℎ𝑂𝑂
𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) and 𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) denote the maximum height and 𝑒𝑒 component of obstruction 𝑗𝑗 at angle 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 relative to the site. 
A further complication could arise if the center of the fire front lies in front of the 
obstruction when the base of the fire front lies behind the obstruction. The issue in 
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this instance is that the obstruction would not have an impact on the view factor. 
To avoid this situation the minimum flame angle is required to satisfy 
𝑐𝑐0 ≥ max �cos−1 �2�𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) − 𝜀𝜀�𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 � :𝐴𝐴1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑓𝑓 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀� 
when 𝑒𝑒 > min�𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖):𝐴𝐴1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑓𝑓 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀�. Note that 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the flame length, and 𝜀𝜀 is 
a small positive number (e.g. 10-6). 
2. If the fire front is positioned on top of an obstruction, the flame angle 𝑐𝑐0 is set to 90 
degrees to effectively consider the fire front as being behind the obstruction. In this 
case, the algorithm is not required to proceed further to determine an optimal 
value of 𝑐𝑐0. 
3. Since the algorithm does not start with the flame angle 𝑐𝑐0 equal to the site slope 
𝜃𝜃, it is possible that the initial value of 𝑐𝑐0 could turn out to be the flame angle that 
optimises the view factor. The standard optimisation algorithm of AS3959 
terminates or refines its search increment when the view factors 𝜏𝜏0, 𝜏𝜏1, and 𝜏𝜏2, 
which correspond to the flame angles  𝑐𝑐0 < 𝑐𝑐1 < 𝑐𝑐2 satisfy 𝜏𝜏1 ≥ 𝜏𝜏0  and 𝜏𝜏1 > 𝜏𝜏2, 
however, if 𝜏𝜏0 > 𝜏𝜏1 at the first step the algorithm will not terminate. Hence the 
additional termination or refinement criteria, 𝜏𝜏0 > 𝜏𝜏1 must be added to the 
algorithm in addition to the existing criteria (i.e., (𝜏𝜏1 ≥ 𝜏𝜏0 and 𝜏𝜏1 > 𝜏𝜏2) or 𝜏𝜏0 > 𝜏𝜏1). 
4. In the case that the obstruction completely obscures the line of sight from the 
building site to the top of the flame front, the optimisation algorithm will never 
terminate as it will not be able to identify a non-zero view factor no matter how 
much the flame angle (𝑐𝑐) is increased. In order to avoid this situation, an additional 
condition is added to both loops of the algorithm. Specifically, if 𝑐𝑐1 > 90𝑅𝑅 during 
the iteration then the algorithm will terminate immediately, and the flame angle 
will be set to 𝑐𝑐1 = 90𝑅𝑅. This measure is only required to avoid an infinite loop, and 
will not affect the outcome of the calculation. 
 
3.7 Fire in isolated vegetation and fuel beds that restrict wildfire growth 
In urban environments the failure to consider the effect of vegetation geometry on 
restricting wildfire growth can lead to significant overestimation of potential radiant heat 
impacts (Penney & Richardson, 2019).  In turn, this may result in: 
1. Firefighters not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend homes as a result 
of over-estimation of wildfire behaviour that indicates suppression efforts are not 
suitable, resulting in avoidable house loss and impacts on communities. This may 
occur as firefighting suppression thresholds are related to wildfire behaviour 
parameters throughout jurisdictions internationally (Penney et. al., 2019). Where 
inappropriate predictions fail to consider vegetation geometry that does not 
support the assumptions of landscape wildfire modelling, otherwise defendable 
areas may be left unguarded due to inappropriate evaluation of suppression 
strategies; 
2. Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, public open 
space, road reserves, and residential areas within urban areas. In turn, land that is 
actually suitable for development may be identified as being subject to 
overestimated wildfire impact which restricts or prohibits development altogether. 
Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a small unmanaged vacant 
residential lot is modelled as supporting a landscape scale wildfire, in turn 
restricting or prohibiting development on adjacent and near-by lots; and  
3. Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire resistant construction 
standards of affected dwellings and structures that hinders development through 
either misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels of wildfire 
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impact, or through making development cost-prohibitive as a result of the level of 
wildfire resistant engineering and construction required. 
 
 
 
As detailed by Penney and Richardson (2019), within the urban environment in road 
reserves, urban parklands and similar scenarios, correction of the wildfire models can be 
achieved through the application of: 
1. The Vegetation Availability Factor (refer to Chapter 2); 
2. Calculation of accelerating 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 from a point source (refer to Chapter 2);  
3. Consideration of shielding structures when calculating view factor; and 
4. Calculating the final radiant heat flux. 
 
 
  
Methods of calculating radiant heat flux that rely of a defined 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 cannot be applied to 
fires occurring in isolated vegetation structures, including individual trees, bushes or small 
garden beds (Figure 3.14) or other situations where there is an absence of a sustained forward 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅.  AS3959 provides some provisions for the exclusion of defined ‘low threat vegetation’, 
where these exclusions do not apply or modelling is required for other purposes. In such 
instances the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 will be zero, a vertical flame (flame angle of 90°) should be modelled (i.e. 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 =
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) and a reduction in emissivity is appropriate compared to landscape scale wildfire 
environments.  
 
  
Figure 3.14: Modelling of isolated trees (left) and shrub/scrub (right). 
 
To calculate radiant heat flux in this situation, flame height (𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) is calculated by (Dupuy, 
Marechal & Morvan, 2003) 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 0.2𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓25 (3.14) 
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 is the flame height (m) and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 is the maximum heat release rate (kW). The maximum 
heat release rate is given by 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 = 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 (3.15) 
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶  is the heat of combustion and 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 is the Mass Loss Rate. Finally, the Mass Loss Rate 
is given by 
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𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
 (3.16) 
 
where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖   is the total fuel load consumed in the isolated vegetation structure (kg), calculated 
using the Vegetation Availability Factor in the absence of other available datasets, and 𝐴𝐴 is 
time (s), assumed to be 37 seconds as reported by Wotton et. al. (2012) reflective of flaming 
residence times and greater than the duration of tall flames, being a maximum 22 seconds. 
 
Once 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 is known, the view factor, flame emissive power and final radiant heat flux can 
be calculated as previously described. 
 
3.8 Case Studies 
A number of case studies are presented to illustrate the application and implications of 
the approaches described previously to consider radiant heat flux from a fire front while 
accounting for fuel loading, non-combustible obstruction(s), or accelerating fire fronts.  These 
case studies, as well as the alternative view factor calculations were originally published in 
Penney and Stevenson (2019). 
 
The first case study considers a semi-rural environment in which a row of single and two 
story brick houses backs onto forest type bush land with a fuel bed of unrestricted geometry 
and Vf=1. Suppose that the radiant heat flux of a fire in the bush land behind the houses is to 
be estimated at a site or house on the opposite side of the street. The geometry of the specific 
case considered here is provided in Figure 3.15. 
 
Figure 3.15. A bird’s-eye view of the case study 1 scenario. The measurements within the house boxes 
denote the height of each house. 
The parameter values used in the calculation as described in AS3959 are summarised in 
Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3. Parameter values used in the Case Studies. 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Effective slope 0o Flame temperature (Tf) 1090 K 
Site slope (θ) 0o Ambient temperature (Ta) 308 K 
Vegetation class Forest Relative humidity (RH) 25% 
Fire Danger Index (FDI) 80 Flame width (Wf) 100 m 
Surface fuel load (w) 25 t/ha Flame emissivity (ε) 0.95 
Overall fuel load (W) 35 t/ha Stefan Boltzman constant (σ) 5.67 × 10−11 kW/m2/K4 
Heat of Combustion (H) 18600 kJ/kg   
The radiant heat flux was calculated for a range of distances from the site to the 
vegetation fuel bed ranging from 10 m to 100m. For the sake of comparison, the radiant heat 
flux at the site was estimated using four calculation methods: 
1. The method outlined in AS3959, ignoring the obstructions presented by the houses located 
between the site and vegetation fuel bed. 
2. The method outlined in AS3959 with the receiver height h  set to 3 m (instead of the mid-
level of the flame front). 
3. The method outlined in this paper, where each of the four houses is considered to reduce 
the view factor of the flame front. 
4. A simplified method in which the four obstructions are considered as a single rectangular 
obstruction with height 5 m (i.e., the height of the tallest house), and width equal to the 
combined width of the four houses. The combined width is the distance from the 
westernmost edge of the westernmost structure to the easternmost edge of the 
easternmost structure. 
Figure 3.16 provides a plot of the radiant heat flux at the site as a function of the distance 
to the vegetation fuel bed using each of the methods 1–4 outlined above. 
 
Figure 3.16. The radiant heat flux at the site as a function of the distance to the vegetation fuel bed. 
As expected, the methods that did not consider the shielding effect of the houses 
(magenta and red lines) provided higher estimates for the radiant heat flux compared to the 
methods that did consider the shielding effect (blue and green). For small distances to the 
vegetation fuel bed, the approaches that did not consider shielding significantly over-
estimated the radiant heat flux compared to the method presented in this paper (blue line). 
As the distance to the vegetation fuel bed increases, the difference between the AS3959 
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approach and shielding approach presented here becomes small. This is most likely because 
the 10m gap between house 2 and 3 becomes the most significant zone for heat flux for a 
more distant fire front, so the impact of the obstructions becomes less significant. 
Method 4 (green line) provided the lowest estimates of radiant heat flux as expected. As 
the distance to the vegetation fuel bed increased, the radiant heat flux estimated using this 
approach tended to zero far more rapidly than the other methods. This was most likely due to 
the significant gap between house 2 and house 3, which was not blocked in methods 1–3, but 
was blocked when the four houses were approximated as a single rectangular obstruction. 
This highlights the importance of considering multiple obstructions individually to ensure that 
the impact of radiation through significant gaps is not diminished. 
 
The second case study considers an accelerating fire front burning within a 20m wide 
treed forest style bushland zone within the road reserve between the edge of a freeway or 
highway and a 3m brick wall separating the freeway from housing. The geometry of the 
vegetation fuel bed prevents the fire attaining its maximum potential rate of spread. There is a 
row of houses located 10m on the other side of the brick wall, one of which will be considered 
the site at which the radiant heat flux from the fire will be considered. The geometry of the 
specific case considered here is provided in Figure 3.17. 
The parameters used in the calculation are summarised in Table 3.3. In addition, the 
vegetation factor Vf = 0.2 scales back the surface and overall fuel loads as defined in Chapter 
2. The fire is assumed to ignite from a point source at the edge of the Freeway, 30 m from the 
site/receiver. The fire is assumed to spread perpendicular to the Freeway at an accelerating 
rate aRoS , which is related to the distance from the ignition point D. The rate parameter 
)10ln(2=β h-1, as suggested by McAlpine (1988), is utilised. Figure 3.18 provides a plot of the 
accelerating rate of spread aRoS  and the equilibrium rate of spread RoS  against the distance 
from the ignition point D. 
 
Figure 3.17. A bird’s-eye view of the case study 2 scenario. 
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Figure 3.18. The accelerating rate of spread RoSa  and the equilibrium rate of spread RoS  against the 
distance from the ignition point D. 
From Figure 3.18 it is apparent that over 20 m (i.e., the distance from the ignition point to 
the obstructing wall) the rate of spread reaches approximately half of its equilibrium value. The 
rate of spread perpendicular to the forward direction is assumed to be half the forward rate 
of spread, so the flame width is given by 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 = 𝐷𝐷2. 
The impact of incorporating the acceleration of a fire front and an obstruction into the 
heat flux model has been highlighted by comparing the above scenario with an additional 
seven modelling variants. The eight scenarios are summarised as follows: 
1. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of spread from the ignition 
point, a width of 100m, a vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored 
(the model of AS3959). 
2. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of spread from the ignition 
point, a width of 100m, a vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored. 
3. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from the ignition point, a 
vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored. 
4. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from the ignition point, a 
vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored. 
5. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of spread from the ignition 
point, a width of 100 m, a vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is included. 
6. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of spread from the ignition 
point, a width of 100 m, a vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is 
included. 
7. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from the ignition point, a 
vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is included. 
8. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from the ignition point, a 
vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is included (i.e., the Case Study 2 
scenario). 
The radiant heat flux for the above scenarios are plotted against the distance from the 
site in Figures 3.19 and 3.20. 
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Figure 3.19. The radiant heat flux for models ignoring the 3m obstructing wall. The yellow line 
represents the Case Study 2 scenario. 
 
Figure 3.20. The radiant heat flux for models including the 3m obstructing wall. The yellow line 
represents the Case Study 2 scenario. 
As expected, the heat fluxes when the wall is ignored are all greater than the 
corresponding fluxes when the wall is incorporated into the model to provide shielding. 
Furthermore, the fluxes with Vf = 1 exceeded those with Vf = 0.2. All of the models that include 
the modelling of acceleration start from a flux of zero, which increases as the rate of spread, 
length, and width increase (in addition to the increase from the larger view factor as the front 
closes on the site). Significantly, in Figure 3.20 the yellow line corresponding to the Case Study 
2 scenario is not visible as the heat flux at the site remains zero. This is because the fuel load 
and rate of spread are not sufficient to create a front with sufficient height to be visible above 
the 3m obstruction after 20m of spreading, with the flame height reaching only 2.4 m. 
The progression of the flame front over the bush region between the freeway and 
obstructing wall is illustrated in Figure 3.21 for scenarios 5 to 8. 
A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020 
 
3-21 
 
 
Figure 3.21. The progression of the fire front for modelling scenarios 5 through to 8. The yellow line 
represents the Case Study 2 scenario. 
The model of AS3959, which assumes the wildfire is established and has attained a quasi-
steady rate of spread, estimates the time taken for the ignited fire to travel from the freeway 
to the wall (20 m) is 30 seconds, while the model incorporating the acceleration of the 
spreading front and the reduced vegetation density estimates the time at 9 minutes, consistent 
with the findings of McAlpine (1988) and Kucuk, Bilgili and Baysal (2007). 
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3.9 Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s  
The case studies presented indicate potential significant over-estimation of radiant heat 
flux using the approach outlined in AS3959 in cases involving non-combustible obstructions 
and point-source ignition fires for a minimum of 20m separation from the fire front. This is 
significant as it is in this distance that wildfire flame radiation is considered to have its greatest 
impact (Cohen & Butler, 1996; Newman et al, 2013). Such situations are common in urban 
environments. The results demonstrate the importance of appropriately considering fuel 
geometry, wildfire behaviour, and the effect of shielding structures when calculating radiant 
heat impacts on buildings and emergency responders within urban environments where 
vegetation fuel bed geometry prevents wildfires reaching landscape proportions.  
Over estimation of potential radiant heat flux impacts could, in turn, result in firefighters 
not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend homes as a result of over-estimation of 
wildfire behaviour that indicates suppression efforts are not suitable, resulting in avoidable 
house loss and impacts on communities. This may occur as firefighting suppression thresholds 
are related to wildfire behaviour parameters throughout jurisdictions internationally. Where 
inappropriate predictions fail to consider vegetation geometry that does not support the 
assumptions of landscape wildfire modelling, otherwise defendable areas may be left 
unguarded due inappropriate evaluation of suppression strategies. 
When considering the suitability of fire suppression strategies, there are factors other than 
radiant heat flux that also require consideration. These are addressed in Chapters 4-7. 
3.10  Implications for urban planners  
Whilst a precautionary approach to development in areas prone to wildfire is necessary, 
inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, public open space, road 
reserves, and residential areas within urban areas. In turn, land that is actually suitable for 
development may be identified as being subject to overestimated wildfire impact which 
restricts or prohibits development altogether. Typically, this may occur in urban settings where 
a small unmanaged vacant residential lot is modelled as supporting a landscape scale 
wildfire, in turn restricting or prohibiting development on adjacent and near-by lots. 
Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire resistant construction 
standards of affected dwellings and structures that hinders development through either 
misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels of wildfire impact, or through 
making development cost-prohibitive as a result of the level of wildfire resistant engineering 
and construction required. 
In addition to the inherent safety factor incorporated within the vegetation availability 
factor previously discussed, the methodologies proposed also retain the assumption of a flame 
emissivity ε = 0.95, being representative of a landscape scale wildfire with an active uniform 
flame front depth greater than 2m, and even potentially greater than 10m (Poon, 2003; 
Sullivan, 2009). In cases where the active flame front will not reach this depth, it may also be 
suitable to reduce the emissivity. It is important to note that whilst the vegetation factor and 
modified view factor model are applicable to all fuel types (forest, woodland, shrub, scrub, 
grassland, etc.), the point source acceleration model presented in this Chapter is suitable for 
treed forest and woodland structures only, as fire growth in other fuel structures may be 
significantly faster. 
The models presented in this Chapter are not intended to address the potential radiant 
heat flux arising from surrounding buildings being involved in fire. In part, this is inherently 
considered within AS3959 through the requirement that associated structures on the same 
parcel of land and within 6m of the dwelling subject to enhanced construction standards, 
must also be constructed to that same standard. In new estates, all dwellings within the land 
development should be constructed to the required standard of wildfire resistance, in theory 
significantly reducing the potential for mass conflagration spreading between multiple houses. 
Due to the differences in wildfire and structural fire behaviour and radiation models as well as 
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the difference in building and structure performance once impacted by wildfire, it is suggested 
that a high level of technical expertise is required to complete this process. 
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4. Wildfire suppression 
4.1 Introduction 
Where wildfires occur yet pose no threat to life, critical infrastructure, private assets or 
cultural and environmental areas of significance it is possible to simply allow the fire to self-
extinguish once it runs out of available fuel or rainfall occurs.  Unfortunately this is rarely possible 
in populated areas common throughout developed nations and significant intervention is 
required by fire and emergency services to suppress wildfires and minimise their impacts.  This 
chapter discusses wildfire suppression strategies and presents evidence and analysis of 
available options to assist Incident Controllers to make critical incident decisions during 
chaotic and large wildfire incidents. 
 
4.2 Strategies  
Whilst offensive strategies involve actively combatting the fire, defensive strategies are 
employed when the fire behaviour is too intense to be safely attacked.  Defensive strategies 
utilise tactics that do not involve active fire suppression including building containment lines 
and focusing on evacuation of people or livestock (DFES, 2012).  When attempting to suppress 
severe wildfire, a combination of strategies may be necessary depending on the fire 
behaviour, availability of resources, accessibility and fuel structure.  When incorrect strategies 
are applied firefighting crews may find themselves overrun by wildfire, known as a burnover.  
In such instances, unless the wildfire behaviour is particularly mild, the results can be fatal. 
 
4.3 Offensive tactics 
 
Direct firefighting attack involves firefighters (including personnel, firefighting appliances, 
machines and aircraft) directly attacking the wildfire using the tactics of either head attack or 
flank attack.  A direct head attack (see figures 4.1-4.3) involves firefighting efforts directly 
against the head fire before moving down either flank once the head fire is suppressed; a 
direct tail attack involves attacking the bushfire from the rear and working along the flanks 
towards the head fire; and a direct flank attack involves attacking the side of the fire and 
working around the head and tail.  The direct tail attack is the “preferred method of 
suppression” (DFES, 2012, p11) as it reduces the potential for crews to be caught in a burnover 
due to a wind change that turns the flank into the greater head fire.  Direct head attacks 
expose firefighters to the most severe wildfire behaviour, which reduces towards the tail.  All 
tactics require firefighters to be able to access the fire edge in order to extinguish the fire.  In 
dense forest fuels or in difficult terrain, this may be problematic and result in firefighters 
attempting to extinguish bushfire wherever they can in a patchwork manner.  Where this 
occurs suppression efforts are likely to be less than optimal and result in unrestrained wildfire 
propagation as well as placing firefighters in unnecessary danger.  Advantages and 
disadvantages of a direct attack reported in DFES (2012) are summarised in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Advantages and disadvantages of a direct attack 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Minimises the area burnt. Only possible on low intensity fires with flame 
heights <1.5m to 2m. 
Reduces the likelihood of fire gaining momentum 
with changes in weather, fuel or topography factors. 
Crews are more exposed to heat-related illnesses such 
as heat stroke, heat exhaustion, heat cramps and 
smoke inhalation. 
Uses any dead edge of the fire to get the fire 
contained quickly. 
If fire behaviour changes or there is a weakness in the 
control line, the fire can quickly escape. 
May allow safe night work. It may produce an irregular, winding control line. 
Usually allows retreat onto burnt ground. 
 
  
(a)       (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 4.1: Direct head attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c) 
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(a)       (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 4.2: Direct tail attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c) 
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(a)       (b) 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 4.3: Direct flank attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c) 
 
Parallel attacks involve construction of control lines by personnel using hand tools or 
machines as close as possible to the flanks of the bushfire (Figure 4.4).  The intent of the parallel 
attack is to establish fuel-free containment boundaries that the fire cannot cross.  Retardant 
drops by firefighting aircraft may be used to reduce wildfire behaviour approaching 
containment line to increase the potential for containment lines to hold.  When considering 
the establishment of parallel control lines or breaks, both the production rates of firefighters 
with hand tools and machinery, as well as the required break width need to be considered as 
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the production of control lines must exceed the bushfire’s rate of spread in order for the fire to 
be contained.  Whilst supporting literature regarding these factors is limited, fire line potential 
rates of construction are detailed in Tables 4.3-4.5, (McCarthy, Tolhurst and Wouters ,2003 cited 
in FESA, 2011).  Required fire break widths in low intensity grassfire events where spotting is a 
possibility are detailed in Table 4.6 (Cheney and Sullivan, 1997 cited in FESA, 2011).  In more 
extreme forest wildfires where flame lengths may reach 40-50m and spotting of several 
hundred meters is possible (Gould et al, 2007) control lines will likely be inneffective against an 
established headfire.  Advantages and disadvantages of a parallel attack reported in DFES 
(2012) are summarised in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Advantages and disadvantages of a parallel attack 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Control line may be shorter and straighter than in a 
direct attack. 
There is an increased chance of fire escaping. 
Crews may be less exposed to heat and smoke. Total fire area will be greater. 
 
Table 2.3: Rates of fireline construction using handtools (FESA, 2011) 
Elevated Fuel Construction rate (meters per 
person per hour) 
Construction rate when 0.5m 
flames within 5m of crew 
 
Low 24 16 
High 19 13 
Very high / extreme 14 10 
 
Table 4.4: Rates of fireline construction by machines (FESA, 2011) 
Machine Flat production rate 
(m/hr) 
15° slope production rate 
(m/hr) 
 
Comments 
D4 & Wheeled 
Loader 
700 420 No debris 
630 380 Some debris – can handle 
470 200 Some debris – can manage 
300 60 Substantial – D6 required 
  10° slope production rate 
(m/hr) 
 
 
D6-D9 900 730 Little debris 
700 550 Some debris – D4 can manage 
450 375 Significant debris – D6+ required 
350 270 Very significant debris – D6+ has 
difficulty 
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Table 4.5: Fireline construction rates (McCarthy, Tolhurst & Wouters, 2003) 
Method / Appliance Mean production rate 
(meters per hour) 
Note 
Firefighters using hand 
tools 
13.7 per person A total of 34 incidents were reviewed and average 
firefighter experience was high (reported as a mean 
of 0.8 out of 1).  Minimum crew of 5, maximum of 60 
firefighters. 
D4 505 A total of 34 D4 performances were reviewed.   
D6 640 A total of 16 D6 performances were reviewed. 
D7 570 A total of 9 D7 performances were reviewed. 
D9 560 A total of 7 D9 performances were reviewed. 
Notes regarding the study: 
1. Maximum flame height for the 103 incidents reviewed for the study was 5m; and 
2. The study does not specify the width of the fire line created. 
Table 4.6: Required firebreak width for spotting vegetation (FESA, 2011) 
Fire line intensity (kW/m) Firebreak width Anticipated success 
1000 10 High 
7.5 Moderate 
 
 
(a) 
 
Figure 4.4: Parallel attack - commencement  
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Identified as one of the most difficult strategies to implement properly in the face of wildfire 
impact at the urban interface, backburning is the only potentially successful tactic available 
for combatting large, fast moving or intense and inaccessible fires (DFES, 2012).  As illustrated 
in Figure 4.5, it involves the deliberate burning out of vegetation fuel between established 
control lines and the approaching fire front and must be undertaken with extreme care to 
avoid the creation of additional uncontrollable fire fronts.  Advantages and disadvantages of 
backburning reported in DFES (2012) are shown in Table 4.7, however it is again noted no 
supporting research or justification was provided to substantiate the statements.  Due to the 
nature of backburning, DFES (2014) identifies several conditions that prohibit backburns being 
utilised, listed as: 
1. The fire is running under extreme conditions; 
2. Long distance spotting is occurring; 
3. The location of the fire edge is not known; 
4. There are no adequate or existing control lines; 
5. There are insufficient resources to construct and hold the backburn; 
6. There is not enough time to allow penetration of the backburn to a  safe depth; 
and 
7. The forecast weather conditions will lead to extreme fire behaviour before the 
backburn can be secured. 
 
Table 4.7: Advantages and disadvantages of backburning 
Advantages Disadvantages 
May stop the progress of a rapidly moving bushfire. Increased total fire area. 
May be the most practicable method of bushfire 
suppression for difficult terrain. 
If the backburn escapes control, the progress of the 
main fire is accelerated. 
It can endanger the lives of firefighters 
It may produce intense fire behaviour at the junction 
between the backburn and the main fire front. 
It requires considerable time to effectively establish. 
It requires substantial resources to light and patrol. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.5: Backburning – point source ignition (a) and line ignition (b) 
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Although the use of fire through hazard reduction burns (HRB’s) and backburning are 
utilised internationally for conservation, to reduce uncontrolled wildfire behaviour and to 
enhance the potential for successful suppression (Boer et al., 2009; Grant & Wouters, 1993; 
Marsden-Smedley, 2011; Stratton, 2004; VBRC, 2010; Wimberly et al., 2009; Ingalsbee, 2015), the 
effectiveness of these strategies in specifically reducing wildfire impact on communities 
remains uncertain (Fernandes & Herminio, 2003; Florec, 2016; McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001; 
Oliveras & Bell, 2008; Penman et al., 2011). Even studies which report potential economic 
benefits of prescribed burn programs from a suppression perspective (Kuzenko, 2000; Florec, 
2016; Silva & Gozalez-Caban, 2010), do not provide comparison of the total economic or life 
loss from wildfires where HRB’s were, or were not present.  Whilst HRB’s remain an essential part 
of Australian wildfire related risk mitigation (AFAC, 2016; McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001), and 
backburning remains an important aspect of wildfire suppression (DFES, 2014; Ingalsbee, 2015; 
Penney et al., 2019a) the effectiveness of these programs in relation to the specific objective 
of protecting people and buildings from the effects of wildfire is unknown. 
Illustrated in equation 4.1, the concept of effectiveness is described as a product of 
efficacy and reliability (Thomas, 2002) and facilitates a numerical measure of effectiveness 
allowing firefighting measures to be quantitatively compared. Efficiency of HRB’s (EffHRB) can 
then be calculated to provide a numerical measure against which to evaluate HRB’s against 
the set objectives. 
𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 = 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 × 𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦    (4.1) 
As Thomas (2002) explains efficacy is the degree to which a system/process achieves an 
objective given it operates / is executed. The efficacy the process will be different depending 
on the objective.  For example, if HRB’s are intended to eliminate house damage at the rural 
urban interface (RUI) from wildfire impacts its efficacy is: 
• One (1) if there were no houses damaged whenever prescribed burns were 
present and a wildfire occurred that would have otherwise impacted the houses; 
• Between zero (0) and one (1) if the rate of houses damaged whenever prescribed 
burns were present and a wildfire occurred that would have otherwise impacted 
the houses was reduced compared to otherwise identical situations where 
prescribed burns were not present; 
• Zero (0) if the rate of damaged houses remained the same whether prescribed 
burns were present or not; and 
• Negative if the rate of damaged houses increased when prescribed burns were 
present and a wildfire occurred that would have otherwise impacted the houses. 
 
HRB’s work to reduce the severity of wildfire behaviour by reducing the understory (and 
potentially bark) fuels available for consumption during a subsequent wildfire event.  
Depending on the rate of vegetation regrowth, HRB’s may reduce subsequent wildfire 
behaviour in the same area for up to ten years post burn completion (McCarthy & Tolhurst, 
2001; Penman et al., 2011; VBRC, 2010).  However, a HRB may potentially stop a wildfire head 
fire for only the first two years (VBRC, 2010) and even then only under certain conditions.  Firstly, 
the HRB must be suitably placed in order for the uncontrolled wildfire to impact it (in other 
words they are reliable).  Secondly, as reported by McCarthy and Tolhurst (2001), as fire 
weather conditions worsen the probability of a HRB having any impact on an established 
wildfire significantly decreases.  As illustrated in Figure 4.6 (McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001, Figure 6), 
even with a moderate overall fuel hazard score, once the Fire Danger Index reaches 50 the 
efficacy of the HRB slowing the wildfire head fire drops to below 0.6.  At increased overall 
hazard scores and higher Fire Danger Indices, the efficacy of a previous HRB slowing the 
wildfire head fire rapidly drops below 0.2.  During a study of a different area by the same 
authors involving 2425 wildfires on public land, the overall efficacy of HRB’s assisting suppression 
efforts was reported to be even lower at 0.11. In some instances HRB’s have even been 
reported to have negative efficacy (McCormick, 2002) where 30% of forest HRB’s studied in 
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the Blue Mountains in NSW had a negative effect.  This negative effect was reported to occur 
due to the curing of scrub fuels greater than 0.5m above the ground, even if understorey fuels 
below that height were consumed.  
The efficacy of a HRB in reducing spotting and new fire behaviour is dependent on its 
ability to remove bark, particularly of stringy bark fuels which contribute significantly to spotting 
behaviour and the ignition of new fires (Grant & Wouters, 1993). Where spotting occurs there 
is the potential for those spot fires to grow into uncontrolled wildfires having attaining a quasi-
steady rate of spread in their own right. Depending largely on vertical fuel understory fuel 
structure and wind penetration (McRae, 1999), in forest fuels this may take in excess of 30 
minutes (Finney & McAllister, 2011; Kucuk, Bilgili & Baysal, 2007; McAlpine, 1988; Penney & 
Stevenson, 2019) and may not occur until a head fire width of approximately 150m is reached 
(Cheney & Gould, 1997). The potential result of this may be that whilst the size of the final 
wildfire that impacts urban areas may be less than that of the original wildfire, this does not 
necessarily mean the wildfire impacts on life or property may actually be reduced.  Recent 
work into the effect of fuel bed geometry on wildfire growth (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), 
firefighter tenability during wildfire suppression (Penney at al, 2019a) and critical flow rates for 
wildfire extinguishment (Penney et al., 2019b) suggests that there will be little if any difference 
in the ability for firefighters to suppress the ‘new’ headfire/s without substantial aerial 
suppression once they attain a quasi-state of spread and an active head fire depth of more 
than 2m.  In such instances the efficacy of the HRB’s would be close to zero if the objective 
was defined as reducing wildfire behaviour that would facilitate active suppression of the 
head fire by firefighter direct attack using machinery. 
 
Figure 4.6. Probability of previous prescribed burn slowing the headfire of a subsequent wildfire as a 
function of Overall Fuel Hazard and Fire Danger Index. (Probability of "1.0" means "certain", probability 
of "0" means "not possible".)  Reproduced with permission of the Department of Environment, Land, 
Water and Planning Victoria 
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In this same context, reliability is the probability that prescribed burns are in the correct 
place when required, in other words they are intentionally positioned so that they will be 
impacted by wildfire.  For example, if the area affected by prescribed burns are always 
impacted by wildfires the reliability is one (1).  If the area affected by prescribed burns are 
impacted by wildfires only half the time then the reliability is 0.5. In a study of 114 wildfires 
between 1990 to 1998, McCarthy and Tolhurst (2001) reported only 69 of all wildfires analysed 
encountered a HRB, equivalent to a reliability of 0.61.  This figure increased 0.92 to when only 
fires within “Zone 1” were assessed.  Zone 1 was identified as the most proximal to development 
where the objective was to protect human life, property and assets and therefore subject to 
significantly reduced overall fuel hazard scores compared to outer lying zones.  The same 
authors reported this figure dropped to less than 0.25 in Zone 1 areas during a study of a 
different area involving 2425 wildfires on public land.  This variance is not unexpected, with as 
the reliability of HRB’s is highly dependent on the area being examined. 
 
 
Fire services throughout Australia, America, Canada, Europe and New Zealand consider 
predicted and reported wildfire behaviour including head fire RoS, fire line intensity (I) and 
flame length (LF) when determining the suitability of suppression strategies and tactics.  Penney 
et al. (2019a) reported that out of the literature reviewed from the various jurisdictions, only 
Western Australia utilised RoS as a marker for wildfire suppression strategies in forest or 
woodland fuel structures.  The reported thresholds were readily suppressed (<0.06kph); hand 
tool attack possible (<0.14kph); direct machine attack possible (<0.4kph); direct attack not 
possible / unlikely to succeed (>0.4kph); and indirect attack likely to fail (>0.8kph).  
Even within fire services some variance exists between strategy thresholds as detailed in 
Tables 4.8 (DFES, 2014) and 4.9 (Smith, 2013) which show values for forest fuels.  DFES (2014, p79) 
also identifies that for tall eucalypt forest, “aerial suppression is of limited effect with fire 
intensities over 2000kW/m”. International literature revealed marked variance between 
jurisdictional thresholds.  Thresholds for the United States of America are identified in Tables 4.10 
and 4.11 (Deeming et al., 1978 cited in Hirsch and Martell, 1996; Andrews and Rothemel, 1982 
and Rothemel, 1983, also cited in Hirsch & Martell, 1996).  Canadian thresholds, Alexander and 
DeGroot (1988) cited in Hirsch and Martell (1996) are shown illustrated in Table 4.12. European 
thresholds (EuroFire, 2012) are identified in Table 4.13 whilst thresholds adopted by New 
Zealand (Alexander, 2000) are detailed in Table 4.14.   
 
Table 4.8: Fire behaviour and firefighting strategies in Western Australia 
Fire Danger Flame Height (m) Intensity (kW/m) 
 
Significance 
Low 0-0.5 0-50 Fires generally self-extinguish 
Moderate 0.5-1.5 50-500 Hand tool line should hold the fire.  Direct 
attack possible. 
High 1.5-3.0 500-2000 Fire too intense for direct attack.  Parallel 
attack recommended. 
Very high 3.0-10.0 2000-4000 Crown fire at upper intensities.  Indirect 
attack recommended. 
Extreme >10 >4000 Crowning, spotting and major runs likely. 
Control efforts probably ineffective.  
Defensive strategy recommended. 
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Table 4.9: Head fire behaviour and firefighting strategies in Western Australia 
Rate of Spread 
(m/hr) 
Intensity (kW/m) Significance 
<60 <800 Readily suppressed. 
<140 <800 Hand tool attack possible. 
<400 <2000 Direct machine attack possible. 
>400 >2000 Direct attack not possible / unlikely to succeed. 
>800 >4000 or 
>5000* 
Indirect attack likely to fail. 
*both values are cited in the same table and category  
 
Table 4.10: Head fire behaviour and strategies - USA (Deeming et al. 1978) 
Flame Length (m) Intensity (kW/m) Significance 
0.9 <173 Behaviour associated with most prescribed burns. 
1.2 346 Limit of control for manual attack methods. 
2.4 1730 The prospects for control by any means are poor above this 
limit. 
2.8 2422 The “heat load” on people within 30 feet of the fire is 
dangerous 
3.3 3460 Spotting, fire whirls and crowning should be expected. 
 
Table 4.11: Head fire behaviour and strategies - USA (Andrews & Rothemal, 1982;  Rothemel, 1983) 
Flame Length (m) Intensity (kW/m) Significance 
<1.2 <346 Manual attack on the head fire possible. 
1.2-1.4 346-1730 Machine attack on the head fire possible. 
2.4-3.4 1730-3460 Control efforts at the head fire will probably be ineffective. 
>3.4 >3460 Crowing, spotting and major fire runs are probable.  Control 
efforts at the head fire are ineffective. 
 
Table 4.12: Head fire behaviour and strategies - Canada  
Flame Length (m) Intensity (kW/m) Significance 
<0.2 <10 Readily suppressed. 
0.2-1.4 10-500 Direct manual attack possible. 
1.4-2.6 500-2000 Direct machine attack possible. 
2.6-3.5 2000-4000 Control efforts at head fire may fail. 
>3.5 >4000 Intermittent crown fire to active crown fire development (at 
>10000kW/m).  Suppression efforts must be restricted to fire flanks.  
Violent fire behaviour at intensities >30000kW and suppression 
activities should not be attempted until burning conditions 
ameliorate.   
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Table 4.13: Head fire behaviour and strategies - Europe  
Flame Length (m) Significance 
<0.5 Fires generally self extinguish. 
0.5-1.5 Direct hand tool attack possible. 
1.5-2.5 Direct machine attack possible.  Flank / parallel attack recommended. 
2.5-3.5 Too intense for direct attack. 
3.5-8 Indirect attack possible. 
>8 Extreme fire behaviour.  Defensive strategies recommended. 
 
Table 4.14: Head fire behaviour and strategies - New Zealand  
Intensity (kW/m) Significance 
<500 Direct hand tool attack possible. 
500-2000 Direct machine attack possible. 
2000-4000 Helitanks and airtankers using chemical fire retardants. 
>4000 Very difficult if not impossible to control. 
 
 
Applying the Noble et al (1980) forest model, as illustrated in Figure 4.7, Penney et al 
(2019a) reported the operational RoS thresholds identified by Smith (2011) are exceeded in all 
but the sparsest of understorey (w) fuel loads and mildest fire weather conditions associated 
with an FDI less than 20.  Hand tool attack is not considered possible once available understory 
fuel loads exceed 5 t/ha, regardless of FDI, whilst the direct machine attack threshold is also 
rapidly exceeded once the FDI exceeds 20 for understory fuel loads exceeding 15 t/ha.  
Indirect attack thresholds are exceeded once an FDI of 45 is reached in understory fuel loads 
of 15 t/ha.  At an understory of 25 t/ha, identified as the standard fuel load in AS3959 (2019), 
direct machine attack is only suitable at FDIs ≤10 and the indirect attack threshold is exceeded 
once the FDI exceeds approximately 23.    
 
 
Figure 4.7. Tactic suitability according to RoS  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Ra
te
 o
f s
pr
ea
d 
(k
m
/h
)
FDI
Tactic suitability according to rate of spread
w5 w10 w15
w20 w25 w30
Readily suppressed limit Direct machine attack limit Indirect attack limit
A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020 
 
4-14 
 
 
When considering fire line intensity (I) thresholds, Penney et al. (2019a) found that whilst 
there is general agreement across international jurisdictions regarding direct attack tactical 
thresholds in forest or woodland fuel structures, discrepancy occurs between direct machine 
attack thresholds as well as when the head fire is considered uncontrollable.  Western 
Australian, New Zealand and Canadian thresholds are the most aggressive, identifying direct 
machine attack on the headfire suitable to 2000 kWm-1 and indirect attack suitable to 3000-
4000 kWm-1 compared to the United States which considers the headfire control limit to be 
1730 kWm-1, dangerous conditions present within 30 feet (9.14m) of the head fire at 2422 kWm-
1 and the head fire to be undefendable at 3460 kWm-1.  Only Canada identified a limit for 
suppression efforts to cease, being 10,000 kWm-1 almost three times higher than the 
undefendable threshold set by the United States. 
Illustrated in Figure 4.8, Penney et al. (2019a) reported that once understory fuel loads 
exceed 20 t/ha headfire behaviour is recognised as undefendable across all jurisdictions 
regardless of the FDI.  Utilising American thresholds, I is recognised as resulting in dangerous 
conditions within 30 ft of the head fire at all FDIs once a surface fuel load of 15 t/ha is 
exceeded.  The lower Canadian intensity threshold of 10,000 kWm-1 to cease all wildfire 
suppression activities can be exceeded under the right fire weather conditions once surface 
fuel loads reach 10 t/ha, and can be breached at an FDI as low as 30 when surface fuels 
exceed 20 t/ha.  The higher Canadian I threshold of 30,000 kWm-1 is breached once surface 
fuels exceed 20 t/ha and the FDI exceeds 80. 
 
Figure 4.8. Tactic suitability according to fire line intensity  
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the 2.8m LF the United States recognises as creating dangerous conditions within 30ft of the 
head fire, whilst the Western Australian indirect attack limit of 10 m is almost three times greater 
than the head fire undefendable threshold of 3.4m set by the United States.   
As detailed in Figure 4.9 (Penney et al, 2019a), when LF thresholds are used, offensive 
suppression strategies are considered unsuitable or dangerous for all landscape scale wildfires 
burning in understory fuel loads exceeding 15t/ha regardless of fire weather conditions.  
Further, fire behaviour is recognised as dangerous within 30ft of the head fire in all understory 
fuel loads once an FDI of 30 is attained.  There is strong agreement between direct personnel 
attack thresholds between jurisdictions with direct personnel attack / manual attack on the 
head fire identified as  inappropriate due to LF across all scenarios regardless of understory fuel 
loads and at all FDIs.  Only two jurisdictions suggest a direct machine attack on the head fire 
is suitable, and only in the mildest head fire behaviour arising from understory fuel loads of 5 
t/ha and at an FDI of 5 (USA) and 10 (Canada).    
 
Figure 4.9. Tactic suitability according to flame length  
 
Penney et al (2019a) reported little agreement between the results of the Dry Eucalypt 
Forest Fire Model (DEFFM) and Noble model analysis.  In comparison to Noble, DEFFM analysis 
under predicted RoS, I and LF across all geographic regions once fuels reached three to four 
years in age and a FDI of 30 to 40 was attained.   Applying DEFFM alone, direct machine attack 
RoS thresholds were reached across all geographical jurisdictions when fuels reached four to 
five years of age, direct machine attack I thresholds were reached at five to nine years of age 
whilst direct machine attack LF thresholds were reached across all geographical jurisdictions 
at fuel ages between three to nine years.    
Comparative Nobel and DEFFM modelling across all fire weather conditions and utilising 
typical forest fuel loads in Western Australia (a sample of these results is illustrated for RoS in 
Jarrah Mosaic -Figure 4.10; I in Jarrah South - Figure 4.11; and LF in Jarrah East - Figure 4.12) 
revealed DEFFM analysis typically over estimated wildfire behaviour below an FDI of 30 to 50, 
above this range DEFFM analysis typically significantly underestimated wildfire behaviour 
across all fuel ages and jurisdictions.  .  Fire line intensity suppression thresholds were typically 
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exceeded across all jurisdictions once fuel ages reached 3 to 4 years and an FDI of 30 was 
reached, with the United States ‘dangerous within 30ft’ threshold rapidly exceeded under the 
same conditions. LF suppression thresholds were typically exceeded with most jurisdictions 
considering the head fire to be undefendable due to fire behaviour once fuels reached 3 to 
5 years of age and an FDI of 30 attained.  Only Western Australia and Europe considered head 
fires to be defendable above these limits, albeit using indirect suppression tactics. 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Tactic suitability – the relationship between rate of spread, fuel age and various suppression 
tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah Mosaic) 
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Figure 4.11. Tactic suitability – the relationship between fire line intensity, fuel age and various 
suppression tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah South) 
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Figure 4.12. Tactic suitability – the relationship between flame length, fuel age and various suppression 
tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah East) 
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4.15, it is necessary to apply the Vegetation Availability Factor as appropriate when predicting 
potential wildfire behaviour and manually determining whether suppression and tenability 
thresholds are exceeded. 
 
Table 4.15: Wildfire head fire suppression guide 
Siege Wildfire Head Fire Suppression  Legend 
FDI/w (t/ha) 5 10 15 20 25 30 DM – Direct 
machine attack 
 
IA – Indirect 
attack 
 
DEF – Defensive 
strategy adopted 
for head fire.  
Consider flank 
and tail attacks 
where suitable. 
 
Note: For 
DEFFM 
Modelling refer 
to fuel age.  For 
McArthur use 
FDI/w 
10 
DM 
Fuel Age < 
5yrs 
IA  
Fuel Age < 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
20 
IA  
Fuel Age < 
10yrs 
IA  
Fuel Age < 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
30 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
40 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
50 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
60 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
70 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
80 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
90 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
100 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
DEF 
Fuel Age ≥ 
10yrs 
 
 
4.4 Defensive tactics 
Defensive tactics are utilised when fire behaviour is too intense to be safely or effectively 
attacked.  As opposed to offensive tactics, defensive tactics do not attempt to suppress the 
bushfire itself, but rather limit the consequences of its impacts through evacuation, community 
information and the protection in place of vulnerable communities and critical infrastructure.   
 
 
The protect-in-place / shelter-in-place defensive Rural Urban Interface (RUI) firefighting 
tactic is typically utilised where communities and infrastructure are located within or 
immediately adjacent to vegetation that will support landscape scale bushfire behaviour, 
(DFES, 2013).  It can be a high risk approach as not all homes are defensible (Cova, 2005) or 
constructed to withstand wildfire impacts.  Illustrated in Figure 4.13, RUI defense essentially 
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requires firefighting crews to position themselves between an identified asset and the 
approaching bushfire front (DFES, 2013).  As detailed in Penney, et al. (2019a) however, it 
should be noted that this type of suppression tactic may expose firefighters to untenable 
conditions well in advance of the wildfire front itself and may be ineffective due to insufficient 
water flow rates.  These factors are explored further in Chapters 5 and 6.  As an alternative RUI 
defense to this high risk tactic, particularly where buildings are constructed in accordance with 
AS3959 (SAI Global, 2018), protection of houses and the sheltering population may be 
achieved by firefighters sheltering inside the buildings until after the passage of the head fire 
and they can safely extingish spot fires and reminant flames.  Where evacuations of large 
vulnerable communities are not possible, as may be the case for hospitals, schools, aged care 
facilities and trapped communities etc, the shelter-in-place defense remains a necessary 
approach.  In such instances sheltering in the safest possibly buildings distal from the fire front 
should be considered.  Preemptive retardent line building from fixed wing and rotary 
firefighting aircraft, coupled with enhanced direct aerial suppression of the section of the head 
fire impacting the protected structures should also be undertaken wherever possible. 
 
 
Figure 4.13: RUI defense 
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Published in Penney et al. (2020a), the Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) can be used 
when considering whether there is sufficient time to set up RUI defense prior to the impact of 
the head fire. Based on Australian and international RUI wildfire fighting strategies and tactics, 
the RUIM represents the expansion of the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (AFAC, 2004) to the 
specific context of firefighting defense at the RUI. When completed, the RUIM assists the 
Incident Management Team determine whether there is sufficient time for taskforce’s assigned 
to protect life, property and critical infrastructure at the RUI, subsequently known as RUI 
taskforce’s, to safely mobilise, prepare for, and find shelter prior to the arrival of the wildfire and 
the untenable conditions which can occur well in advance of the headfire front. deterministic 
analysis of Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) versus Required Safe RUI Preparation 
Time (RSRPT) can be applied: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 (4.2) 
ASRPT is calculated by: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑  (4.3) 
Where the distance between the headfire and RUI is the lineal separation between the 
headfire and the structures under threat; and the headfire rate of spread is calculated using 
appropriate equations for the vegetation type and fuel structure involved, such as those 
described in (Gould et al, 2007, SAI Global 2018, Cruz et al., 2015). 
Illustrated in figure 2, RSRPT is calculated by: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅) (4.4) 
Where TR is the time taken for the RUI taskforce to respond; TT is travel time (to a base, 
staging area and/or the RUI itself); THL is time to complete and assessment of the immediate 
area and set up hose lines; TS is the time taken for crews to seek shelter within a structure prior 
to the arrival of untenable conditions associated with the wildfire front. Safety factors (FS) are 
included at each stage of the process. Each of these components are discussed separately 
in this manuscript.  
 
The main differences between the RUIM and FBIM are: 
1. FBIM requires the firefighting strategy and associated tactics to be determined.  In 
RUI firefighting, the strategies are limited to either ‘backstop defense’ or sheltering 
within the structures. The RUIM reflects this accordingly;  
2. Wildfire suppression during large campaign wildfires such as those in California 
(CAFS, 2018; USFD & CDFFP, 2003), Greece (CBS, 2018) or Victoria (BCRC, 2009) 
required the mobilization of military, interstate and even international firefighting 
assistance.  Suppression efforts are protracted, lasting weeks and firefighting crews 
will be drawn from many regions and are likely to be unfamiliar with the 
operational area, particularly during the escalation phases of the incident.  This 
results in greater uncertainty compared to metropolitan structural fire response, 
therefore some of the decision points and pathways of the FBIM are not 
appropriate to the wildfire context;  
3. RUI firefighting does not involve crews committing to internal structural firefighting 
as structures actively on fire are identified as undefendable (DFES, 2013 & 2014). 
Therefore external suppression of structures only is considered in the RUIM; and 
4. The RUIM also allows for Available Safe Time to Critical Points or ASTCP to be 
calculated, enabling critical components of the response including wildfire 
impacts on access routes, evacuations and other aspects to be deterministically 
assessed.  This further enhances firefighter safety when responding to areas 
involving active wildfire. 
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Similarities between the RUIM and FBIM are: 
1. Both models rely on the systematic completion to determine the total time to 
complete the required activities; 
2. Both models require the identification of the critical path, being the sequence of 
activities determining the minimum time required for the firefighting intervention; 
3. Whilst neither model provides a definitive answer for the duration of mobilization 
and suppression efforts, both the RUIM and FBIM provide useful guidance for 
Incident Controllers when making operational decisions; and 
4. Both models can be improved with enhanced data. 
 
One limitation of the RUIM is the presence of spot fires that grow into new head fires well 
in advance of the original fire front are not automatically considered due to the difficulty in 
accurately forecasting spot fire formation. Where spotting results in new wildfires in advance 
of the original head fire result from spotting, the ASRPT must be revised appropriately.  This is 
not unique to the RUIM however as new fires within an urban structure require a new timeframe 
to be established.  As with any model, they are only one tool firefighters and Incident 
Controllers can utilise to assist the decision making process.  Field validation and current and 
reliable intelligence will further assist to increase the accuracy of predictions. 
For each of the RUIM stages in the boxes of Figure 4.14, separate flow charts and 
associated tables are required to be referred to in order to calculate the total RSRPT.  Whilst 
firefighters will complete property protection tasks prior to seeking shelter inside the building of 
refuge, the time available to complete the property protection (shaded in Figure 4.14) is 
calculated after the other stages as it is not in the critical path of completing RUI defense.  To 
calculate RSRPT, the Incident Controller or relevant officer should commence at Box 1 in Figure 
4.15 and work their way through the RUIM until all time components have been calculated.  
The incorporation of safety factors and/or percentiles into the RUIM is also essential (AFAC, 
2004; ICC et al., 2005; SFS, 2007) due to: 
1. Fire safety engineering, especially wildfire engineering, being a discipline based 
on complex science which is neither exact or complete (AFAC, 2004);  
2. The potential for mass fatalities associated with firefighters’ convoys being caught 
in a burnover (Haynes et al., 2008; Handmer, O’Neil & Killalea, 2010; Blanchi et al., 
2014);  
3. The potential for untenable conditions occurring well in advance of the wildfire 
front (Penney et al., 2019); and the complexity of significant wildfire events, the 
incorporation of a safety factors and/or percentiles is also required. 
 
As AFAC (2004, p26) reports 
“Fire safety engineering is a discipline based upon a complex science which is neither 
exact nor complete. For a realistic result to be achieved, informed approximations and 
expert judgement must be employed. In order to ensure safety, appropriate margins are 
required in the analysis.” 
To account for firefighter fatigue, varying levels of firefighter proficiency and other 
uncertainties that can affect fire service response, utilising a percentile approach can also be 
incorporated into the RUIM. The mean values provided in this manuscript are sourced from 
AFAC (2004) and are representative of the particular activity being completed within the 
stated duration, 50% of the time.  Due to the severity of the consequences of burnover, it is 
suitable to incorporate a greater percentile.  For reference, AFAC (2004) suggests a 90th 
percentile is suitable, meaning a particular activity will be completed within the stated 
duration 90% of the time.  Adopting a conservative approach, the relationship between X 
percentile and k standard deviations can be expressed as: 
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𝑘𝑘 = � 100100 − 𝑋𝑋 (4.5) 
When the distribution is unknown, for X = 90, k = 3.17 (AFAC, 2004), however where the 
average time is at least several standard deviations greater than zero, it is reasonable to 
assume the distribution to be normal and for X = 90, k = 1.28 (AFAC, 2004).  Using the example 
of an “officer size up” where the mean (μ) is 135 seconds and the standard deviation (σ) is 20 
seconds, the 90th percentile can then be expressed as: 90𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝜇𝜇 + 1.28𝜎𝜎 (4.6) 90𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  135 + (1.28 × 20) =  160.6 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴  
Where the calculation involves speed as opposed to time, the equation becomes: 90𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝜇𝜇 − 1.28𝜎𝜎 (4.7) 
 
The use of safety multipliers or factors is also recommended. As AFAC (2004) describes, 
where the scientific basis for a well-established discipline is sound, a relatively small safety 
factor (FS) as low as 1.2 may be suitable.  In keeping with the recommendations of the FBIM, a 
safety factor of 2 should be considered for the RUIM.  As opposed to applying a single safety 
factor at the completion of the model, the correct approach to incorporating safety factors 
is to apply them after each individual stage.  This is demonstrated in the case study presented 
later in this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) methodology 
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 This represents the time taken for firefighters to respond to the dispatch / turnout message 
and respond to either the staging area, or the RUI to be defended.  It considers whether the 
taskforce is pre-assembled or must first mobilise to the staging area from various locations. 
 
Figure 4.15: RUI taskforce dispatch time flow chart.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Chart 3, p56) 
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Table 4.16: RUI taskforce dispatch flow chart explanation.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Table E, p106) 
Box / 
diamond 
Description Time (s) 
1 This flowchart determines the time taken for firefighters to respond to the 
dispatch / turnout message. It is the time taken from activation of the turnout 
signal to the time when the taskforce proceeds to the RUI to be defended. 
n/a 
2 The RUI taskforce assembles at the staging point prior to mobilising to the 
RUI to be defended. 
n/a 
3 When assembled at the staging area and wearing PPC, firefighters receive 
their briefing and crew their machines immediately prior to mobilising to the 
RUI to be defended.   
60*  to 
1,200** 
4 If the RUI taskforce hasn’t been assembled then firefighters must first 
mobilize to the RUI taskforce staging area from their home fire stations.   
n/a 
5 If firefighters are on station then they must respond to the message to 
proceed to the RUI staging area, don PPC and depart.   
90* 
6 If firefighters are not on station then (as may be the case with volunteer 
stations) they must first drive to the fire station prior to responding to the 
dispatch/turnout message.  Once on station the firefighters must respond to 
the message to proceed to the RUI staging area, don PPC and depart.   
480*            
to 1,200** 
7 Figure 4.17 details the flowchart used for calculation of fire appliance travel 
times. 
Fig. 4.17 
8 Time for RUI taskforce to respond = sum of times in shaded boxes along 
chosen paths. 
n/a 
*Sourced from AFAC (2004, Table E, p106) 
**Suggested realistic worst case scenario  
 
 
This process can be used for determining both the time it takes for individual appliances 
to reach the taskforce staging area (the area all crews assemble prior to being briefed and 
dispatched as one taskforce), and the time it takes for the assembled taskforce to reached 
the RUI to be defended.   
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Figure 4.16: RUI taskforce travel time flow chart.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Chart 4, p60) 
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Table 4.17: Fire appliance and RUI taskforce travel flow chart explanation.   
Box / 
diamond 
Description Value 
9 Time taken for individual appliances to reach RUI taskforce staging area (use 
greatest time).  Also the process used to determine the time taken for the 
assembled taskforce to reach the designated RUI. 
n/a 
10 If the response is along a defined route then the actual road distance can be 
used (Box 11).  If the route or the exact distance of a route is unknown then 
the radial distance multiplier (Box 12) applies. 
n/a 
11 Use the actual road distance. Actual 
route (km) 
12 AFAC (2004, p61) reports the radial distance multiplied by 1.5 provides a 
reasonable approximation of actual road distance to be travelled. 
Radial 
distance X 
1.5 (km) 
13 AFAC (2004, Tables F1-F5) provide typical fire service travel times for 
different Australian jurisdictions.  The average of these times is provided in 
Table 4.18 and may be used where other data sets are not available (AFAC, 
2004, p61). 
Table 4.18 
14 Total travel time = distance travelled (Box 11 or 12) divided by average 
expected speed (Box 13) 
n/a 
 
Table 4.18: Mean fire appliance travel times, in kph.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Tables F1-F5).   
Context Melbourne Tasmania South Australia Average 
μ σ μ σ μ σ μ σ 
Major city CBD 38.8 12.8 45.1 24.1 36.6 8.7 40.2 15.2 
Major city inner suburb 44.3 12.0 51.0 20.3 41.4 7.3 45.6 13.2 
Major city outer suburb 60.5 16.2 43.9 18.2 42.6 8.8 49.0 14.4 
Rural town centre - - 54.9 25.6 - - 54.9 25.6 
Rural country - - 55.7 23.6 - - 55.7 23.6 
Travel through site 8 - 8 - - - 8 - 
Note: other datasets from AFAC (2004) included firefighter response times which are 
considered separately in RUIM Figure 4.15 
 
 
 
This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to set up hose lines for the 
RUI defense.  It provides flexibility around the individual RUI tactics that individual fire services 
utilise.    
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Figure 4.17: Time to set up RUI defense hose lines flow chart.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Charts 7&10) 
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Table 4.19: Time to set up RUI defense hose lines flow chart explanation.   
Box / 
diamond 
Description Value 
15 Time taken for individual crews to set up hose lines in preparation for 
RUI defense. 
n/a 
16 The Office in Charge must first complete a size up of the RUI and 
determine which properties the taskforce will focus on.  This is 
considered to be equivalent to complex wayfinding in a structure fire 
context (AFAC, 2004, Table K) and the time taken to gather 
information in an area >10,000m2 (AFAC, 2004, Table L). Total 135 
seconds. 
135 
seconds 
 
Table 4.20 
17 If lay flat hoses are used proceed to Box 18.  If high pressure hose 
reels are to be used proceed to Box 19.   
n/a 
18 Lay flat hose must be removed, connected and charged from the 
appliance.  Guidance is provided in Table 4.20, amended from AFAC 
(2004, Table V, p110). 
Table 4.20 
19 Appliance hose reel must be removed from appliance and carried to 
position.  Guidance is provided in Table 4.20, amended from AFAC 
(2004, Table Q, p109) and is considered equivalent to firefighter 
horizontal speed in PPC with equipment. 
Table 4.20 
20 Total time taken to set up RUI = sum of shaded boxes (16 + 18 or 19) 
along chosen path. 
n/a 
 
Table 4.20: RUI defense activities and times.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Tables K, L, Q, V) 
Activity Time (s) 
μ σ 
Officer in Charge size up 135  - 
Remove and position high pressure hose reel*  15.8  23.1 
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 65mm 
diameter hose 
39.4**  17.4** 
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 38mm 
diameter hose 
33.3**  15.4** 
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 65mm diameter 
hose 
20.3**  13.2** 
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 38mm diameter 
hose 
18.4**  10.2** 
*Movement speed of firefighter in turnout uniform carrying equipment (AFAC, 2004, Table 
Q) 
**Per 30m length of hose 
 
 
This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to seek shelter in an 
appropriate refuge prior to the arrival of the wildfire front.    
 
A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020 
 
4-30 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Time for firefighters to seek shelter flow chart.   
Assuming firefighters are only required to travel horizontally (i.e. no stairs are involved) and 
firefighters move at μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3 (AFAC, 2004, Table Q ‘dressed in turnout uniform with 
equipment’) the time taken for firefighters to reach the building of refuge can be estimated 
by: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑 (𝑚𝑚)
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹  (𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴−1) (4.8) 
Where Rd is the distance of the firefighters from the building of refuge; SF is the speed of 
the firefighters.  In the absence of available data it is suggested that as a worse case credible 
scenario it is appropriate to consider this distance to be 90m, being three lengths of 30m hose 
consistent with the tactics of RUI defense (DFES, 2013 & 2014). 
The time taken for a group of people (including firefighters) to pass a point in a path of 
travel (corridor, aisle, ramp, doorway) is expressed as (Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 
2008, Eqn 11): 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = 𝐴𝐴 [(1 − 𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹)𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠]⁄  (4.9) 
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Where tp is the time for passage in seconds, P is the population size in persons, D is the 
population density in persons per m2, k is 1.40, a is 0.266ms-1, and We is the effective width in 
metres of the component being transferred (door, corridor, ramp etc.).  In the absence of 
alternate data, We of a door can be assumed to be 0.6m and D assumed to be 1.9 persons 
per m2 (Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno et al., 2008). 
Whilst the time available to complete property protection tasks (TF) is not on the critical 
path for RUI defense, removal of proximal fuel from houses can increase their resilience to 
wildfire impacts (Leonard, 2009; Blanchi et al., 2006). TF is calculated by: 
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 −  (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅) (4.10) 
If  ASRPT<RSRPT then Incident Controllers need to consider the high potential for the 
responding taskforce to be caught by the approaching headfire in the open, either on route 
or during RUI preparation.   
 
 
 
In order to provide the pathway between firefighting theory and practice, and 
demonstrate the practical application of the RUIM to a realistic wildfire scenario, the following 
case study based on recent and potential wildfire events in Western Australia (illustrated in 
figures 4.19-4.21) is presented: 
A wildfire ignition is reported in the Blackwood State Forest in the south west of Western 
Australia. Aurora wildfire simulation completed by the IMT predicts the wildfire will impact 
Nannup, a town approximately 47km to the east in 30-34 hours post ignition.  The fire will also 
impact the road between the taskforce staging point and Nannup in 26-30 hours post ignition.  
For the first 11 hours suppression is unsuccessfully attempted through aerial firefighting and the 
construction of containment lines.  Community warnings are issued and residents are advised 
to evacuate north towards the regional city of Bunbury, however a large aged care facility of 
80 high dependency residents cannot be evacuated and a critical radio communications 
tower is also located in Nannup townsite.  At the 12 hour mark the IMT determine a defend-in-
place strategy is required to protect the aged care facility.  A request for a taskforce is issued 
however it is not known whether the taskforce will arrive too late to protect the town.  The 
taskforce of 30 personnel (including the Officer in Charge) will be coming from the regional 
city of Bunbury and the state capital city of Perth.  Bunbury is approximately 70km to the north, 
whilst Perth is approximately 220km to the north (both distances measured lineally). Whilst the 
Bunbury Taskforce is already assembled and ready to depart to the RUI staging area, the Perth 
Taskforce is to be made up of fire appliances from various metropolitan and regional volunteer 
fire stations, including Lancelin (114km northwest of Perth) and Northam (90km northeast of 
Perth).  The crew of Northam have advised there will be a four hour delay due to appliance 
technical issues before they can depart to the Perth staging area where the convoy will 
depart.  The IMT are situation in the town of Busselton, 50km northwest of Nannup.  This is also 
the location of the RUI Taskforce Staging point.  To provide the IMT guidance, the RUIM is 
applied. An overview map is provided in figure 7.   
 
Step One – Determining ASRPT and safety factors 
From the Aurora modelling, the town of Nannup wll be impacted by the headfire in 30-34 
hours post ignition.  It is critical however to acknowledge the request for the taskforce is issued 
12 hours post ignition, reducing the Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) to 18-22 hours. 
The Incident Controller takes a precautionary approach and requires the lower 24 hour period 
to be used.  
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 22 ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴  
A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020 
 
4-32 
 
However, another critical point is also identified for the scenario, being the available time 
before access road is impacted by fire, being 28-30 hours post ignition.  It is equally as critical 
to acknowledge this event is forecast to occur 16-18 hours after the request for the taskforce 
is issued.  This is termed the Available Safe Time to Critical Point 1 or ASTCP1 = 16 hours = 960 
minutes.  
The Incident Controller also requires 90th percentile margins and safety factors to be 
applied where possible, except for the initial travel to the taskforce staging area located well 
away from the fireground or any smoke impacts etc, and requires a Safety Factor (FS) of 2 to 
be applied in all instances. 
 
Step Two – Calculating time taken for RUI taskforce to respond (TR) 
Separate TR must be calculated for each section of the taskforce, subsequently denoted 
Bunbury TF and Perth TF.  With reference to figures 4.15-4.16, the process for determining TR for 
each section is detailed in tables 4.21-4.22 from initial dispatch to arrival at the Busselton 
staging point to receive their briefing and then table 8 from Busselton to the RUI staging point.  
The process results in TR for the Bunbury TF calculated as 58.5 minutes and the TR for the Perth 
TF as 637 minutes.  When considering the two separate taskforces are to join into a single 
taskforce to respond to the RUI, the greater value of 637 minutes is applied. 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com    
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Figure 4.20: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com    
 
Figure 4.21: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com    
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Table 4.21: TR Bunbury TF  
Step Comment Time 
1 Start of RUIM.  Proceed to step 2. n/a 
2 Task force is ready to depart Bunbury but is not at the RUI staging area.  
Proceed to step 4. 
n/a 
4 Firefighters are at their station.  Proceed to step 5. n/a 
5 Firefighters dress, assemble, assimilate information and leave station. 
Duration 90 seconds. Proceed to Step 7. 
1.5 min 
7 Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step 
9. 
n/a 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is known.  Proceed to step 11. n/a 
11 Actual distance of 52km is used, 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and 42km through ‘rural country’.  Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14. n/a 
14 Travel time to taskforce staging area = (10/49.0) + (42/55.7) = (0.2 + 0.75) = 
0.95 hours 
57 min 
End Total Bunbury TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals 
time to respond plus travel time, being 1.5 + 57 min.  Equal to 58.5 minutes. 
58.5 
minutes 
Table 4.22: TR Perth TF  
Step Comment Time 
1 Start of RUIM.  Proceed to step 2. n/a 
2 Task force is not assembled.  Proceed to step 4. n/a 
4 Firefighters are not at their station.  Proceed to step 6. n/a 
6 For all stations except for Northam, time to travel to fire station, dress, 
assemble, assimilate information and leave station is 1,200 seconds = 20 
minutes. 
For Northam station, the stated delay is 4 hours = 240 minutes.   
The highest value is used for the purposes of calculation. 
Proceed to step 7. 
 
240 min 
7 Calculation of travel time to Perth base for Perth TF to form starting at step 9. n/a 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is not known, travel times calculated for the two 
stations required to travel the greatest distance, being Lancelin (114km) and 
Northam (90km).  Assumption made that as all other metropolitan 
appliances are within 20km of the Perth base they will arrive prior to either 
Lancelin or Northam. 
Proceed to step 12. 
n/a 
12 Maximum radial distance from staging area calculated as: 
Lancelin = 1.5 x 114 = 171km; and  
Northam = 1.5 x 90 = 135km 
Both distances assumed to include 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and the remaining distance through ‘rural country’. 
Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14. n/a 
14 Travel time to taskforce staging area is calculated as: 
Lanceline = (10/49.0) + (161/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.9) = 3.1 hours = 186 minutes 
Northam = (10/49.0) + (135/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.4) = 2.6 hours = 156 minutes.  
156 min 
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As the Lancelin crew will arrive at the Perth base prior to the Northam crew 
leaving their station, the Northam value of 156 minutes is the critical value 
used for the purposes of calculation. 
Proceed to step 1 to determine time required for Perth TF to respond to TF 
staging area in Busselton. 
1 No action required.  Proceed to step 2. n/a 
2 Perth TF is assembled at the Perth base and ready to depart to the staging 
area in Busselton.  Proceed to step 4. 
 
4 Crews are at the Perth base.  Proceed to step 5.  
5 Crews receive their briefing and depart. Duration 60 seconds. Proceed to 
step 7. 
1 min 
7 Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step 9. n/a 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is known.  Proceed to step 11. n/a 
11 Actual distance of 222km is used, 20km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and 202km through ‘rural country’.  Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used.  Proceed to step 14. n/a 
14 Travel time to taskforce staging area = (20/49.0) + (202/55.7) = (0.4 + 3.6) = 4 
hours 
240 min 
End Total Perth TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals time 
to respond plus travel time, being 240 + 156 + 1 + 240 min.  Equal to 637 
minutes.  This is greater than the Bunbury TF travel time and is used for 
subsequent calculations. 
637 min 
 
Step Three – Calculating time taken for joint taskforce to travel to RUI (TT) 
Now the taskforce is united, subsequently referred to as the Joint TF, at the Busselton 
staging area, a single travel time (TT) to the RUI staging area can be calculated.  With reference 
to figure 4.15, the process for determining TT is detailed in table 4.23.  Noting that the Joint TF is 
now proceeding to the fireground, the IC requirement for 90th percentile values and safety 
factor of 2 to be applied will be in effect.  Importantly, the calculations demonstrate ASTCP1 
of 960 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 minutes and the taskforce can be safely deployed to the RUI 
with reasonable confidence that they will not be impacted by the headfire during the journey.  
The total TT is calculated as 288 minutes. 
Table 4.23: TT Joint TF  
Step Comment Time 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is known.  Proceed to step 11. n/a 
11 Actual distance of 60km is used, 5km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and 55km through ‘rural country’.  Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used and 90th percentile applied. 
 90th percentile= μ-1.28σ, therefore major city outer suburb speed = (49.0 
– (1.28x14.4) = 30.7kph and ‘rural country’ speed = (55.7 – (1.28 x 23.6) = 
25.5kph.  Proceed to step 14. 
n/a 
14 Travel time to RUI staging area = (5/30.7) + (55/25.5) = (0.2 + 2.2) = 2.4 
hours. 
144 min 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 288 min 
ASTCP1 For the taskforce to travel to the RUI without being impacted by the fire 
front, ASTCP1 > (TR+TT).  Using the forecast time of impact of the access 
road and the calculated TR and TT: 
 ASTCP1 = 960 minutes 
TR = 288 minutes and TT = 637 minutes, therefore TR+TT = 925 minutes 
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Step Four – Calculating time taken to set up hose lines (THL) 
Once the taskforce arrives at the Nannup RUI the time taken to set up hose lines and 
establish the urban defense must be calculated.  With reference to figure 5, the process for 
determining THL is detailed in table 4.24.  The IC requirement for 90th percentile values and safety 
factor of 2 to be applied is incorporated into the calculation.  The total THL is calculated as 10 
minutes. 
Table 4.24: THL Joint TF  
Step Comment Time 
15 No action required.  Proceed to step 16. n/a 
16 Time taken for Officer in Charge (OIC) to complete size up is 135 seconds 
= 2.3 minutes.  Proceed to step 17. 
2.3 min 
17 The OIC determines that hose lines will consist of 1 length of 65mm hose 
and 2 lengths of 38mm hose. Proceed to step 18. 
n/a 
18 Table 5 values used and 90th percentile applied. 
 90th percentile= μ+1.28σ, therefore time to remove and connect 65mm 
hose from appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (39.4 + (1.28 
x17.4)) = 61.7 seconds and time to remove and connect 38mm hose from 
appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (33.3 + (1.28 x 15.4) = 53.0 
seconds.   
 
Time to charge hose is the time to charge the 65mm length and both 38mm 
lengths of hose.  This is calculated by (20.3+(1.28 x 13.2)) + 2(18.4+(1.28 x 
10.2) = (37.2+62.9) = 100.1 seconds = 1.7 minutes 
Proceed to step 14. 
1.7 min 
20 THL = 2.3 + 1.7 min = 5 minutes 
 
5 min 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 10 min 
 
 
Step Five – Calculating Time taken for firefighters to seek shelter (TS) 
With reference to figure 4.18, the process for determining TS is detailed in table 4.25. The 
required time for firefighters to seek shelter prior to the arrival of untenable conditions 
associated with the head fire are calculated in accordance with equations 4.8 and 4.9, where 
Rd is the distance of the firefighters from the building of refuge = 90m; SF is the speed of the 
firefighters μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3, therefore SF = 2.3 – (1.28 x 1.3) = 0.6 ms-1; P is 30, We is 0.6m; and 
D is 1.9 persons per m2.  The FS of 2 is again applied.  The total TS is calculated as 12.6 minutes. 
 
Table 4.25: TS Joint TF  
Step Comment Time 
21 No action required.  Proceed to step 22. n/a 
16 Time taken for firefighters to reach shelter, applying equation 6.   
∴ 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎  90 (𝑚𝑚)0.6 (𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴−1) = 150 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴 = 2.5𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴 
 
Apply Safety factor. 
2.5 min 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 
Proceed to step 23. 
5 min 
18 Time taken for firefighters to enter shelter, applying equation 7. 0.65 min 
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 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = 30 [(1 − 0.266 × 1.9)1.4 × 1.9 × 0.6]� = 38 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴.   
Apply Safety factor 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 
Proceed to step 24. 
1.3 min 
24 TS = 5 + 1.3 min = 6.3 minutes 
 
6.3 min 
 
Step Six – Deterministic analysis and calculating TF 
Equation 4.4 is now applied to determine whether there is sufficient RSRPT for the taskforce 
to be deployed.  ASRPT was previously determined to be 22 hours. 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅)  
∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  (637 + 288 + 10 + 6.3)  
∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  941.3 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 =  15.7 ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴  
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇  
In this scenario, the deterministic analysis provides guidance to the IMT that there is 
sufficient time for the taskforce to safely reach the Nannup RUI and ready the defense of the 
nursing home. The calculation of RSRPT also enables evidence based trigger points to be set 
by the IMT.  For instance, should spotting result in a new headfire that will impact the access 
road into Nannup 20 hours post ignition (8 hours after the taskforce request is submitted) and 
impacting the Nannup RUI 26 hours post ignition (15 hours after the taskforce request is 
submitted), then the revised ASTCP1 of 480 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 minutes and the revised 
ASRPT of 900 minutes < RSRPT of 941.3 minutes.  Having completed the RUIM process, the IMT 
are aware that without waiting for the Perth TF, the Bunbury TF RSRPT is 369.1 minutes (6.2 hours); 
and only 310 minutes (5.2 hours) if they are already assembled at the Busselton staging area.  
This analysis supports the IMT to enact the contingency plan of deploying a smaller taskforce 
to the Nannup RUI as opposed to no taskforce at all.  It also supports the establishment of 
operational ‘go/no-go’ trigger points to reduce the potential for responding firefighters to be 
caught in burnover. 
 
 
Evacuations of communities in the path of large wildfires is a growing problem for both 
land use planners and Incident Management Teams alike (Cova, 2005; Taylor & Freeman, 
2010).  If left too late or incorrect routes are taken during evacuations, fatalities may result, 
particularly in the wake of significant wildfires (Haynes et al, 2008; Blanchi et al, 2014; Handmer 
et al, 2010; Ronchi et al, 2019). When considering whether community evacuations are 
possible, a hydraulic model which simplifies egress behaviour and enables evacuation to be 
described by a set of equations can be used (Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 2008; ICC 
et al, 2005).  This subsequently enables deterministic analysis of Available Safe Evacuation Time 
(ASET) versus Required Safe Evacuation Time (RSET) as described in the wildfire context by 
Ronchi et al, (2017 & 2019): 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 = 𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 + 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 + 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁 + 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 (4.11) 
where td is the time for the incident to be detected after ignition, tFDA is the time spent by 
the fire department assessing the situation on site, tFDI is the time spent by the fire department 
intervening and attempting to control the incident, tN is the time for the population to be 
notified once intervention has been deemed unsuccessful, tprep is the time for a resident to 
complete preparations after they have initially been notified, tfoot is the time for the population 
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to move on foot (e.g. walk to a place of safety or to a vehicle), tveh is the time for the population 
to move into a vehicle, and finally tref is the time for the individual to be on-boarded at a place 
of safety. An additional consideration not inherently contained within the model is the 
requirement for assisted evacuations from schools, aged care facilities, hospitals etc. When 
considering evacuations from such places it may be more suitable to adopt a shelter-in-place 
strategy with dedicated urban firefighting appliances.  As illustrated in Figure 4.22, the timing 
and adequacy of decisions made by Incident Controllers can have significant impact on the 
ability of the community to safely evacuate.  Whilst td, and tprep are often beyond the control 
of responding fire services, rapid and accurate assessment of the incident and subsequent 
selection of appropriate strategies and tactics (tFDI), including evacuation as a tactic, coupled 
with detailed and timely community warnings tN can increase the available time for evacuees 
to find safe refuge.  It is important to note that this approach implies various assumptions about 
human behaviour and has several limitations including (Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 
2008, p3-376): 
1. Behaviours that detract from movement are not explicitly considered; 
2. People are considered as a group as opposed to their own personal identity and 
attributes; 
3. Movement between egress components is considered, rather than within them; 
and 
4. The results are deterministic and will therefore remain the same unless changes are 
made to the scenario or the assumptions employed. 
As a result it is important to include a safety factor when considering the suitability of an 
evacuation strategy. For example, depending on the size of the population to be evacuated, 
the complexity of the situation and the Incident Controller’s own risk tolerance they may 
require ASET ˃ 2.7RSET prior to approving and evacuation plan.  As a point of reference, whilst 
AFAC (2004) identifies that the safety factor for a well-established discipline supported by 
robust evidence may be quite small and as low as 1.2, for structural firefighting efforts a factor 
of 2 is appropriate.  Given the relative infancy of wildfire engineering as a discipline, the lack 
of robust data and the potential for mass fatalities associated with evacuating people being 
caught in a burnover (Haynes et al., 2008; Handmer, O’Neil & Killalea, 2010; Blanchi et al., 2014) 
the authors suggest a minimum safety factor of 2.5 is utilised for community evacuation 
purposes in the landscape wildfire context.  In sub-landscape scale wildfire scenarios within 
the urban environment, where head fire suppression is possible and smaller community 
movements need to be considered, a safety factor of 1.5 may be suitable. 
 
 
Figure 4.22: (a) ASET; (b) RSET with delayed community notification; (c) RSET with rapid community 
notification and early evacuation decision. 
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tfoot and tref include movement and queuing times for all evacuees and can become 
complicated where large numbers of evacuees are moving to different refuges.  In such 
instances guidance can be found in Gwynne & Rosenbaum (in DiNenno, 2008), however in 
simple cases flow of persons through a certain point (such as the doors of buildings) can be 
calculated by: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠 (4.12) 
where Fc is calculated flow (m/s), S is speed of movement(m/s), D is population density 
(persons/m2), and We is effective width of component being traversed such as a door or 
stairwell (m). 
 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 (4.13) 
where k and a are both constants, obtained from sources including Gwynne & 
Rosenbaum (in DiNenno, 2008, Table 3-13.2) or Vaughan and Bain (2001). 
 
The complexity of mass evacuations during natural disasters and emergencies requires 
dynamic modelling software to be used (Shiwakoti et al., 2013). Dynamic traffic simulation 
enables the comparison of different evacuation plans under a variety of situations (Yuan et 
al., 2006), however there is often a trade-off between accuracy, cost, data requirements and 
the time required for simulations to be completed (Shiwakoti et al., 2013). In addition to 
recommending minimum traffic means of egress standards for urban design in wildfire prone 
areas, Cova (2005) also identifies the major factors that can impede community evacuation.  
Whilst accurately calculating tveh remains problematic (Cova et al, 2011; Intini et al, 2019; 
Ronchi et al, 2017), in an urban design and planning assessment context when a shelter in 
place strategy is adopted, calculation of tveh is not required as occupants are not leaving the 
site.  To improve the design of wildfire prone communities (including visiting tourists) in regards 
to large scale evacuation and egress, Cova (2005) recommends a number of safety aspects.  
These recommendations are summarised in Tables 4.26-4.29. 
 
Table 4.26: Wildfire prone road design safety aspects. Adapted from Cova (2005) 
Component Standard 
Occupant load factor (density) The density of homes along the roads in any fire-prone community or 
portion thereof should not exceed: that specified in Table 4.16 (reproduced 
with permission from ASCE) 
Number of exits The number of means-of-egress from any fire-prone community or portion 
thereof shall meet the minimum specified in Table 4.28 (reproduced with 
permission from ASCE) 
Exit capacity The total egress capacity from a fire-prone community or portion thereof 
shall meet the factors specified in Table 4.29 (reproduced with permission 
from ASCE) 
Exit arrangement The closest distance between any two points along any of the n exits from 
a fire-prone community must be at least 1/n the maximum diagonal 
distance across the community. The maximum diagonal of a community 
is defined as the greatest Euclidean distance between any two households 
that rely on the same exit set, and the minimum distance between exits is 
defined as the shortest Euclidean distance between any two points along 
two exiting roads. 
Maximum exist distance No household in a fire-prone community shall be further than 3 km by 
road from its closest exit. The maximum exit distance for a community is 
defined as the household with the greatest shortest-path distance on the 
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road network to an exit discharge in the most constraining bottleneck set 
i.e., the end of one of the exiting roads from the community. 
Exit vulnerability (distance to fuel) Exits in a fire-prone community shall have a 10m buffer on each side that 
is clear of fuel. 
 
 
 
Table 4.27: Occupant load factor (density). Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE 
Use Hazard Road length per household (m) Road length per vehicle (m) 
Residential Low 12.5 6.3 
Moderate 16.7 8.3 
High 20.0 10.0 
Residential 
& Tourism 
Low 12.5 4.2 
Moderate 16.7 5.6 
High 20.0 6.7 
 
Table 4.28: Minimum exits. Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE 
Number of households Minimum number of 
exiting roads 
Maximum households per 
exit. 
1-50 1 50 
51-300 2 150 
301-600 3 200 
600+ 4 200 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.29: Exit capacity. Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE 
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Use Hazard Minimum total exit capacity 
(vehicles per hour per 
household) 
Minimum evacuation time 
(hours) 
Residential Low 1 2 
Moderate 2 1 
High 4 0.5 
Residential 
& Tourism 
Low 1.5 2 
Moderate 3 1 
High 6 0.5 
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4.5  Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s  
Wildfires, particularly mega wildfires such as those experienced in late 2019 and early 2020 
throughout Australia are dynamic and complex disasters that require significant interstate and 
international resourcing over prolonged durations.  When such events occur they will inevitably 
impact life and property as well as overwhelming firefighting efforts.  This chapter discussed 
the strategies available to firefighters, their limitations, and where the evidence suggests they 
may be successful.  Detailed and accurate planning is required to be completed by IMT’s and 
fire behaviour specialists to ensure firefighting operations are suitable and to minimise the 
potential for firefighter injury.  When applied correctly and in the right context, the findings of 
new research including Table 4.15 and the RUIM may assist IMT’s to achieve this. 
As will be the case in many landscape scale wildfires and mega wildfires, detailed 
predictions and analysis of wildfire behaviour in itself is insufficient.  Care must be taken to 
bridge the theory – practice gap and ensure planning is operationally relevant.  The research 
presented in this chapter demonstrates that even in mild conditions, the head fire will often be 
unstoppable where it occurs in continuous vegetation fuel bed geometry.  This is further 
supported by the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The use of existing wildfire scars and 
prescribed burns for wildfire suppression can only be considered opportunistic and with 
marginal chance of success unless the burn scar is both recent (within 2-3 years) and significant 
in area. As climate change continues to result in worsening fire conditions, frontline firefighters, 
IMT’s and fire behaviour specialists need to apply increased scrutiny to fuel bed structure and 
geometry, focusing suppression efforts where fuels are discontinuous and broken. 
 
4.6 Implications for urban planners  
By understanding wildfire behaviour and wildfire suppression strategies, urban planners 
can significantly influence the defendability and resilience of communities to wildfire impacts 
through appropriate design of development at the RUI.  The research and increased analysis 
presented in this chapter enables wildfire impacts and potential suppression to be considered 
at the design stage of RUI development.  Evidence based design that incorporates minimum 
measures for evacuations and eliminates the unrealistic expectation that firefighters will be 
able to defend every property will lead to more appropriate passive3 wildfire resilient design 
The use of design wildfires, Wildfire Engineering Briefs and Wildfire Engineering Reports, 
similar to the standard fire engineering processes within the urban fire engineering profession 
will only further increase the standard of safety in bushfire prone areas.  These are detailed and 
complex technical documents however that required a high degree of technical knowledge 
and proficiency from both the engineer and the agencies involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Passive systems do not require action or maintenance.  For instance, ensuring road 
design allows sufficient evacuation opportunity without additional control measures is a 
passive measure that can be supported by appropriate and timely community evacuation 
messages.  Firefighters being required to suppress a wildfire is an active intervention.  
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5. Firefighter tenability in the wildfire context 
5.1 Introduction 
Whilst the wildfire suppression thresholds discussed in Chapter 4 are utilised internationally 
by fire services, they fail to sufficiently consider firefighter tenability.  The International Fire 
Engineering Guidelines (ICC, 2005) defines untenable conditions as “environmental conditions 
associated with fire in which human life is not sustainable.”  This should not be confused with 
the conditions required to facilitate effective firefighting suppression which are significantly 
milder than those able to be withstood for short periods of time. Therefore, improving firefighter 
safety during wildfire suppression by clearly defining fire ground environmental conditions that 
are considered tenable, or safe for firefighters is paramount.  Both the Society of Fire Safety 
(2014) and Poh (2010) identify four primary hazards associated with fires within the built 
environment that affect tenability being convected heat, radiant heat, toxic gases and smoke 
obscuration.  However, as Poh (2010) reports, there is no single set of related values for 
tenability criteria which is universally accepted.  This chapter defines and discusses firefighter 
tenability in the wildfire context to assist Incident Controllers to make critical incident decisions 
during chaotic and large wildfire incidents. 
 
5.2 Defining Tenability  
Smoke obscuration is excluded as a factor affecting firefighter tenability in the wildfire 
context due to the lack of injuries and incidents associated with visual obscurity during wildfire 
events (Hayes et al, 2008; Penney, 2019 – risk). Knight, Brown and Leonard (2001) identify the 
toxic gases produced during the thermal degradation of vehicle componentry, particularly 
the interior vehicle componentry, will be subsequent to the loss of tenability due to radiant 
heat and other factors.   The same authors do note that hydrogen chloride (HCl), a severe 
irritant released when vinyl interiors thermally degrade even without combustion, 
formaldehyde (HCHO), hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and carbon monoxide (CO) may cause 
significant irritation to occupants in the vehicle cabin, however not to the extent of affecting 
tenability.  The concentration for each of these gases that are immediately dangerous to life 
or health (IDLH) are detailed in Table 5.1.  Brown et al. (2003) reports fire truck cabins will 
generally remain tenable in regards to toxic gases unless there is catastrophic window failure 
with glass falling from the frame. 
Table 5.1: IDLH concentrations 
Material IDLH (ppm) Source & Comments 
CO 1000-8000 (Brown et al., 2003; NIOSH, 2014)  
HCHO 20-100  (Brown et al., 2003; Kent, 1998; NIOSH, 2014a)  
@20ppm – severe respiratory irritation  
@50ppm – pulmonary oedema  
@100ppm – immediate death 
HCl 50-1000 (Brown et al., 2003; Hull et al., 2008; NIOSH, 2014b) 
@50ppm – barely tolerable 
@1000ppm pulmonary oedema 
HCN 50-280 (Brown et al., 2003; NIOSH, 2016) 
@ 100 death after 1 hour 
@181 fatal after 10 minutes 
@280 immediately fatal 
 
Radiant heat transfer is primarily responsible for the propagation of landscape scale 
bushfire and subsequent impacts on firefighters (Penney & Stevenson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; 
Butler, 2014; Frankman et al., 2012; Leonard, 2010) therefore it is proposed any impacts of 
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convective heat transfer, or noxious gases on firefighters would first occur from radiant heat 
transfer.  Direct flame contact from the passing fire front or adjacent involved fuels (including 
burning fuels underneath the vehicle) have the potential to result in rapid vehicle fire 
involvement and untenable conditions in as little as 90 seconds (DFES, 2012a & 2016; Pearce 
et al, 2004).  Post burnover investigations support the conclusion radiant heat remains the 
greatest threat to firefighters (Sullivan et al., 2003) and conditions within the vehicle cabin may 
become untenable in a much shorter timeframe than this (Linton, 2016; Johnstone, 2002; 
Pearce et al., 2004; WFA, 2013).  Calculated potential peak radiant heat flux from large 
wildfires can exceed 76 kWm-2, even at greater than 10 m separation from the head fire under 
mild fuel loads and weather conditions (Penney et al., 2019a).  By comparison experiential 
forest fire field data reported by Frankman et al. (2013) identified peak heat fluxes of 179 kWm-
2 and 263 kWm-2, whilst an analysis of 216 homes post the Springwood wildfire in New South 
Wales, Australia in 2013 by Newnham et al. (2014) estimated peak radiant heat fluxes 
experienced by houses to be as much as 52.5kWm-2. 
Purser (2008) cites three methods of incapacitation from exposure to fire are possible, 
being heat stroke, body surface burns and respiratory tract burns.  The sensation of pain occurs 
prior to burns, incapacitation and ultimately death, however in the case of significant bushfire 
such events may be almost simultaneous as opposed to the more prolonged onset of 
hyperthermia.   
In considering pain and burns two assumptions detailed in both Poe (2010) and Purser 
(2008) are retained: 
1. Thermal burns to the respiratory tract will not occur unless the air temperature / or 
humidity are sufficient to cause (unprotected) facial skin burns; and 
2. Heat flux and temperature tenability limits designed to protect victims from 
incapacitation by skin burns should be adequate to protect them from burns to the 
respiratory tract.  
Whilst the protective effects of Personal Protective Clothing (PPC) and Equipment (PPE) 
are acknowledged, this report includes a third assumption that unprotected skin thresholds are 
suitable for modelling purposes (and as a result incorporate an inherent safety factor where 
structural firefighting PPC and PPE are worn).  Limited experimental data involving human test 
subjects is available to support tenability thresholds and variance between the literature exists.  
Although Raj (2008) suggests exposure to as much as 5 kWm-2 may occur without pain or injury 
in clothed subjects, Poe (2010) identifies 2.5 kWm-2 is sufficient to result in both skin and 
respiratory burns.  The Australasian Fire Authorities Council (2004) provides further guidance for 
firefighters in structural firefighting PPC (including Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) as 
detailed in Table 5.2, however the Society of Fire Safety (2014) suggest the ‘Routine’ exposure 
threshold may be inappropriate considering radiant heat flux received whilst sunbaking may 
be as high as 1.1 kWm-2.  For firefighters sheltering inside a fire appliance cabin Knight et al. 
(2001) utilise a 60 second radiation limit of 2 kWm-2 and air blast temperature limit of 200°C 
however the lower temperature of 150°C for exposed personnel is adopted in Europe (2010). 
Further guidance regarding human tolerance to thermal radiation is provided by Purser (2008, 
Table 2-6.19] as summarised in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.2: Firefighter exposure limits 
 Routine 
Condition 
Hazardous 
Condition 
Extreme 
Condition 
 
Critical 
Condition 
Maximum Time 25 minutes 10 minutes 1 minute < 1 minute 
Maximum Air Temperature 100°C 120°C 160°C >235°C 
Maximum Radiation 1kWm-2 3kWm-2 4-4.5kWm-2 >10kWm-2 
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Table 5.3: Radiant heat flux effects 
Heat Flux kWm-2 
Time to Effect (seconds) 
Pain Burn  Full Burn 
2.5 40 - - 
4.2 - 30 (blisters) - 
10.5 5 - - 
23.5 1.6 - - 
30 6 10 >15 
35 5 9.5 >15 
40 4.5 9 >15 
50 4 7 >15 
100 2 4 6 
150 1 2.5 4 
 
The time taken for various effects as a result of exposure to thermal radiation can also be 
calculated by Purser’s (2008) equation: 
𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 𝑎𝑎4 3�
𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝
4
3�
 (5.1) 
where trad is the time to reach end effect for the identified thermal radiation (minutes), qr 
is the given radiant heat flux, and r is the radiant heat exposure [(kWm-2)min-1] for the identified 
endpoint detailed in Table 5.4: 
Table 5.4: Radiant heat exposures  
Thermal radiation [(kWm-2)min-1] Endpoint 
1.33 tolerance limit / pain / first-degree burns 
10 severe incapacitation and second-degree burns 
16.7 fatal exposure with third-degree burns 
 
Applying Purser’s equation, Penney et al. (2019a) provided comparison of the various 
times to reach the identified endpoint as a function of radiant heat flux.  This is shown in Figure 
5.1 and illustrates that incapacitating burns can occur within relatively small timeframes at the 
lower end of possible wildfire induced radiant heat flux.  The results demonstrate fatal exposure 
occurs within 1 minute once radiant heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2, whilst incapacitating injuries 
occur within 1 minute once radiant heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2.   
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Figure 5.1: Time to effect as a function of thermal radiation 
5.3 Radiant heat flux suppression and tenability thresholds 
Penney et al. (2019) reported that when setting firefighter tenability thresholds, the worse 
cast credible scenario should be adopted.  This is defined as firefighters in personal protective 
clothing (PPC) suitable for wildland fire suppression are exposed to radiant heat effects of a 
rapidly advancing flame edge that is part of a continuous landscape scale wildfire flank or 
head.  This is a deliberate measure to account for burnover situations in appliances are 
disabled and firefighters attempt to flee by foot.  In these situations sheltering behind 
appliances and other small structures will provide little if any shielding from radiant heat flux 
(Penney & Stevenson, 2019).  Whilst the literature identifies several potential tenable limits as 
previously discussed, it is recommended the AFAC (2004) “Hazardous Condition” limit of 3 
kWm-2 is adopted as the threshold for suppression operations involving personnel (the 
“Suppression Threshold”).  This is less than both the “Extreme” limit of 4 kWm-2 (AFAC, 2004) and 
the acceptable 5 kWm-2 exposure in normal clothing reported by Raj (2008) which were 
considered to provide an insufficient margin for error to firefighters to retreat to a safe area as 
incapacitating injury may occur within 30 seconds depending on the individual, but greater 
than the limit adopted by Knight et al. (2001).  As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the “Critical” limit of 
10 kWm-2 [58] can result in incapacitating burns in less than one minute and is subsequently 
identified as the “Tenability Threshold”.   The “Suppression Threshold”, being the radiant heat 
flux the firefighters in PPC can withstand whilst being able to undertake suppression activities is 
inherently lower than the “Tenability Threshold”, being the radiant heat flux those same 
firefighters could physically survive.  Whilst different PPC affords firefighters various levels of 
protection however exposed skin and respiratory tracts (in the absence of closed circuit 
breathing apparatus) remain vulnerable.  As a result the thresholds reported by Penney et al. 
(2019) incorporate an inherent safety factor where structural firefighting PPE is worn. 
Illustrated in Table 5.5, even in the mildest of fuel loads and fire weather conditions, when 
attempting to suppress a fully developed forest head fire in continuous fuel structures, 
firefighters will need to remain at least 20 m from the head fire (Penney et al., 2019).  At 
understory fuel loads of 5 t/ha and assuming no shielding, the Suppression Threshold is 
exceeded even at an FDI of 10 until 20 m separation from the head fire is achieved, whilst 
tenability limits are exceeded for the first 6 m from the head fire.  The required separation for 
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the Suppression Threshold increases with FDI, with 28 m separation necessary to reach suitable 
conditions once an FDI of 40 is reached.  Conditions supportive of suppression efforts are not 
experienced within 30 m of the head fire at or above an FDI of 50.  As illustrated in Figures 5.2 
and 5.3, representative of typical Woodland and Forest fuel loads [28], conditions worsen as 
fuel load increases.  For typical Woodlands fuel loads, depending on FDI, radiant heat flux falls 
below the Tenability Threshold at 15 m-35 m whilst 35 m-80 m separation is required for 
conditions to be conducive to safe suppression efforts.  These distances increase to 20 m to 50 
m and 45 m to >100 m respectively for typical Forest fuel loads.   None of the scenarios analysed 
resulted in conditions that would facilitate suppression efforts on the head fire within 10 m of 
the flame edge, being the typical maximum separation from the flaming zone for firefighters 
to effectively apply suppressants from hand held attack lines or machine monitors. 
 
Table 5.5: Separation (distance between firefighters and flaming zone) required for suppression and 
tenability thresholds 
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (based on 5 m increment data) 
Surface 
Fuel 
(t/ha)  
FDI 
10 
FDI 
20 
FDI 
30 
FDI 
40 
FDI 
50 
FDI 
60 
FDI 
70 
FDI  
80 
FDI  
90 
FDI 
100 
w5 
Tenability  10 10 10 10 15 15 15 15 15 20 
Suppression 20 25 25 30 35 35 35 40 40 45 
w10 
Tenability  10 15 15 15 20 20 25 25 25 30 
Suppression 30 35 40 45 45 50 55 60 60 65 
w15 
Tenability  15 15 20 20 25 30 30 30 35 35 
Suppression 35 40 50 55 60 65 70 70 75 80 
w20 
Tenability  15 20 25 25 30 35 35 40 40 45 
Suppression 40 50 55 65 70 75 80 85 90 90 
w25 
Tenability  20 25 30 30 35 40 45 45 50 50 
Suppression 45 55 65 70 75 85 90 95 100 >100 
w30 
Tenability  20 25 30 35 40 45 50 50 55 60 
Suppression 50 60 70 80 85 90 95 >100 >100 >100 
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Figure 5.2: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between radiant heat 
flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Woodlands fuel structures 
 
Figure 5.3: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between radiant heat 
flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Forest fuel structures 
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Applying Purser’ equation [56] and assuming 10 m separation from the head fire, the 
reality of the environmental conditions faced by firefighters becomes evident across 
understory fuel loads and FDI (Table 5.6).  In the mildest of conditions, the time taken for pain 
tolerance thresholds to be reached and for first degree burns to occur is 8 seconds.  In 
foreseeable circumstances, such as an FDI of 60 and understory fuel loads of 25 t/ha, this time 
is reduced to less than a second.  In comparison, the time taken for severe incapacitation to 
occur in the mildest conditions at 10 m separation from the head fire is approximately 120 
seconds, whilst at an FDI of 60 and understory fuel load of 25 t/ha this drops to approximately 
10 seconds.  At 10 m separation and at the lowest FDI and fuel load, fatal exposure limits are 
also rapidly reached, occurring in under 233 seconds.  At understory fuel loads of 25t/ha and 
an FDI 60 fatal exposure will occur in less than 17 seconds (Table 5.6).       
The time frame for incapacitating burns to occur is a critical factor when identifying safe 
zones for firefighter retreat and for assessing the appropriate wildfire suppression strategies and 
tactics.  When interpreting the results of this study, it is suggested that once incapacitation 
occurs a firefighter will likely be imminently exposed to fatal levels of radiant heat and the 
shorter time frame should be applied.   It is also important to consider the shielding effects of 
intervening unburnt vegetation may provide firefighters a false sense of fire intensity until the 
flames engulf the vegetation in front of them.  Firefighters surprised by the rapid emergence of 
landscape scale wildfire from behind thick vegetation could be rapidly incapacitated and 
may have insufficient time to retreat to vehicles and activate protective systems such as 
sprinklers and radiation shields fitted to the vehicles.   Even if protective systems are activated, 
the flow rates required to extinguish or substantially lessen fire impact is likely to exceed the 
capacity of the protective systems (Penney et al., 2019b; Penney et al. 2020b) which suggests 
fatal burnovers may still occur. 
Table 5.6: Time to pain, incapacitation and fatal exposure from radiation at 10m separation from the 
head fire 
Time (seconds) taken to tolerance limit / pain / first degree burn at 10m separation  
w/FDI 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
w5 8.0 6.4 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 
w10 4.8 3.6 2.8 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 
w15 3.4 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 
w20 2.5 1.8 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 
w25 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 
w30 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Time (seconds) taken to severe incapacitation and second degree burns at 10m separation  
w/FDI 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
w5 117.5 94.4 78.2 66.3 57.3 50.2 44.5 39.8 35.9 32.7 
w10 71.4 53.2 41.8 34.1 28.5 24.4 21.2 18.6 16.6 14.9 
w15 49.7 35.7 27.3 21.9 18.0 15.2 13.1 11.4 10.1 9.0 
w20 37.3 26.2 19.7 15.6 12.8 10.7 9.1 7.9 6.9 6.1 
w25 29.5 20.3 15.2 11.9 9.6 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.0 5.0 
w30 24.1 16.4 12.1 9.4 7.6 6.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Time (seconds) taken to fatal exposure with third degree burns at 10m separation  
w/FDI 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
w5 232.8 187.0 155.0 131.4 113.4 99.4 88.1 78.9 71.2 64.7 
w10 141.4 105.5 82.9 67.6 56.6 48.3 42.0 36.9 32.8 29.4 
w15 98.4 70.6 54.1 43.3 35.7 30.2 25.9 22.6 19.9 17.8 
w20 74.0 51.8 39.1 30.9 25.3 21.2 18.1 15.6 13.7 12.1 
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w25 58.4 40.3 30.0 23.5 19.1 15.9 13.5 11.6 10.0 10.0 
w30 47.8 32.5 24.0 18.7 15.1 12.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, emissivity will vary depending on the depth of the active fire 
front.  Table 5.7 illustrates the effect of emissivity on the Tenability and Suppression thresholds.  
For Woodlands fuels, the Tenability Threshold is not achieved until a minimum 25 m separation 
from the head fire flames is reached whilst the Suppression Threshold is not achieved until a 
minimum 60 m separation is reached. For Forest structures, these distances increase to 40 m 
and 80 m respectively.  These results suggest suppression efforts will be ineffective against siege 
head fires where the flame emissivity exceeds 0.6, representative of optically thick flames in 
head fires with an active flame depth of more than 1 m to 1.5 m (Boulet et al., 2009;  SAI Global, 
2019;  Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011). 
Table 5.7: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds – sensitivity 
to emissivity 
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data) 
Surface 
Fuel 
(t/ha)  Ԑ 0.6 Ԑ 0.65 Ԑ 0.7 Ԑ 0.75 Ԑ 0.8 Ԑ 0.85 Ԑ 0.9 Ԑ 0.95 
w15 
Tenability  25 30 30 30 35 35 35 35 
Suppression 60 65 65 70 70 75 75 80 
w25 
Tenability  40 40 40 45 45 50 50 50 
Suppression 80 85 85 90 95 95 100 >100 
 
As illustrated in Table 5.8, as the FDI and understory fuel loads increase, slope has a greater 
effect on the separation distance required to achieve tenable and operational conditions.  In 
all scenarios presented, increased positive slope and associated increase in fire behaviour 
decreases tenability and suppression potential compared to equivalent siege wildfire burning 
over flat terrain.   
 
Table 5.8: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds – sensitivity 
to slope 
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data) 
FDI  0° Slope 5° Slope 10° Slope 15° Slope 20° Slope 
10 
Tenability  20 20 25 25 30 
Suppression 45 50 55 60 65 
20 
Tenability  25 25 30 35 45 
Suppression 55 60 70 80 85 
30 
Tenability  30 30 40 45 55 
Suppression 65 70 80 95 >100 
40 
Tenability  35 40 50 60 70 
Suppression 75 80 90 >100 >100 
50 
Tenability  35 40 50 60 70 
Suppression 75 90 100 >100 >100 
60 
Tenability  40 45 55 65 80 
Suppression 85 95 >100 >100 >100 
70 
Tenability  45 50 60 70 85 
Suppression 90 100 >100 >100 >100 
A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020 
 
5-9 
 
80 
Tenability  45 55 65 75 90 
Suppression 95 >100 >100 >100 >100 
90 
Tenability  50 60 70 80 100 
Suppression 100 >100 >100 >100 >100 
100 
Tenability  50 60 75 85 >100 
Suppression >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 
 
 
5.4 Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s 
It is concerning that existing operational wildfire suppression thresholds do not 
systematically or quantifiably take account of wildfire behaviour (RoS, I and LF) combined with 
the associated potential radiant heat flux received by firefighters attempting suppression 
activities in a landscape scale wildfire scenario.  Current fire behaviour-linked suppression 
guidelines do not specifically address the tenability of environmental conditions in the 
proximity of the flaming zone where firefighters are often working to suppress the fire.  Once 
tenability thresholds are considered it is evident that offensive, direct attack on the head of 
large wildfires is extremely hazardous to firefighters under all but the mildest of conditions. 
Consideration of radiant heat flux also reveals how truly dangerous defensive rural urban 
interface firefighting is.  Firefighters exposed to head fire fronts will potentially be subjected to 
levels of radiant heat that are capable of causing severe incapacitating burns in as little as 
five seconds in elevated fire weather conditions and higher fuel loads.   Incident Controllers 
and fire crew leaders must therefore carefully consider whether properties and the occupants 
that shelter insider them are defendable or whether the credible risk to their own crews is too 
high.  As discussed in Chapter 7, firefighters have a personal risk tolerance higher than that of 
their commanding officers, this means that frontline firefighters are more likely than their 
ranking officers to commit themselves to defending occupants from insuppressible wildfire 
fronts.  This is  potentially due to firefighters’ own personal expectations that they should put 
themselves in personal danger to protect and rescue civilians, whist officers also consider the 
responsibility of keeping their crews safe and potential greater reaching consequences on the 
firefighter’s family should they be severely injured or killed during wildfire suppression operations 
(Penney, 2019).   
As opposed to being part of a RUI strategy, sheltering inside or behind firefighting 
appliances during the passage of a wildfire front should be considered an absolute last resort 
only.  Instead, firefighters should seek refuge in suitable structures well before the expected 
impact of the wildfire front and emerge to salvage property where they are able to do so.  
Committing to a RUI defense by positioning firefighters in between a landscape scale forest 
wildfire front and private property or critical infrastructure with the expectation that suppression 
efforts will be either safe or successful is at best, reckless.  Even the intervention of aerial 
firefighting suppression is unlikely to be sufficient to make this approach safe or effective.  
Given the extreme danger associated with RUI firefighting, it should be considered only as a 
contingency plan except in extreme circumstances where large populations of vulnerable 
communities including school, nursing homes and hospitals cannot be safely evacuated prior 
to the arrival of the wildfire front. 
 
5.5 Implications for urban planners 
Current wildfire planning guidelines and policy in Australia  typically set deemed to satisfy 
‘acceptable’4 threshold for development at 10kW-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for 
 
4 Planning approval will typically be provided. 
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vulnerable, critical or hazardous land use5 and between 19kWm-2 to 29kWm-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; 
WAPC, 2015, 2017) for standard development such as subdivision.  As detailed in this chapter, 
10kWm-2 is considered critical conditions for firefighters in structural PPC and breathing 
apparatus, with retreat required in less than 60 seconds.  At the same level, for a healthy person 
without protective equipment, incapacitating burns are predicted in approximately 60 
seconds, with severe pain and first degree burns expected to occur after substantially less 
exposure.  By adopting these thresholds, communities are effectively being designed to be 
undefendable by firefighters.  At 29kWm-2, firefighters in structural PPC and breathing 
apparatus are likely to face incapacitating burns in less than 30 seconds.  This realisation is also 
significant for firefighters and IMT’s who are considering firefighting defense of threatened 
communities who must consider whether they are expected to, or are indeed themselves 
expecting to do the impossible and un-survivable. 
The solution from an urban planning perspective may rest in several approaches that 
require consideration on a case by case basis: 
1. If development is required to be actively defendable by firefighters during the passage 
of a wildfire front, the maximum radiant heat impact at any point within the 
development needs to be within the window of safe and effective wildfire suppression.  
In turn, this arguably either requires extensive and permanent vegetation modification 
and fuel reduction around the development, or appropriate landscaping that forms 
part of a passive wildfire engineered design; 
2. If development does not require active firefighter defense then the actual level of 
wildfire radiant heat impact can, in theory, be addressed by the application of 
enhanced wildfire resilient engineering construction such as that detailed in AS3959.  In 
turn, this may also allow the fire truck related road access standards to such as those 
described in existing guidelines (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017; GSA, 2012) to be 
revisited; 
3. Development of an evidence based performance based wildfire urban planning 
code, similar to that of the Building Code of Australia and that adopted by Tasmania 
(2017).  This would need to go beyond the existing and largely subjective planning 
guidelines and carry throughout the planning and building legislation and process, as 
is the case in Victoria (VSG, 2019); 
4. Professionalisation and regulation of the wildfire engineering industry.  Whilst the existing 
Bushfire Planning and Design (BPAD) accreditation scheme is the first step in this 
process, the technical knowledge and expertise required of wildfire engineers 
arguably requires greater accreditation and regulation.  
 
 
5 Vulnerable land use includes schools, nursing homes, tourism etc.   
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6. Critical water flow rates 
6.1 Introduction 
Globally various retardants are applied during wildfire suppression efforts, yet water 
remains the primary extinguishing agent (Hansen, 2012). Whilst prediction of water suppression 
requirements and its impacts on firefighting strategies and logistics within the urban 
environment has been the subject of many previous publications (Grimwood, 2017; Barnett, 
2004), the same level of research has yet to be applied in the field of wildfire suppression 
(Hansen, 2012; Simpson et al., 2019). With fire services around the globe advocating offensive 
wildfire fighting strategies (DFES, 2012, 2014a; DBCA, 2014; Hirsch et al., 1996; Eurofire, 2012) 
heavily reliant the application of both water and other suppressants, it is suggested this 
knowledge gap and a lack of suitable data may be impeding firefighting efforts of significant 
wildfires, known as siege or campaign wildfires amongst fire services internationally.  
Existing water extinguishment models reported by Hansen (2012) have been validated 
against field data from low intensity experimental burns with fire line intensities of less than 1 
MWm−1 and flame lengths of less than 2.5 m. These experimental conditions are far from the 
conditions faced during siege wildfire events which can include fire line intensities of 88 MWm−1 
and flame heights extending 10–20 m above the crowns of trees (Cruz et al, 2012). Further 
limiting the application of existing research to dynamic emergency conditions is the lack of 
consideration for the capabilities of firefighting vehicles and aircraft that have limited water 
capacities and may be away from the active fire front for considerable durations whilst they 
refill. 
To work towards addressing the identified knowledge gap, this chapter applies a fire 
engineering analysis of water flow rates required for head fire suppression during wildfires. 
Guidance is provided in relation to critical water flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire 
across a wide range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths. The impacts 
of the results on current suppression strategies and logistics are discussed in order to facilitate 
enhanced effectiveness and safety of operational response to siege wildfire incidents.   
 
6.2 Calculating critical flow rates  
The prevention or extinguishment of fire through the application of water occurs by three 
methods (Hansen, 2012; Grimwood, 2017): 
1. Water is applied to fuel surfaces not yet involved in fire, preventing pyrolysis and the 
production of combustion gases; 
2. Water is applied directly into the flames, cooling the flame below the critical temperature; 
or 
3. Water is applied directly to the burning fuel surface, cooling the fuel and resulting in a 
reduced pyrolysis rate and quenching of the flames. 
When considering active suppression efforts during high intensity bushfires only surface 
cooling should be considered as evaporating water vapour is rapidly dispersed and will not 
noticeably affect the flame temperature (Hansen, 2012). As a result, by applying Fire Point 
Theory and accounting for external radiant and convective heat flux, the critical flow rate (CF) 
in Lm−2s−1 can be calculated for the wildfire scenarios using Equation (6.1). CF is the flow rate 
of water required to extinguish a burning surface, with an infinite period of time available 
(Särdqvist, 2002). As the wildfire length and depth of the active flame front changes over time 
and is influenced by many factors including but not limited to terrain, wind, fuel structure and 
fuel geometry (Cruz et al., 2015, Penney & Stevenson, 2019), the CF can only be calculated at 
a specific point in time. The limitations of fire ground suppression, including appliance or 
aircraft capacity and available must be considered and are addressed later in the chapter.  
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𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 = ?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0 + ?̇?𝑞”𝐸𝐸𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 × 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 (6.1) 
where: 
?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0  is the critical water application rate assuming no external heat flux, identified 
as ≈0.0129 Lm−2s−1 (Hansen, 2012), 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 is the efficiency of water application, representing the 
portion of water leaving the firefighting branch which actually contributes to fire 
extinguishment, conservatively assumed to be 0.7 (Hansen, 2012), 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 is the enthalpy 
change of water, identified as 2640 kJkg−1, ?̇?𝑞”𝐸𝐸 is external heat flux, calculated using Equation 
(6.2),  
 
?̇?𝑞”𝐸𝐸 = � 0.27 × 𝐹𝐹�2 × 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 + 𝐹𝐹� × 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏� + �ℎ × �𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 − 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙�� (6.2) 
Where 𝐹𝐹 is fire line intensity in kWm−1, 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is flame length in m, 𝐹𝐹 is depth of the active flame in m, 
𝜏𝜏 is atmospheric transmissivity, assumed to be 1 due to the proximity of the unburned fuel in 
respect to the flames, 𝜏𝜏 is view factor, assumed to be 1 due to the proximity of the unburned 
fuel in respect to the flames, h is the convective heat transfer coefficient set at 0.077 kW/m2K 
assuming a forced convection and air velocity at 10 ms−1 (Hansen, 2012), Tg is gas temperature 
of the flame, assumed to be 1090 K, representative of siege wildfire conditions (Penney & 
Stevenson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011; Wotton et al., 2011), Tfuel is the 
fuel temperature of the fuel, assumed to be 588 K, being the ignition surface temperature for 
pine-needle fuel beds (Hansen, 2012). 
Penney et al., (2019b) completed analysis of CF using Equation (6.1) across variations of 
fuel load, FDI and active flame depth to simulate a large range of wildfire conditions and 
scenarios. Six variations of forest understory fuel loads at 5 tha−1 increments between 5–30 tha−1 
with corresponding total fuel loads between 15–40 tha−1 (Note: the assumption that the 
canopy contributes 10 tha−1 reported in SAI Global (2018) is retained) were simulated, 
representing a broad spectrum of forest fuel loads (Penney et al., 2019a). Ten variations of FDI 
at increments of 10 between 10–100, identified as the 99.9th percentile of fire weather 
conditions across Australia (Dowdy et al., 2012) were incorporated into the simulations. Nine 
variants of active flame depth (D) were also modelled at 1m increments between 2–10 m, 
representative of the optically thick head fire flame experienced during severe wildfire events 
(Penney & Stevenson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011). In total, 540 wildfire 
scenarios were analysed. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities were derived 
from technical literature (DFES 2013, 2014c, 2014d, 2016c, 2017) and discussions with technical 
experts (Parks, 2018). These capabilities are summarised in Table 6.1, with maximum potential 
flow rates, representing best case scenario, selected for the study. Deterministic analysis of 
calculated required CF to available flow rates was completed. For the purposes of 
deterministic analysis, it was assumed that appliances and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern 
of water to a 10 m length of active head fire front. These values can be easily converted should 
different active head fire lengths be required. 
Table 6.1. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities. 
Type Name Water Capacity (L) Flow Rate (Ls−1) 
Aircraft-Rotary 1  Dauphin Type 2 1000–1200 ~333–400 
Aircraft-Rotary 2  Erikson S64E Aircrane 7560 ~1512 
Aircraft-Fixed wing 3  AirTractor AT802F 3150 ~1050 
Appliance 4WD 4  Light Tanker ~500 2.5 
Appliance 4WD 4,5  Heavy Tanker ~3000 3.8–7.9 
1 Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~15 m, full deployment in 3 s; 2 Drop width >8 m, drop length 
~30 m, full deployment in 5 s; 3 Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~30 m, full deployment in 3 s; 4 
Branch jet spray width ~1 m; 5 700 L water required for appliance sprinkler protection which 
activates at 3 Ls−1 from each head. 
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6.3 Implications for wildfire suppression  
As reported in Penney et al. (2019b), figure 6.1a–f illustrate critical flow (CF) rates per 10 m 
section of active head fire range from 0.94 Ls−1 in a 2 m deep active flame front through 
understorey fuels of 5 tha−1 at a FDI of 10 through to 21.10 Ls−1 in a 10 m deep active flame 
front through understorey fuels of 30 tha−1 at an FDI of 100. As previously described, this study 
assumes appliances and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern of water to a 10 m length of 
active head fire front and the results are presented on this basis.  
Deterministic analysis of required CF to available CF identifies that a single Light Tanker 
cannot apply the required flow rate to 10 m section of wildfire front once an active flame 
depth of 6 m is attained, irrespective of fuel loads and FDI. Prior to the active head fire attaining 
a 6 m depth, in limited Light Tankers can engage in head fire suppression for a duration of 200 
s in limited circumstances. Larger appliances such as the Heavy Tanker have a maximum flow 
rate of 7.9 Ls−1 and can supply enough water to extinguish at 10 m section of active wildfire 
front at all FDI’s in understorey fuel loads of 5 tha−1. As conditions worsen, the capacity of a 
single Heavy Tanker to extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire rapidly diminishes. With 
significantly higher capabilities, all aircraft assessed are found to provide enough flow rates to 
extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire, regardless of flame depth, FDI or understorey fuel 
load.  
The results demonstrate small firefighting appliances such as light tankers cannot deliver 
sufficient water flow rates to extinguish wildfire, regardless of FDI, once the active flame depth 
reaches 2.5 m in typical Woodland fuels of w = 15 tha−1 or 3 m in typical Forest fuels of w = 25 
tha−1 [22,26]. In larger appliances with higher delivery capacities, the required CF cannot be 
achieved once the active flame depth reaches approximately 5 m with an FDI of 40. All aircraft 
reviewed are capable of achieving the required CF. However, they remain restricted by the 
inherent limitations of availability, turn around, restricted ability to operate at night where they 
may be most effective due to reduced fire behaviour, and the increasing presence of privately 
operated drones over fire grounds which requires the cessation of aerial suppression on safety 
grounds (Parks, 2018).  
In translating the theory to practical application during a wildfire emergency, Figure 6.1a–
f may assist Incident Controllers quickly determine the suitability of appliance-based 
suppression strategies where fuel load, FDI and active flame depth are known. In jurisdictions 
that do not rely on FDI or surface fuel loads, it is suggested Table 6.2 (with an appropriate safety 
factor) may be suitable to provide a deterministic assessment required CF to available CF, and 
therefore determine whether ground suppression efforts are potentially suitable. Used in 
conjunction with existing suppression thresholds and newer thresholds that consider radiant 
heat flux and firefighter tenability (Penney et al. 2019 – tenability), these results will assist provide 
greater justification for the selection of appropriate wildfire suppression strategies.  
The results also demonstrate the importance of active flame depth when analysing wildfire 
severity and the suitability of suppression strategies. In addition to having a significant impact 
on CF as shown in this study, the depth of the active flame front has significant effects on 
emissivity and subsequently, radiant heat flux. It is therefore proposed that active flame depth 
may be a better measure of wildfire intensity than the traditional measures of RoS, intensity or 
Lf utilised internationally. Where active flame depths remain less than 3 m, traditional 
suppression strategies may remain suitable as long as firefighter tenability is considered and 
due care is exercised.  
In order to meet the required CF to extinguish a wildfire in accordance with the 
assumptions applied in this research, firefighters must be able to have appliances consistently 
attacking each 10m section of wildfire. Whilst it is not in any way suggested incident logistics is 
as simplistic as providing a single suitable ground appliance for every 10 m section of fire front, 
it may be applied for determining initial resourcing turnout to developing wildfires that have 
the potential to grow into siege wildfire dimensions. 
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
(e) (f) 
 
Figure 6.1. Critical flow, (CF) per 10 m length of head fire across the selected range of FDI’s for Forest 
with surface fuel loads (w) of: (a) 5 tha−1; (b) 10 tha−1; (c) 15 tha−1; (d) 20 tha−1; (e) 25 tha−1; (f) 30 tha−1. 
CF as functions of (RoS), intensity (I) and flame length (Lf) are illustrated in Figures 6.2–6.4. 
This also enabled CF as a function of active flame depth (CFD) to be expressed as equations 
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of the corresponding the fire behaviour, summarised in Table 6.2. The advantages of this 
approach are: 
(1) The analysis incorporates the full spectrum of fire weather conditions and understorey fuel 
loads. Therefore the CF can be rapidly estimated by Incident Controllers without requiring 
current or predicted fire weather conditions (an essential component for calculating FDI) 
or understorey fuel loads (w) which may vary across the landscape.; and 
(2) It provides Incident Controllers both visual and mathematical tools to assess the potential 
suitability of suppression strategies.  
The limitation of this approach is that as wildfire behaviour intensifies the power functions 
appeared to under-predict CF at active flame depths greater than 6m compared to using Fire 
Point Theory and Equation (6.1) directly. This may be explained however as the equations are 
trend lines of the data, which are influenced by the somewhat clustered data at lower levels 
of wildfire behaviour.  
Table 6.2. CFd as functions of Rate of Spread, intensity and flame length. 
Rate of Spread, RoS (kmh−1) 
Active Flame Depth (m) Function 
2 CF2 = 2.72 RoS0.42 
3 CF3 = 3.97 RoS0.43 
4 CF4 = 5.12 RoS0.44 
5 CF5 = 6.24 RoS0.44 
6 CF6 = 7.23 RoS0.45 
7 CF7 = 8.30 RoS0.45 
8 CF8 = 9.23 RoS0.45 
9 CF9 = 10.20 RoS0.45 
10 CF10 = 11.11 RoS0.46 
Intensity, I (kWm−1) 
Active Flame Depth (m) Function 
2 CF2 = 0.11(I)0.33 
3 CF3 = 0.15(I)0.34 
4 CF4 = 0.12(I)0.35 
5 CF5 = 0.22(I)0.35 
6 CF6 = 0.24(I)0.36 
7 CF7 = 0.27(I)0.36 
8 CF8 = 0.30(I)0.36 
9 CF9 = 0.32(I)0.36 
10 CF10 = 0.35(I)0.36 
Flame Length, Lf (m) 
Active Flame Depth (m) Function 
2 CF2 = 0.64 Lf0.62 
3 CF3 = 0.90 Lf0.63 
4 CF4 = 1.14 Lf0.65 
5 CF5 = 1.35 Lf0.65 
6 CF6 = 1.56 Lf0.66 
7 CF7 = 1.74 Lf0.67 
8 CF8 = 1.93 Lf0.67 
9 CF9 = 2.11 Lf0.68 
10 CF10 = 2.28 Lf0.68 
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Figure 6.2. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of head fire Rate 
of Spread, RoS (kmh−1). 
 
Figure 6.3. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of intensity, I 
(kWm−1). 
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Figure 6.4. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of flame length, Lf 
(m) 
Sensitivity to variations in the base inputs was conducted to evaluate how they influence 
CF. To complete the sensitivity analysis the following inputs were assumed: FDI = 80, w = 25 
tha−1, W = 35 tha−1, D = 4 m, Lf = 19.8 m, I = 43,000 kWm−1, h = 0.077 kW/m2K, Tg = 1090 K, Tfuel = 
588 K, 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 0.7, 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 2640 kJkg−1, ?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0 ≈ 0.0129 Lgm−2s−1, 𝜏𝜏 = 0.8, 𝜏𝜏 = 0.8. As the 
effects of FDI, fuel load (and thereby Lf and I due to the mathematical relationships identified 
in Chapter 2) and flame depth are investigated throughout the study, sensitivity to the 
remaining inputs was assessed by decreasing and increasing the subject base input by 20%, 
all other inputs as assumed. The results are summarised in Table 6.3. With the exception of 𝜏𝜏 
and 𝜏𝜏, there was little if any change to CF as a result of a 20% to the base input. It is worth 
noting that in the context of wildfire where the fuel and the flame are in close proximity, both 
𝜏𝜏  and 𝜏𝜏 should be set at 1 (Hansen, 2012). 
Table 6.3. Sensitivity analysis. 
Input % Change to Base Input % Change to Critical Flow (CF) 
h ±20% ±1% 
Tg ±20% ±2% 
Tfuel ±20% ±1% 
𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝  ±20% ±1% 
𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝  ±20% ±1% 
?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0 ±20% ±0% 
𝜏𝜏 ±20% ±24% 
𝜏𝜏 ±20% ±24% 
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6.4 Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s  
Put simply, the effectiveness of suppression by applying water to landscape scale forest 
and woodlands fires drops significantly as the active flame depth of the head fire increases.  
By understanding this concept, as well as how vegetation structure influences fire behaviour 
and fire front geometry, IMT’s and firefighters can more realistically assess the potential for 
suppression success.  At the same time, if fire behaviour specialists understand these 
relationships, they are better prepared to describe the fire behaviour in terms that are 
meaningful for the IMT and frontline firefighters.  The use of guiding analysis such as that 
presented in this and other chapters may assist IMT’s determine that suppression strategies are 
unlikely to succeed and resources would be better spent in evacuations or allowing crews 
more time to prepare to defend vulnerable assets. 
This chapter provides guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to CF required to 
extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire 
front depths. Perhaps the greatest ramification of the results is the need to reexamine the use 
of aerial and appliance suppression in high fire intensity conditions. The use of ground based 
appliances remains vital in suppression of wildfires. However, in both forest and woodland fuel 
structures, and when faced with siege wildfire behavior with active flame depths across the 
head fire greater than 3 m, increased reliance on aerial suppression may be required to deliver 
the CF necessary to impact the head fire and have any effect on the forward Rate of Spread. 
In reality this will require greater investment to ensure that fuel loads adjacent or near 
congregations of high value assets are prevented from reaching the thresholds that support 
this level of fire intensity. Fire services investment in improved technologies that supports night 
time aerial suppression operations during periods of reduced fire behaviour is also suggested. 
Where aerial resourcing is limited, strategies such as guiding head fire direction and pre-
emptive line building adjacent to existing fuel breaks such as major roads, supported by 
appliance based suppression may provide enhanced outcomes compared to reliance on 
head fire suppression alone.  
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7. Vehicle protection systems during entrapment and burnover 
7.1 Introduction 
During wildfire operations the use of inappropriate suppression tactics [Penney et al, 
2019a] or sudden changes in wind direction (Lahaye et al., 2018) can result in firefighters being 
directly caught by wildfire smoke and fire, a situation known as entrapment.  The occurrence 
of wildfire flame directly impacting firefighters is known as burnover.  The threat posed from 
entrapment and burnover is significant and has resulted in 411 firefighter deaths in the USA 
from 1910 to 2006 (Mangan, 2007), 92 Australian firefighter deaths from 1901 to 2011 (Blanchi 
et al., 2014) and 165 Canadian firefighter deaths between 1941 and 2010 (Alexander & Buxton-
Carr, 2011). In many cases multiple fatalities resulted from a single entrapment and burnover.  
The causes entrapment and burnover are well known (Wilson,1977), although more recent 
studies have increased this understanding by defining human factors and fire behaviour 
leading up to these events (Blanchi et al. 2012; Butler et al. 1998; Diakakis et al. 2016; Page & 
Butler, 2017; Lahaye et al., 2016, 2018; Viegas et al. 2009).   
 
7.2 Vehicle Protection Systems 
In an effort to improve firefighter safety and aiming to protect the integrity of firefighting 
vehicles, enabling escape and improving the tenability for entrapped occupants, Australian 
fire services have invested in vehicle protection systems (VPS). 
Vehicle protection systems include (DFES, 2016a; IDES, 2014) (figure 2):   
1. Installation of deluge sprinklers, drop down thermal shielding blankets and personal 
fire blankets; 
2. Protect components essential to vehicle mobility against thermal damage, through 
shielding, relocation and lagging; 
3. Protect components critical to firefighting against thermal damage, through 
shielding, relocation and lagging; 
4. Ensuring the cabin is a suitable refuge and provides a continuous enclosure of non-
combustible materials through: 
i. removal of wheel arches, mudguards, step shrouds, cabin body aesthetic 
panels, side mirror mounts, door handles, backing plates and underbody 
panels; or 
ii. Where this is not possible, making these products fire resistant; 
5. Protection of windows that are not essential for vision including the replacement of 
rear and side rear windows with solid panels; 
6. Adding infill panels between the cabin and the vehicle tray; and 
7. Modifying the air-conditioning system to prevent smoke and heated gases entering 
the cabin. 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
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(c) 
Figure 7.1. Burnover protection systems (a) Drop down shielding blanket deployed (DFES, 2013c); (b) 
Firefighter under a personal fire blanket (DFES, 2013f); (c) Typical wildfire fighting appliance showing 
position of side deluge sprays (DFES, 2013a).  
The vehicle protection system deluge sprays designed to (DFES, 2016b): 
1. Prevent glass failure, i.e. to ensure integrity of the cabin;   
2. Cool the cabin to reduce occupant heat exposure; and 
3. Cool the tyres to reduce risk of ignition. 
 
The deluge system is required to be activated from the cabin, operate for a minimum of 
5 minutes from the time the ‘crew protection water alert’ sounds which occurs once water 
tank reserves reach 600L, and to have a nominal flow rate of 120Lmin-1 with a flow pressure of 
3 bar (DFES, 2016a).  An audible and visual warning device alerts crews once they have 
reached the deluge system reserve capacity, however the crew can continue to utilise this 
reserve without restriction. Not all appliances can be fitted with deluge systems.  For instance 
Light Tankers, a small four wheel drive appliance with a 500L water tank, cannot be fitted with 
deluge systems due to insufficient water capacity to generate the required protection 
duration and existing vehicle weight restrictions (IDES, 2014; Knight et al, 2003). Note that 
existing design specifications do not consider water droplet size or their effect on thermal 
attenuation.   
Limited field experimentation has been completed (Cruz et al., 2016) and the inherent 
danger of wildfire suppression during elevated fire weather conditions has prevented the 
potential effectiveness of vehicle protection systems being suitably quantified in full scale field 
experimentation.  Addressing this gap is vital and forms a critical component of thorough fire 
engineering safety analysis [ICC et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007].  Current external vehicle protection 
systems utilised in Australian fire service vehicles incorporate drop down thermal shielding 
blankets and sprinkler deluge systems have been tested against fire line intensities of between 
2500-10000kWm-1 and designed to withstand 7500kWm-1 (Nichols, Gould, Knight, Leonard, & 
Brown, 2005).  In similar tests, Nichols et al. (2003) reported that cabin tenability was maintained 
when simulated fire line intensities of up to 12000kWm-1 were maintained for up to 14 seconds 
when water spray protection systems were used in conjunction with window radiation shields, 
whilst Sargeant et al. (2003, p7) reported that  
“In general vehicle orientated front on remained tenable at radiation levels up to 30kWm-
2. while side on and rear facing vehicles lost integrity at around 10 to 15 kWm-2” 
  By comparison forensic wildfire analysis(Cruz et al., 2012) and field experimentation (Cruz 
et al., 2011; Frankman et al., 2012) identified fire line intensities of up to 88MWm-1 and radiant 
heat fluxes in excess of 100kWm-2 can be experienced for longer durations during landscape 
scale wildfires, far exceeding the limits of crew protection systems (Nicholas et al., 2003).   
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The potential effectiveness of vehicle protection systems in providing an adequate level 
of fireifghter protection during burnover remains unquantified.  Without validation firefighters 
may overestimate their personal safety during wildfire suppression based on the belief they will 
be adequately protected.   To address this knowledge gap and provide further guidance the 
potential effectiveness of VPS in improving firefighter tenability during entrapment and 
burnover, Penney et al. (2020b) completed: 
1. Systematic analysis of historical entrapments and burnover; and  
2. Simulated wildfires encompassing the 99th percentile of weather conditions and fuel 
structures. 
In order to verify the effectiveness of fire safety systems clear objectives and performance 
criteria must be defined (ICC et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007; Yung, 2008).  Effectiveness is defined as 
the product of fire safety system efficacy and reliability (Thomas, 2002).  The objective of 
vehicle protection systems is to increase the tenability of firefighters during vehicle entrapment 
and burnover.  For the purposes of the study the performance criteria (PC) required to meet 
this objective were subsequently defined as: 
PC1. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line intensity (I) is less 
than 7500kWm-1 (the current rating of VPS); 
PC2. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line intensity (I) is less 
than 10000kWm-1 (the maximum intensity VPS have been tested to); 
PC3. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line intensity (I) is less 
than 12000kWm-1 (maximum short duration intensity VPS can withstand); 
PC4. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line intensity (I) is less 
than the mean historical upper reported / calculated intensity for all 
entrapments resulting in fatality or injury; 
PC5. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant heat flux (RHF) is 
less than 15kWm-2, assuming vehicles are orientated side on or with the rear to 
the advancing headfire; and 
PC6. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant heat flux (RHF) is 
less than 30kWm-2, assuming vehicles orientated front on to the advancing 
headfire. 
 
7.3 Historical entrapment analysis 
Of the 4856 reports initially reviewed in the study (Penney et al., 2020b), 4336 were 
excluded as they did not meet the initial inclusion criteria.  Of the remaining 520 reports, 56 
reports were excluded because they did not involve a fatality or injury; two reports were 
excluded because they detailed accidents unrelated to entrapment (one structure fire 
propane tank explosion and one ATV rollover); eight reports were excluded as they related to 
controlled burns; and 392 reports were excluded because they contained insufficient 
information to extract or calculate fire line intensity.  A total of 62 reports were included in the 
final study, 42% (n=26) containing firefighter fatalities and 58% (n=36) reports containing 
firefighter injuries only.   
By vegetation, forest fuel structures accounted for approximately 62% (n=16) of fatal 
entrapments, scrub 23% (n=6), shrub 7.5% (n=2) and grassland 7.5% (n=2).  For entrapments 
involving injury only, forest accounted for approximately 25% (n=9) of incidents, woodlands 
14%  (n=5), scrub 11% (n=4), shrub 17% (n=6) and grassland 33% (n=12).   
For all entrapments resulting in either fatality or injury, forest accounted for approximately 
40% (n=25) of incidents, woodlands 9% (n=5), scrub 16% (n=10), shrub 13% (n=8) and grassland 
22% (n=14).  Wildfire behaviour (lower and upper reported / calculated values) during 
entrapments and burnover at the time of fatality, injury and all incidents is detailed in Table 
7.1, with distribution across all incidents illustrated in Figure 7.2.  The highest RoS by vegetation 
type was Forest 8.3ms-1, Woodland 4.53ms-1, Scrub 7.23ms-1, Shrub 6.73ms-1, and Grass 5.63ms-
1.  The highest intensity and flame length occurred in planation Forest fires during fatal 
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entrapments, with the highest reported intensity being 249226kWm-1, the highest calculated 
intensity being 318990kWm-1 and the largest flame length being reported as between 45.7 to 
61m. The mean (μ) upper reported / calculated intensity across all entrapments was 
64453kWm-1 and was subsequently adopted as the intensity threshold for Performance Criteria 
4.  Acknowledging the limitations and assumptions of the wildfire models used in the study, 
these figures are consistent with explosive wildfire behaviour over short runs (Alexander & Cruz, 
2016; Tedim et al., 2018; Penney et al., 2019a). 
 
Table 7.1. Wildfire behaviour at point of impact during entrapments resulting in injury or fatality, 
showing minimum and maximum reported or calculated values, mean (μ) and standard deviation (σ) 
Fatality only incidents 
Wildfire behaviour min max μ σ 
RoS lower reported value (ms-1) 0.1 7.2 2.0 2.1 
RoS upper reported value (ms-1) 0.1 8.3 2.3 2.4 
I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 1012 318990 68523 87142 
I upper reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 3113 318990 83545 85912 
LF lower reported value (m) 1.8 45.7 13.7 13.0 
LF upper reported value (m) 3.0 61 19.8 18.5 
Injury only incidents 
Wildfire behaviour min max μ σ 
RoS lower reported value (ms-1) 0.2 4.5 1.5 1.4 
RoS upper reported value (ms-1) 0.2 6.7 2.2 1.8 
I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 253 209250 32937 7481 
I upper reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 850 227850 50664 60349 
LF lower reported value (m) 0.6 45.7 8.5 10.9 
LF upper reported value (m) 1.2 76.2 11.8 15.5 
All incidents considered 
Wildfire behaviour min max μ σ 
RoS lower reported value (ms-1) 0.1 7.2 1.8 1.8 
RoS upper reported value (ms-1) 0.1 8.3 2.2 2.1 
I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 253 318990 47860 67687 
I upper reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 850 318990 64453 73373 
LF lower reported value (m) 0.6 45.7 10.6 11.9 
LF upper reported value (m) 1.2 76.2 15.0 17.1 
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(a) RoS all incidents by vegetation 
 
(b) Intensity all incidents by vegetation 
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(c) LF all incidents by vegetation 
Figure 7.2. Wildfire behaviour all incidents by vegetation type (a) RoS; (b) Intensity; (c) LF  
Efficacy is the ability of a fire safety system to successfully achieve its required objective, 
assuming it functions as intended (SFPE, 2008; Thomas, 2002, Yung, 2008).  Table 7.2 details the 
efficacy of vehicle protection systems against Performance Criteria 1 to 4 using the results from 
the historical entrapments analysed.  Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to 
an intensity 7500kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 1) have an efficacy between 0.12 to a 
maximum of 0.36.  An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 is observed when vehicle protection 
systems performing to Performance Criteria 2, i.e. 10000kWm-1, are considered.  Vehicle 
protection systems designed to operate up to an intensity of 12000kWm-1 (i.e. Performance 
Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47.  Applying Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. 
performance threshold equal to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of 
64453kWm-1), efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62 to 0.81.  By 
comparison, Yung (2008) reports the efficacy of sprinklers in suppressing a ‘large’ fire in 
buildings as between 0.89 to 1.00, with an overall effectiveness (efficacy multiplied by 
reliability) of 0.77 to 0.96.  In conjunction with the analysis of historical entrapments, this suggests 
that existing vehicle protection systems may be unreliable in protecting vehicle occupants 
from entrapment and burnover.  Improvements in vehicle protection system efficacy could be 
achieved by increasing the performance standard they are required to meet, whilst further 
research into the reliability of vehicle protection systems will facilitate greater understanding 
of overall effectiveness. 
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Table 7.2. Vehicle protection system efficacy based on historical entrapments considering lower and 
upper recorded / calculated intensity 
Fatality only incidents (n=26) 
Performance Criteria lower intensity upper intensity 
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)  0.19 (n=5) 0.12 (n=3) 
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1) 0.31 (n=8) 0.12 (n=3) 
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1) 0.31 (n=8) 0.12 (n=3) 
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1) 0.69 (n=18) 0.62 (n=16) 
Injury only incidents (n=36) 
Performance Criteria lower intensity upper intensity 
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)  0.36 (n=13) 0.22 (n=8) 
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1) 0.42 (n=15) 0.28 (n=10) 
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1) 0.47 (n=17) 0.33 (n=12) 
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1) 0.81 (n=29) 0.67 (n=24) 
All incidents (n=62) 
Performance Criteria lower intensity upper intensity 
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)  0.29 (n=18) 0.18 (n=11) 
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1) 0.37 (n=23) 0.21 (n=13) 
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1) 0.42 (n=26) 0.24 (n=15) 
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1) 0.76 (n=47) 0.66 (n=41) 
 
 
7.4 Design wildfire analysis 
Where full scale systems testing is prohibitive, fire safety systems analysis using simulations 
and modelling (International Code Council et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007, 2008) is required.  Assessing 
the effectiveness of existing VPS against the full scale of wildfires experienced in Australia using 
field testing is not achievable due to the inherent dangers associated with catastrophic wildfire 
events and the costs associated with the burnover of firefighting appliances.  To in part address 
this and provide some guidance to firefighters, Incident Management Teams and fire safety 
engineers, simulated design fires are used for the study.  Yung (2008, p80) defines define fires 
as “prescribed fires that can be used by fire protection engineers for performance-based fire 
safety designs”.   
The approach adopted by Penney et al. (2020b) enabled vehicle protection systems 
designed to Performance Criteria 1 to 6 (intensities of 7500kWm-1, 10000kWm-1, 12000kWm-1, 
64453kWm-1; and radiant heat flux of 15kWm-2 and 30kWm-2) to be assessed across Forest, 
Woodland, Scrub, Shrub and Grassland fuel structures, fuel loads, forest and grassland fire 
danger indices, windspeeds, slope and fuel age.  
 
A total of 90 simulations were completed during the first phase of the study. As expected 
wildfire intensity increased with slope, windspeed (V) and Forest / Grassland Fire Danger 
Indices (Figure 7.3a-j), which is consistent with the principles of established wildfire behaviour.  
Forest simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1 
(7500kWm-1) and Performance Criteria 2 (10000 kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 10 to 
20, and Performance Criteria 3 (12000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a Fire Danger Index 
of 20 to 30.  Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. performance threshold equal to the mean historical 
upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1) was not exceeded regardless of the Fire 
Danger Index.  By comparison Woodland simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity 
exceeding Performance Criteria 1 (7500kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 30 to 40, 
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intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 2 (10000 kWm-1) between a FDI of 40 to 50, and 
Performance Criteria 3 (12000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a Fire Danger Index of 50 to 
60.  Echoing the results of Forest simulations, Performance Criteria 4 (64453kWm-1) was not 
exceeded in Woodland regardless of the Fire Danger Index.  In Grassland under equivalent 
conditions, intensity exceeded Performance Criteria 1-3 prior to a Grassland Fire Danger Index 
of 50 while Performance Criteria 4 was not exceeded at any Fire Danger Index. 
To put these figures into context, Blanchi et al. (2010) report virtually all house loss from 
wildfire in Australia occurs on days when the FDI exceeds the 99.5th percentile in the 
distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions considered, with the majority of 
house loss occurring on days of Fire Danger Index greater than 100.  Further, they report there 
is little house loss on days where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50.  This indicates that 
vehicle protection systems designed to current performance criteria are unlikely to be 
effective on days that firefighters are most likely to be actively involved in the protection of 
houses during significant wildfire events. 
  The influence of windspeed on fire line intensity in Scrub and Shrub wildfires is illustrated 
in Figures 7.3g and 7.3i.  Scrub simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity exceeding 
Performance Criteria 1 to 3 between windspeeds (V) of 5 to 15kmh-1.  Unlike all other 
simulations, intensity exceeded Performance Criteria 4 in simulated Scrub wildfire, but only 
once windspeed exceeded approximately 55kmh-1. By comparison, Shrub simulations in 
equivalent conditions resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1 and 2 between 
windspeeds of 5 to 15kmh-1, and Performance Criteria 3 being exceeded between 
windspeeds of 25 to 35kmh-1.  Intensity did not exceed Performance Criteria 4 regardless of 
windspeed in Shrub simulations. 
Sensitivity analysis was completed to determine the effect of changing slope across all 
vegetation structures.  Simulations in each fuel structure were completed at 0° to 20°. When 
simulating the effect of increase in slope (Figures 7.3b,d,f,h,j), a positive relationship was 
confirmed between slope and wildfire intensity (Table 7.3).  This subsequently resulted in 
Performance Criteria 1-3 thresholds being exceeded more rapidly as slope increased.  
Increased slope may also result in Performance Criteria 4 being exceeded where it previously 
provided adequate protection.   These outcomes were expected given the mathematical 
relationship between slope, rate of spread and intensity detailed in Penney et al (2020b).   
Sensitivity analysis of intensity to fuel load in Forest and Woodland also confirmed 
consistent increase of intensity as understory (w) and total fuel (W) load increased (Figure 7.4).  
At a Fire Danger Index of 80 and assuming flat ground, fire line intensities exceeded 
Performance Criteria 1 and 2 when Forest fuels reached 40-50% of their default design wildfire 
values (w= 10-12.5tha-1 and W= 14-17.5tha-1) and Performance Criteria 3 was exceeded once 
Forest fuels reached 50-60% (w= 15-17.5tha-1 and W= 21-24.5tha-1) of default design wildfire 
values.  Under the same conditions, Performance Criteria 1 was exceeded when Woodland 
fuels reached 60-70% (w= 7.4-9tha-1 and W= 12.5-15tha-1) of default design wildfire values and 
both Performance Criteria 2 and 3 were exceeded once Woodland fuels reached 70-80% (w= 
10.5-12tha-1 and W= 17.5-20tha-1) of their default design wildfire values (the fuel loads assigned 
in AS3959).  Performance Criteria 4 was not exceeded in Forest or Woodland simulations at any 
fuel load up to 100% of default values detailed in AS3959.  These results indicate that whilst 
sparser fuels result in reduced intensity, vehicle protection systems designed to existing 
performance criteria may still be exceeded, however vehicle protection systems designed to 
Performance Criteria 4 would provide a significantly higher level of firefighter protection.  
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(a) Forest headfire intensity FDI sensitivity (b) Forest headfire intensity slope sensitivity 
(FDI 80) 
  
(c) Woodlands headfire FDI sensitivity (d) Woodland headfire intensity slope 
sensitivity (FDI 80) 
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(e) Grass headfire FDI sensitivity (f) Grass headfire intensity slope sensitivity 
(GFDI 110) 
  
(g) Scrub headfire V sensitivity (h) Scrub headfire intensity slope sensitivity 
(V=45) 
  
(i) Shrub headfire V sensitivity (j) Shrub headfire intensity slope sensitivity 
(V=45) 
Figure 7.3. Wildfire intensity by vegetation type  
Table 7.3. Relationship between slope and intensity, all vegetation types 
Slope 
Intensity factor 
compared to flat ground 
Flat 1 
5° 1.4 
10° 2.0 
15° 2.8 
20° 4 
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Figure 7.4. Sensitivity to fuel load - Forest & Woodland  
 
Wildfire simulations (n=45) enabled radiant heat flux (RHF) to be calculated at 5m 
increments for 0 to 100m of separation from the headfire for Forest, Woodland, Scrub, Shrub 
and Grassland vegetation structures (Figure 7.5).  As expected, radiant heat flux at each unit 
of separation increases with slope, Fire Danger Index (FDI), Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) 
and windspeed (V).   
In all simulations, regardless of FDI, GFDI, V, slope or fuel load, Performance Criteria 5  
(15kWm-2) and Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) were exceeded for 0 to 5m separation from 
the wildfire front.  Historical analysis (Table 3) identifies the mean flame length during 
entrapments and burnover resulting in either injury or fatality is 10.6 to 15m, with a maximum 
flame length of 45.7 to 76.2m.  This indicates vehicle protection systems would likely fail in the 
event of protracted flame immersion associated with engulfment and burnover during the 
passage of the headfire.   
In Forest simulations (Figure 7.5a), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5 
(15kWm-2) for approximately 14m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, 
increasing to approximately 44m at a Fire Danger Index of 100.  Radiant heat flux exceeded 
Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 8m separation from the headfire at a Fire 
Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 25m at a Fire Danger Index of 100.   
As expected, the efficacy of vehicle suppression systems in Woodlands fuels was slightly 
higher by comparison, Woodlands having less understory fuel (15tha-1) compared to Forest 
(25tha-1).  Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately 
10m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 
30m at a Fire Danger Index of 100 (Figure 7.5b).  Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance 
Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index 
of 10, increasing to approximately 17m at a Fire Danger Index of 100.    
In Scrub simulations (Figure 7.5c), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5 
(15kWm-2) for approximately 8m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to 
approximately 35m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.  Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance 
Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, 
increasing to approximately 20m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.  By comparison, in Shrub 
simulations (Figure 7.5d), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for 
approximately 5m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to approximately 
25m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.  Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-
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2)for approximately 4m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to 
approximately 13m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.   
In Grassland simulations (Figure 7.5e) radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5 
(15kWm-2) for approximately 10m from the headfire at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, 
increasing to approximately 17m at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130.  Radiant heat flux 
exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at a 
Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 10m at a Grassland Fire Danger 
Index of 130.     
These results again demonstrate that the operating parameters of existing vehicle 
protection systems are likely to be exceeded well below the conditions Blanchi et al (2006) 
report are most likely to be involved in the defense of life and property. 
 
  
 
(a) Forest headfire RHF as a function of 
separation distance 
(b) Woodland headfire RHF as a function 
of separation distance 
  
 
(c) Scrub headfire RHF as a function of 
separation distance 
(d) Shrub headfire RHF as a function of 
separation distance 
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(e) Grass headfire RHF as a function of 
separation distance 
 
Figure 7.5. Radiant heat flux (RHF) as a function of separation from headfire: (a) Forest; (b) Woodland; 
(c) Scrub; (d) Shrub; (e) Grassland 
Sensitivity analysis (table 7.4) demonstrates the separation required from the headfire (all 
vegetation structures) in order for radiant heat flux to fall below Performance Criteria 5 and 6 
increases with slope.  Similarly, sensitivity analysis of understory fuel loads (w) in 
Forest/Woodland design wildfires (Figure 7.6a-f) demonstrates a positive relationship between 
the separation required from the headfire in order for radiant heat flux to fall below 
Performance Criteria 5 and 6, and understory fuel loads (w).  At surface fuel loads (w) of 30tha-
1, and a Fire Danger Index of 100, radiant heat flux exceeds Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) 
until approximately 45m separation from the forest head fire is achieved.  Under the same 
conditions radiant heat flux exceeds Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) until separation of 
approximately 25m is achieved.  The required separation from the head fire for RHF decreases 
with FDI and w, with only approximately 6m separation required for RHF to fall below 30kWm-2 
at a FDI of 100 when w is 5tha-1; and 10m separation required for RHF to fall below 15kWm-2 
under the same conditions. 
Table 7.4. Effect of slope on reparation from headfire required before Performance Criteria 5 & 6 are 
achieved.  
Vegetation 
Slope 
0° 5° 10° 15° 20° 
Performance Criteria 5 (Radiant heat flux of 15kWm-2) exceeded 
Forest (FDI=80) 35-40m 45m 55m 65m 75-80m 
Woodland (FDI=80) 25m 30m 35-40m 45-50m 55-60m 
Scrub (V=45kmh-1) 20-25m 25-30m 30m 30-35m 35-40m 
Shrub (V=45kmh-1) 15-20m 15-20m 20-25m 20-25m 25-30m 
Grassland (GFDI=110) 15m 15-20m 20m 15-20m 25-30m 
Performance Criteria 6 (Radiant heat flux of 30kWm-2) exceeded 
Forest (FDI=80) 20-25m 25-30m 30-35m 40-45m 50-55m 
Woodland (FDI=80) 10-15m 15-20m 20-25m 25-30m 30-35m 
Scrub (V=45kmh-1) 10-15m 10-15m 15-20m 15-20m 20-25m 
Shrub (V=45kmh-1) 5-10m 5-10m 10-15m 10-15m 10-15m 
Grassland (GFDI=110) 5-10m 5-10m 10m 10-15m 10-15m 
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(a) w = 5tha-1 (b) w = 10tha-1 
  
(c) w = 15tha-1 (d) w = 20tha-1 
  
(e) w = 25tha-1 (f) w = 30tha-1 
 
Figure 7.6. Effect of understory fuel load on RHF as a function of separation from the headfire: (a) w = 
5tha-1; (b) w = 10tha-1; (c) w = 15tha-1; (d) w = 20tha-1; (e) w = 25tha-1; (f) w = 30tha-1 
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7.5 Discussion 
The results identify that vehicle protection systems designed to operate in fire line intensities 
of 7500kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 1) could reasonably expected to have been successful 
in 0.12 to 0.36 of historical entrapments and burnovers, assuming they operate without fault 
100% of the time (i.e. a reliability factor of 1.00).  An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 was 
observed when vehicle protection systems performing to Performance Criteria 2, i.e. 
10000kWm-1, were considered.  Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to an 
intensity of 12000kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 
0.47.  This is well below the expected efficacy of commercial fire safety systems (Yung, 2008; 
SFPE, 2008).  Increasing the operational performance standard of vehicle protection systems 
to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance 
Criteria 4) would result in an increase in efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to 
between 0.62 to 0.81. To improve firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover it is 
recommended that significantly higher fire line intensity performance criteria are adopted 
across fire services for vehicle protection systems.  Further research into the reliability of vehicle 
protection systems is also recommended to enable the effectiveness of each system to be 
determined as part of a detailed fire safety system validation and fire engineering analysis.  
Until this is completed the potential of unrealistic expectations of the safety afforded to 
firefighters during entrapment and burnover may contribute to increased injuries or fatalities 
during wildfire suppression.  
Radiant heat flux analysis further highlights the performance limitations of existing vehicle 
protection systems.  Whilst the 95th and 99th percentiles of Fire Danger Indices across Australia 
from 2000 to 2007 as reported by Dowdy et al. (2009) are illustrated in figure 2.2 (refer to 
Chapter 2), fire weather in Australia is increasingly worsening as a result of climate change 
Lucas et al. (2007).  As Blanchi et al. (2010) report, virtually all house loss from wildfire in Australia 
occurs on days when the Fire Danger Index exceeds the 99.5th percentile in the distribution of 
daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions considered, with the majority of house loss 
occurring on days of Fire Danger Index greater than 100.  Further, they report there is little house 
loss on days where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50.  Fire line intensity simulations 
identified Performance Criteria 1-3 (i.e. intensity of 7500kWm-1, 10000kWm-1 and 12000kWm-1 
respectively) were exceeded on flat terrain in Forest below a Fire Danger Index of 30; in 
Woodlands at Fire Danger Indices between 30 to 60; in Grassland at a Grassland Fire Danger 
Index of less than 50 (equivalent to a Fire Danger Index of 40); and in Scrub and Scrub at 
windspeeds of less than 15kmh-1.  By comparison, the mean historical upper recorded / 
calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) was not exceeded in any 
simulation, regardless of Fire Danger Index or windspeed except for Scrub fuels once 
windspeed reached approximately 55kmh-1.   
Radiant heat flux modelling completed in Penney et al. (2020b) demonstrated vehicle 
protection system Performance Criteria 5 and 6 (i.e. 15 kWm-2 and 30kWm-2) are likely to be 
exceeded in all cases of entrapment where flame immersion occurs, and, remains a distinct 
possibility for significant distances of separation from the headfire.  To increase firefighter safety 
it is recommended further research and development into vehicle protection systems satisfying 
Australian Standard 1530.8.2 Methods for fire tests on building materials, components and 
structures – Part 8.2 Tests on elements of construction for buildings exposed to simulated 
bushfire attack – large flaming sources,  which specifically identifies performance criteria for 
prolonged radiant heat flux exceeding 40kWm-2.   
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7.6 Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists, IMT’s and 
fire services 
This chapter identifies that vehicle protection systems designed to the existing intensity 
standard of 7500kWm-1 may have been successful in 0.12 to 0.36 of historical entrapments and 
burnovers, assuming they operate without fault.  An efficacy this low is highly unlikely to be 
tolerated in any traditional fire safety system.  In conjunction with research into wildfire weather 
in Australia, the results of design wildfire analysis indicate existing vehicle protection systems 
are unlikely to be effective on days that firefighters are most likely to be actively involved in 
the protection of houses during significant wildfire events.  In order to maximise firefighter safety 
during wildfire suppression, and to avoid providing firefighters unrealistic expectations 
regarding vehicle protection systems and other fire safety systems which may contribute to 
firefighters taking unacceptable risks, it is recommended fire services should include training 
on the limitations of their respective systems.  
Significant improvements in firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover may be 
made by increasing the required intensity threshold of VPS.  Increasing the operational 
performance standard of vehicle protection systems to the mean historical upper recorded / 
calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result in an increase in 
efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62 to 0.81. Adopting this intensity 
threshold would also result in vehicle protection systems being theoretically effective in all 
design wildfires modelled, with the exception of Scrub where VPS may potentially remain 
effective until windspeeds reach 45 to 55kmh-1.  
When considering radiant heat flux, this chapter identifies that both 15 and 30kWm-2 is 
likely to be exceeded in all cases of entrapment where flame immersion occurs, and, remains 
a distinct possibility for significant distances of separation from the headfire.  To increase 
firefighter safety it is recommended fire services not only ensure wildfire suppression training 
includes analysis of the magnitude and effects of wildfire radiant heat flux, but include credible 
worse case radiant heat flux thresholds of 30kWm-2 as one of the mandatory performance 
criteria of VPS and any other wildfire vehicle fire safety system. 
The results of this study should not be considered in isolation, but rather alongside the 
findings of other recent research (Penney et al., 2019a, 2019b, 2020a, 2020b) into wildfire 
suppression strategies and the limitations of firefighters and the equipment they rely on. A 
recurring theme within the conclusions of this research is that when attempting to suppress 
landscape scale wildfire, it may be more appropriate for fire services to consider early 
instigation of indirect attack or defensive strategies including safeguarding, evacuations and 
clear communication to the community and other stakeholders that conditions at the head 
fire are not defendable.  It is suggested offensive strategies involving personnel and appliances 
should be employed with caution after detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity, 
secondary to the increased use of aerial firefighting suppression.  Early adoption of this 
approach will assist prevent crews being inappropriately tasked to potential dangerous ‘dead 
man zones’ where they will not only be at great risk, but will have little if any impact on the fire.  
Further, it will clearly articulate the severity of the approaching head fire and will assist to 
prevent unrealistic community expectations of fire services intervention during catastrophic 
wildfire events. 
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8. Risk management during dynamic firefighting contexts 
8.1 Introduction 
Succinctly described by (Kunadharaju et al., 2011), “there is little protective redundancy 
in firefighting.” Accordingly, effective risk management is an essential component of dynamic 
firefighting operations throughout the world. International Standard 31000 Risk management 
guidelines (ISO, 2018) subsequently referred to as ISO31000, is the standard of risk management 
within the Australian emergency services context.   
Previous studies (Ash & Smallman, 2012; Sadler et al. 2007) reported decisions made on 
the incident ground to be reactionary rather than considered, or to be adapted from previous 
experience at similar situations or incidents potentially without thorough analysis (Tissington & 
Flin, 2007). Dynamic risk management in the emergency rescue context is often restricted to a 
qualitative selection of tactics guided by tacit professional craft knowledge as opposed to 
quantified risk assessment and evidence based practice as part of the entire risk management 
process (Jacobs, 2010; Loflin & Kipp, 1997). Buoyed by disasters of significant scale including, 
the devastating Grenfell Tower fire of June 14, 2017 (GTI, 2018) and more frequent siege and 
mega wildfires such as those experienced in California (CA Gov, 2018; USFS & CDFFP, 2004), 
Greece (CBS, 2018) and Australia (Bushfire CRC, 2009), fire services are facing increased public 
scrutiny and both firefighters Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) are being held to a higher 
standard of performance than ever before.  
In response to the changing external environment, fire services throughout the world are 
embracing new technologies and turning to research to support evidence based practice.  
At the same time, fire services are collecting significant amounts of specific and information 
rich data. Probabilistic analysis of this data can subsequently facilitate improvements in 
operational risk management during emergencies and in pre-incident planning (Penney, 2017, 
2019) ultimately resulting in a safer workplace and providing Incident Commanders evidence 
that can be used to support operational decisions. This chapter not only defines risk 
management within the dynamic emergency fire service context, but explores firefighters risk 
attitudes and how these may influence Incident Controllers (IC’s). 
 
8.2 Defining risk in dynamic fire and emergency situations  
Whilst the term ‘risk’ is often used incorrectly instead of, or interchangeably with the term 
‘hazard’ within the majority of fire services literature (Penney, 2017, 2019), risk is specifically 
defined as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO, 2018). Risk is not an event (SAI Global, 
2013a) such as an explosion, fire or other emergency. Instead, risk is expressed as the likelihood 
of a consequence, positive or negative, occurring. When applied to emergency response it is 
essential to appreciate that incidents are dynamic, occurring within an environment subject 
to constant change and therefore the level of uncertainty and therefore risk, must be 
constantly reassessed. Often inappropriately described, three elements must be defined in 
order to articulate risk: 
1. The objective(s) being referred to; 
2. The particular source of uncertainty; and 
3. How the source of uncertainty may lead to consequences. 
In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may include: 
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved in a high speed 
vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the firefighters from mechanical, thermal 
and chemical hazards preventing all firefighters completing the rescue unharmed. In this 
statement: 
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed; 
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and 
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3. Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead to the 
consequences, i.e., firefighters getting injured.  
In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may include: 
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved in a high speed 
vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the firefighters from mechanical, thermal 
and chemical hazards preventing all firefighters completing the rescue unharmed. 
 
In this statement: 
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed; 
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and 
3. Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead to the 
consequences, i.e., firefighters getting injured. 
 
 
8.3 Risk management in the dynamic emergency context 
The term ‘risk management’ refers to the structure (principles, framework and process) for 
managing risk effectively whilst ‘managing risk’ refers to the application of that structure to the 
decision making process (SAI Global, 2013a). The risk management process provides the 
architecture for decision making and must be applied in every situation, including emergency 
response, for risk to be deemed to have been considered sufficiently (Penney, 2016).  Further, 
SAI Global (2013a,p45) provides the following example of how the process must be applied in 
even the most dynamic emergency situations: 
 “A military special forces section leader might have a split second in which to make a 
tactical decision on which personal wellbeing and that of subordinates as well as the success 
of the mission, might depend. In that time the leader must recall the objectives, appreciate 
the external and internal environment, assess the risks, consider the options, review those 
against the objectives and take the appropriate action. Despite the very short decision making 
window, the quality of each of these steps must be of the highest standard.” 
Failure to comprehend risk or to apply the entire risk management structure to dynamic 
decision making in the emergency environment can result in decisions that exacerbate rather 
than mitigate adverse consequences. Should adverse outcomes eventuate it may also lead 
to post incident scrutiny of the decisions made by ICs. Existing studies suggest risk assessment 
in accordance with (ISO, 2018) may not occur during frontline emergency response in most 
jurisdictions (Ash & Smallman, 2012; Sadler et al., 2007; Penney, 2019). In contrast to these 
findings however, the risk management methodology for dynamic emergency incidents 
adopted by United Kingdom Fire Services as published by the Department for Communities 
and Local Government is comprehensive and requires specific attention.  
The first of these publications, the Fire and Rescue Authorities “Health, safety and welfare 
framework for the operational environment” (DCLG, 2013), details a comprehensive 
architecture for management of dynamic incident risk that commences with the brigade’s 
senior officers and ends with the individual emergency responder on the incident ground. This 
publication is unique amongst the literature reviewed in that it not only acknowledges Health 
and Safety legislation, often viewed as encumbrance to emergency response, but embraces 
it as a pillar of dynamic emergency risk management. In doing so the United Kingdom Fire 
Services succinctly define both internal and external organisational risk contexts as they apply 
to frontline operations. Further, DCLG (2013) not only articulates the dynamic incident risk 
assessment process through the hierarchy of command but also provides multiple fire service 
specific examples for ICs and front line personnel of all ranks and operational roles to 
reference. Perhaps most importantly from an organisational context is the recognition that 
“standard operational procedures need to be sufficiently flexible to allow the Incident 
Commander to exercise discretion on the resources and the procedures required to resolve 
the emergency” (DCLG, 2013, p23). The flexibility for ICs and personnel to use ‘operational 
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discretion’ is carefully articulated and “should be based on a balance in terms of risk versus 
benefit, and the Incident Commander knowing the action which they are normally required 
by the relevant standard operational procedure” (DCLG, 2013 ,p23). In these statements the 
term Incident Commander and IC are interchangeable. 
The second publication is the Fire and Rescue Manual 2nd Volume “Fire Service 
Operations – Incident Command” (DCLG, 2008). It is the doctrine of fire service dynamic 
incident management at all levels and embraces incident risk management as one of the 
three key elements required for effective incident command. Most significantly DCLG (2008, 
p64) recognises “in order to provide an acceptable level of protection at operational 
incidents, the organisations health and safety management must operate at three different 
levels – Strategic, Systematic and Dynamic.” At a strategic level, the doctrine defines the fire 
service’s risk attitudes and establishes internal context whilst complying with relevant external 
contexts. This is achieved through appropriate policy and doctrine that embrace the risk 
philosophy of the fire service. Systematic risk management is completed by operational 
subject matter experts in each discipline. The results subsequently guide the development and 
implementation of operations including but not limited to safe work systems, procedures, 
equipment, training and supervision. Dynamic risk management occurs during an operational 
incident and encompasses all risk management carried out by all personnel involved in the 
incident whilst an emergency situation is present.  
In considering the application of ‘dynamic risk management’ it is essential to distinguish 
between time critical emergency situations, for instance where lives are endangered and 
rescue is required, and non-emergency situations such as body recovery. The distinction is 
critical as risk thresholds will vary accordingly as demonstrated in the “Safe Person Concept” 
(NZFS, 2008) and the philosophy of the DCLG [2008,p65], 
“In a highly calculated way, firefighters: 
• Will take some risk to save saveable lives. 
• May take some risk to save saveable property. 
• Will not take any risk at all to try and save lives or property that are already lost.” 
Whilst NZFS (2008) considers dynamic incident risk management in isolation, DCLG (2008, 
2013) acknowledge it as only a part of the greater risk management process applicable to the 
fire service as a workplace.  Through this approach the United Kingdom integrates the internal 
and external risk contexts into the dynamic incident risk management process. This holistic 
approach empowers ICs to manage risk in accordance with ISO31000 regardless of the nature 
of the emergency encountered. 
 
 
 
Klein’s (1989) Recognition-Primed Decision and Rasmussen’s Decision Ladder (1976, cited 
in Naikar, 2010) represent two accepted models representing the decision process of 
experienced personnel in dynamic situations.  Both models are dependent on a high level of 
expertise from the decision maker and the ability to process information in a structured 
sequence that characterises rational, knowledge-based behaviour (Naikar, 2010).  Neither 
model references the application of risk management into the decision making process or 
how prior exposure may influence risk tolerance and the cognitive process.  Recognition 
Primed Decision Making (RPDM) requires a level of operational maturity bordering on mastery 
that can only be achieved through significant and repeated exposures that result in both 
positive and negative consequences.  Basing training solely on RPDM can be problematic as 
it relies on teaching rookie ICs the “experience” of veterans and expecting them to respond 
as the veteran would, despite not having the personal library of experience to draw upon.  
Alternatively, the cognitive processes explained by Kahneman (2012) explain how complex 
cognitive processes such as risk analysis during dynamic emergency situations can be 
expedited by the development of advanced and efficient cognitive processes that can be 
A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020 
 
8-4 
 
taught, practiced and mastered. Unlike RPDM, Kahneman’s approach supports the 
implementation of ISO31000 risk analysis during dynamic emergencies.  This is not to say that 
RPDM does not have a place in risk management during emergency operations, however to 
introduce it to inexperienced ICs as the sole means of risk analysis is not appropriate. 
Risk analysis (also known as risk assessment) is the process to comprehend the nature of 
risk and to determine the level of risk (SAI Global, 2013a). The process of comprehension 
requires the risk manager to be able to adequately interpret risk sources in a structured manner 
and to subsequently understand the probability and consequences of an event occurring. 
During even the most rapidly changing emergency situations the risk management framework 
and structure remains the same. Each risk analysis must be considered a new separate 
process, even if it builds upon a previously and recently completed analysis of the same 
emergency situation at an earlier point in time. This realisation is significant as it supports the 
understanding that dynamic risk management does not involve a changing architecture or 
process of analysis, but rather the same risk management architecture and analysis process 
applied multiple times during a rapidly changing (dynamic) emergency situation.  
    
Risk analysis may either be qualitative, quantitative or a combination of both. Qualitative 
analysis involves descriptive and often subjective appraisal of risk as described by the assessor. 
It is often useful when risk treatment strategies involve multiple risks at different levels that 
cannot be accurately measured on the same quantitative scale and may be suitable during 
preliminary or scoping assessments. Importantly, when qualitative analysis is applied “there 
should be a clear explanation of all the terms employed and the basis for all criteria should be 
recorded” (SAI Global, 2013a, p18). Review of fire services literature (ACT, unknown; NZFS, 2008; 
DFES, 2012; SACFS, 2014) identified that whilst prioritised objectives of the protection of life, 
property and the environment were common across jurisdictions, explanations of terminology 
were largely absent from operational material. Yung (2008) asserts that reliance on qualitative 
assessment alone must be considered fundamentally flawed because subjective judgements 
cannot be verified and may often differ between operators. Further, the same operator may 
make different decisions given the same situation at various points in time. 
Quantitative assessment requires the analysis of numerical data to calculate probabilities, 
frequencies and distributions. Considered the epitome of fire risk analysis probabilistic risk 
analysis requires detailed and time consuming consideration of all possible outcomes as either 
a function of incidence, Bayesean probability or life/dollar loss per unit time (Yung, 2008). Such 
analysis requires availability of substantial high quality data as well as the ability to numerically 
represent variability within defined confidence levels, therefore it cannot be undertaken within 
the parameters and constraints of a single emergency incident. This is supported in (ACTESA, 
date unknown, p2] by the Dynamic Risk assessment overview statement that “often, rescues 
have to be performed, exposures protected and hose lines placed before a complete 
appreciation of all material facts have been obtained”. Whilst typical quantitative analysis, 
including fault tree or event tree diagrams, may be particularly useful for pre-incident planning 
and as a supporting assurance process, their complexity and time required for completion 
render them impractical for incident ground completion. Review of available literature 
identified that whilst significant international statistical analysis of fire related fatality and injury 
data were available (DCLG, 2015; FEMA, 2011 & 2012) a total absence of statistical analysis of 
Australian firefighting injuries and risk management during dynamic operations was noted in 
both published and internal brigade documentation.  
For risk analysis during dynamic incidents to align to ISO31000, both qualitative and 
quantitative components are arguably required. Reviews of historical injury data may provide 
quantitative probabilities pertaining to the effectiveness of certain personal protective 
equipment in reducing firefighter injuries. At the same time, experience may provide an IC with 
valuable insight into qualitatively assessing the effectiveness of specific tactics in certain 
situations. 
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Risk treatment involves the application of mitigating processes, systems or other inhibitors 
to reduce the likelihood or consequence of an event occurring (ISO, 2018; SAI Global, 2013a 
& 2013b). Consequences of inaccurate identification of risk and subsequent treatment can 
be catastrophic with Ash & Smallman (2012) identifying 19% of all firefighter deaths in the 
United States between 2000 and 2005 being a direct result of human error. In the context of 
firefighting operations, risk treatments (also known as controls) are subsequently presented in 
the contextualisation of the traditional hierarchy of controls. 
At the top of the hierarchy is “elimination” which refers to the removal of the risk source. 
In the firefighting context this may be viewed as pre-operational actions such as arson 
prevention or road safety campaigns. During an emergency incident “elimination” may 
include the decision not to commit crews, but rather to isolate a fuel source and permit it to 
‘burn out’ so that lives are not endangered. 
Next in the hierarchy is “substitution” which is difficult to translate to the firefighting context 
because firefighters often respond to emergency situations where time and resourcing 
restrictions are encountered. It may be considered that a decision to use defensive firefighting 
strategies, as opposed to offensive internal firefighting strategies, may meet the definition for 
substitution because even though the risk source is not eliminated, the approach to resolving the 
incident is specifically varied in a manner that reduces the potential for an adverse event to 
occur. 
“Engineering” controls are those that isolate assets from the risk source. In the firefighting 
context this may only be partially achieved because there is likely to be a requirement for at 
least several firefighters to be present within the ‘hot’ zone (DFES 2012, 2015a, 2015b) and this 
remains essential to resolving many dynamic emergency situations. Isolation occurs through the 
implementation of controlled access to areas within an emergency incident that are the 
greatest risk source through Entry Control Officers and physical demarcation (DFES, 2015a, 
2015b). Despite the use of isolation controls at emergency incidents, which may reduce the 
potential for greater numbers of adverse outcomes, ICs are still required to commit sufficient 
firefighters into hazardous situations in order to resolve the emergency. 
“Administrative” controls are the policies, procedures and ‘doctrine’ that provide 
organisational guidance as to the appropriate manner in which to resolve a dynamic 
emergency situation. Extensive fire services literature in this area was found, however, an 
absence of established risk criterion or documented risk thresholds was also noted. No reason for 
this absence was found. 
“Personnel attitudes” are an addition to the traditional hierarchy of controls and may be 
considered a critical component to the contextualised hierarchy of controls within the 
firefighting environment. It may be considered that personnel attitudes are significantly 
influenced by the internal context in which they evolve (Lloyd, 2005, 2008) and the internal 
context of firefighters is particularly influential. It is therefore surmised that the attitude of individual 
firefighters under the command of an IC must be considered in the contextualised hierarchy of 
controls. Whilst good attitudes will afford some benefit for the reduction of the likelihood of an 
adverse outcome, poor attitudes will inevitably increase the potential for failure to implement or 
abide by other controls and therefore increase both the probability and severity of adverse 
outcomes on the incident ground. 
“Personal protective equipment” colloquially known as PPE within fire services represents the 
final line of defence between personnel and an adverse outcome. Whilst some PPE may in fact 
reduce the potential for realisation of an adverse effect, for instance breathing apparatus 
theoretically preventing a firefighter inhaling toxic smoke and products of combustion, it must 
also be considered that the presence of PPE may result in firefighters undertaking greater risk 
taking behaviour due to a perception that the PPE affords them complete or excessive levels of 
protection (Penney, 2013). 
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8.4 Risk attitudes amongst firefighters 
Differences in the identification of objectives and the willingness to accept and retain risk 
(risk tolerance) between strategic and tactical levels within an emergency services 
organisation, as reported by Ash and Smallman (2012) and Jacobs (2010), may result in risk 
management decisions being made by ICs that could be later considered to be inappropriate 
or unjustified. Further, Ash and Smallman (2012) identified the perception by emergency 
services personnel that strategic (organisational) decisions and guidance may hinder 
achievement of goals at a tactical level and actually contribute to inappropriate risk 
management during emergency response. Further, inappropriate or insufficient understanding 
and consideration of risk may leave emergency services personnel with potentially dangerous 
familiarity with the hazards they face (Sadler et al., 2007). 
Also worth consideration is the intimate culture amongst firefighting crews that can affect 
management of risk during dynamic emergencies. Firefighters spend a significant amount of 
time together during both emergency incidents and routine station life (Childs et al., 2004). In 
this environment, indoctrinated traits established by organisational culture invariably flourish 
and form a unique environment that has the capacity to directly influence an IC’s 
management of risk during dynamic emergency operations. Reports including NIFC (1996) 
and Moore-Merrell et al. (2008) identify an established culture of risk taking amongst firefighters 
in order ‘to get the job done’ regardless of operational guidelines. This is supported by the 
findings of Kunadharaju et al. (2011) who reported, in contrast to most high hazard work, 
firefighting operations are actively based on hazard engagement, typically compounded by 
acute time pressures. In addition to these findings, Fender (2003) reported multiple firefighter 
specific traits that directly affected personal risk tolerance. These included: 
• The age of a victim - the younger the victim the higher the threshold to personal injury 
or death; 
• Respect for the officer in charge – firefighters were willing to undertake more 
dangerous tasks if they respected the officer giving a command; 
• A sense of pride in taking risks; and 
• Expectations of the community. 
A previous study into the decontamination practices of firefighters exposed to hazardous 
and toxic materials (Penney, 2013) found a tendency amongst firefighters to perceive 
potentially life threatening incidents as routine if they were regularly encountered without 
acute health effects becoming evident. It is suggested the cultural acceptance of personal 
risk taking amongst firefighting crews needs to be carefully understood by ICs who are 
ultimately responsible for crew safety and may well have less risk tolerance during incidents. 
Recent research (Penney, 2016, 2019) provides insight into the risk attitudes and 
perceptions of operational Australian firefighters.  The research was conducted in two phases: 
(1) Semistructured interviews and (2) subsequent in-depth structured surveys. This enabled 
exploration and documentation of the beliefs, understanding, and attitudes of fire and 
emergency service ICs. Phase one involved ethnographic qualitative interactive observation 
of 20 current serving professional fire and emergency service ICs over a three-month period. 
All participants were experienced ICs with a minimum of seven years operational experience 
across all fire service hazards, including but not limited to structure fire, bushfire, hazardous 
materials, road crash, and other rescue response. Semistructured interviews and subsequent 
in-depth structured surveys designed to identify the individual’s risk attitudes and beliefs were 
completed by all participants. The participation of one candidate was interrupted by an 
incident call out, resulting in 19 interviews and surveys being available for analysis. These 
represented 7% of the overall officer population from a Western Australian career fire service 
background.  
The first question asked of participants in the semistructured interview was “How do you 
define risk?” Whilst all participant responses acknowledged that risk is a consideration of 
consequences and likelihood, only one participant provided the answer “it is the effect of 
uncertainty on objectives” as defined in ISO31000. Approximately a quarter of participants 
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(26%) provided answers that were specific to emergency response without consideration of 
the greater application of risk, and only one participant provided the restrictive definition “risk 
is the potential to injure me”. Consistent with the findings of Tissington and Flin (2004) and 
Reinhardt-Klein (2010), these answers suggest fire and emergency service ICs generally have 
a perception of risk as the practical consideration of consequence and likelihood as it applies 
to a reactive emergency environment, rather than as a considered and managed process 
consistent with ISO31000. 
The second question asked of participants was “How do you manage risk in a dynamic 
emergency environment compared to other situations and contexts?” In response, nearly all 
participants identified that risk management in dynamic contexts was based on a similar 
process to risk management in other situations, but with limited information available and with 
restricted time frames in which to make decisions. Ten percent of participants expressed the 
opinion that dynamic risk management required more “forward thinking” than risk 
management in other situations. These responses again suggest the study group has adopted 
a definition of risk that is reasonably consistent throughout their population and contextualised 
to their perception of reality but does not consider all elements detailed in ISO31000; especially 
when consideration is given to the example of the special forces soldier in a hostage situation 
provided in SAHB436 (SAI Global, 2013a). 
More than half of participants (58%) also expressed that they managed risk in dynamic 
emergency environments according to how they believed their organisation expected them 
to do so, or that they managed risk in accordance with organisational procedures and 
protocols. This suggests the majority of fire and emergency service ICs believed they managed 
risk using the same risk attitudes as their organisation. This was despite a review of the literature 
identifying an absence of organisational risk thresholds and attitudes specific to dynamic 
emergency response environments. 
Responses from the study group to the third question “How do you decide whether risks 
are acceptable in a dynamic emergency environment?” were varied. A quarter of 
participants (26%) reported they relied on organisational procedures and protocols; almost 
half of participants (47%) reported they relied on personal prior experience to determine 
whether risks were acceptable; 16% of participants stated they simply relied on whether they 
believed the risk was acceptable to themselves personally; and 10% of participants responded 
that in the case of “life involvement” (being the fire services terminology for when potential 
consequences include the loss of occupant life), all risks are acceptable. The variation in 
answers provided by fire and emergency service ICs represents significant variance in the risk 
thresholds between ICs within the same organisation. Conflicts between risk attitudes will 
foreseeably lead to increased risk at an emergency incident because additional uncertainty 
is introduced when individuals work together to form incident management teams or when 
they are responsible for different sectors within the same emergency incident. When the 
answers provided by participants to question three are considered in conjunction with the 
answers provided by participants to question two, the variance in risk thresholds between 
participants suggests an absence of a defined organisational internal risk context that may 
otherwise guide participants towards similar answers. This notion is consistent with Fender (2003) 
and reinforces the conclusion that, for risk management to be compliant with ISO31000, it must 
be ingrained as part of the core culture of the fire service inclusive of explicitly defined risk 
tolerances. 
The final question posed to fire and emergency service ICs was “Does the risk 
management process differ in the dynamic emergency environment compared to other 
situations? If yes, then how?” Responses provided by participants were far less varied than the 
responses to question three. Forty-two percent of participants stated there was no difference 
in the process; however, half of these participants also stated the time frame available for 
completing the risk assessment was significantly reduced during dynamic emergency 
environments. Interestingly, one participant also stated that risk tolerance is significantly higher 
during dynamic emergency operations compared to other situations, which suggests 
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fluctuating risk thresholds depending on the participant’s evolving perception of the severity 
of an incident. In addition, only one participant identified that the risk management process 
had to be repeated multiple times throughout an emergency incident, suggesting the 
remaining participants did not consider repeated risk application of the risk management 
process necessary.  
More than half of participants (53%) stated that the risk management process did differ in 
the dynamic emergency environment compared to other situations. These participants all 
identified that the process changed due to a significant reduction in both the available 
information on which to make decisions, and the available time to gather further information. 
One participant clarified their response by adding they felt “pushed to do things you wouldn’t 
normally do due to expectations and pressure”. This indicated they operated at risk thresholds 
they personally felt were unacceptable. Only one participant stated the dynamic risk 
management process was reactive as opposed to being a thought out process.  
These findings appear to contradict the previous findings of Ash and Smallman (2012), 
Fender (2003), and Naikar (2010), all of whom identified decision making during dynamic 
emergency incidents to be reactive and based on recognition of specific cues. Whilst the 
finding from the study reported may be interpreted with some caution, due to the moderate 
sample size, the finding is supported by the answers provided by the fire and emergency 
service ICs to the second question posed in the interview. One participant stated they were 
unsure whether the risk management process differed in the dynamic emergency 
environment compared to other situations. 
The first question in the structured survey relating to risk perceptions required participants 
to identify the severity of potential consequence for 20 outcomes that may occur during fire 
and emergency incidents. From the answers provided, probability analysis was completed 
across the entire sample population. Conditional probability was then calculated on the basis 
that participants had, or had not, been previously injured at an incident. Nine participant fire 
and emergency service ICs had been injured at an incident and 10 had not been injured at 
an incident, and these results were compared to the severity assigned to the consequence in 
fire and emergency services risk literature. Full results are provided in Table 8.1. Analysis of the 
results revealed there was a conditional probability of 0.00 (zero) for all fire and emergency 
service ICs assigning the same severity to a consequence given the event being realised. Only 
in a single instance did a subgroup completely agree on the severity of a consequence. This 
was the non-injured group agreeing that the death of a rescuer was of catastrophic severity 
(represented by a conditional probability of 1.00). 
Further analysis revealed there was an equal probability between the group that had 
never been injured, with a conditional probability of 0.2 that the survey groups’ perception of 
consequence severity would align with the severity adopted by fire and emergency services. 
Whilst some variance may be expected due to potential differences in individuals’ perception 
of the consequence realised, a conditional probability of 0.2 signifies agreement between 
participants and fire and emergency services in the perception of consequence severity of 
only a single occurrence each year. It is therefore concluded that the internal context of risk 
attitudes is not harmonious amongst fire and emergency service ICs and may lead to 
conflicting risk management during dynamic emergency situations or post-incident analysis. 
Descriptive analysis of the results identified a mean probability of 0.612 (standard deviation of 
0.142) that the entire survey group would agree on the severity of any given consequence. 
This further supports the findings of the potential for conflicting risk attitudes between ICs and 
parties conducting post-incident analysis. 
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Table 8.1. Consequence severity across the entire sample and the injured/never been injured subgroups. 
Rating Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
Group 
Consequence A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
1 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.58 0.56 0.60 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.40 
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.63 0.78 0.50 0.21 0.22 0.20 
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.26 0.00 0.50 0.47 0.78 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.20 
6 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.83 0.88 0.80 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.95 0.89 1.00 
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.56 0.70 0.37 0.44 0.30 
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.40 
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.61 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.40 
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.11 0.40 0.63 0.78 0.60 0.11 0.11 0.00 
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.22 0.72 0.78 0.67 0.06 0.11 0.00 
15 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.56 0.30 0.16 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.68 0.44 0.90 0.26 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.42 0.33 0.50 0.37 0.44 0.30 0.16 0.22 0.10 
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.22 0.50 0.58 0.78 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.10 
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.47 0.56 0.40 
Consequences:  
1. Near miss—cut finger 
2. Near miss—broken arm 
3. Near miss—death of rescuer 
4. Near miss—exposure to acutely toxic material 
5. Near miss—exposure to hazardous material with health effects that may take 20 years 
to occur 
6. Scratch or dent to a vehicle 
7. Cut finger requiring first aid treatment 
8. Broken arm requiring hospitalization 
9. Death of a rescuer 
10. Exposure to acutely toxic hazardous material requiring hospital admission 
11. Exposure to hazardous material that results in lung damage only evident 20 years post-
exposure 
12. Inhaling asbestos particulates and dust as a result of rescue activities 
13. Exposure to silica particulates and dust as a result of rescue activities 
14. Exposure to glass particulates and dusts as a result of rescue activities 
15. Damage to a vehicle resulting in $1000 damage 
16. Damage to a vehicle resulting in $20,000 damage 
17. Damage to the environment that does not result in long term impact 
18. Damage to the environment resulting in long term impact 
19. Lung tissue damage without respiratory impairment 
20. Lung tissue damage that limits physical activity 
Group:  
A. Total study population 
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response whilst 
working under a different IC  
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency response 
whilst working under a different IC  
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An individual’s beliefs and expectations can significantly affect the internal context of the 
risk management process (SAI Global, 2013a). To investigate how this may be a factor in risk 
management during dynamic emergency operations, the second question of the survey 
required participants to state their agreement to four statements regarding external and 
personal risk attitudes and expectations using a Likert scale. The statements were: 
1. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to 
save others. 
2. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to 
save property. 
3. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to 
save the environment. 
4. Emergency services personnel have a moral obligation to put themselves at a higher 
level of risk than the general public in the course of their duties. 
Full results are provided in Table 8.2. Analysis of these results reveals that the overwhelming 
majority of the entire study group (74%), as well as the both subgroups (injured 77% and never 
injured 70%), believed there were external expectations that emergency services personnel 
would risk their own lives to save others. By comparison, only 52% of the entire study group, 78% 
of the injured subgroup, and 30% of the never injured subgroup believed there were external 
expectations that emergency services personnel would risk their own lives to save property. 
This difference in attitudes between the injured and never injured populations appears to 
suggest personnel who had a higher personal risk threshold may be more likely to be injured 
during emergency operations; however, further research is required to confirm this hypothesis. 
Analysis of the responses to the statement “There is an expectation that emergency 
services personnel will risk their own lives to save the environment” was less conclusive but 
appeared to suggest a less strongly held belief amongst the study group of fire and emergency 
service ICs that this was the case (37% of the total study group stating they either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the statement). 
Table 8.2. Incident controller perceptions and expectations across the entire sample and the 
injured/never been injured subgroups. 
Response Strongly  
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  
Agree 
Group 
Belief 
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.11 0.00 0.2 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.21 0.33 0.10 
2 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.21 0.11 0.30 0.47 0.67 0.30 0.05 0.11 0.00 
3 0.21 0.11 0.30 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.37 0.56 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.05 0.11 0.00 
Beliefs:  
1. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to 
save others. 
2. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to 
save property. 
3. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to 
save the environment.  
4. Emergency services personnel have a moral obligation to put themselves at a higher 
level of risk than the general public in the course of their duties. 
Group:  
A. Total study population 
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response whilst 
working under a different IC  
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency response 
whilst working under a different IC  
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To further define the risk attitudes and tolerance of the study group, participants were 
required to identify whether potential scenarios were either acceptable or unacceptable 
when the probability of realisation of the consequence was low, moderate, and high. 
Participants were required to answer the question in two contexts: First, that they were 
personally exposed to the risk source and, second, that they were responsible for other 
responders and it was these other responders who were exposed to the risk source. The 
scenarios presented were: 
1. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where the consequence is being 
severely injured or killed. 
2. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where the consequence is being exposed to dust 
that may cause immediate lung damage. 
3. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where the consequence is 
developing cancer. 
4. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where the consequence is being exposed to dust 
that may cause long term lung damage. 
5. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where the consequence is being severely 
injured or killed. 
6. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where the consequence is being 
severely injured or killed. 
7. Entering a burning building to save the property where the consequence is being 
severely injured or killed. 
 
Full results are provided in Table 8.3. Analysis of results revealed a probability of certainty 
(where probability equals 1.00) amongst the study group of only 0.143. This means there was a 
probability of 0.857 that participants did not collectively agree on risk tolerance attitudes or 
thresholds. Further analysis revealed a probability of only 0.286 that all participants shared the 
same risk tolerance across the presented scenarios. This probability increased to 0.381 amongst 
the “injured” population, whilst there was no change in the probability of agreeance amongst 
the “never injured” population compared to all participants. One potential explanation for the 
increased consensus of risk acceptance amongst the “injured” population may be that those 
participants who had been previously injured held a higher risk tolerance and therefore were 
more likely to undertake hazardous tasks that may result in injury compared to the “never 
injured” group.  
Risk acceptance with limited certainty was also higher for the entire study population and 
both injured and never injured subpopulations where life involvement was present. Participants 
would typically put both their own safety and the safety of personnel under their command at 
increased risk to facilitate occupant rescue (from all risk sources). This risk acceptance with 
limited certainty increased marginally where rescue was of a colleague, particularly when risk 
was transferred from the participant to those under the participant’s control. Marginal increase 
in risk threshold was observed between personal and personnel exposure where rescue 
involved a child compared to an adult. It is hypothesised that this increase may be a 
consequence of perceived community expectations and/or due to an innate willingness to 
permit great risk to save a child. Further investigation is required to explore this hypothesis. 
Risk acceptance with limited certainty declined quickly for the protection of property, 
whilst the level of certainty decreased as the lead time to the realisation of potential 
consequences increased. For example, the certainty regarding risk acceptance involving 
immediate impacts, such as trauma, was generally higher compared to those involving 
delayed impacts, such as cancer or lung disease. This suggest participants were more likely to 
be concerned with impacts they can witness immediately and is supported by the findings of 
previous research (Penney, 2013). 
Descriptive analysis of the results identified a mean probability of 0.529 (standard 
deviation of 0.336) that the entire survey group would agree on the acceptability of any given 
situation where the risk was personal in nature. By comparison, a mean probability of 0.449 
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(standard deviation of 0.321) was found that the entire survey group would agree on the 
acceptability of any given situation where the risk was to personnel under the participant’s 
command. This further supports the findings that participants were more likely to accept risk 
when they believed the consequences were limited to themselves. 
Table 8.3. Risk tolerance to the participant themselves compared to those under their command. 
 
Risk to Participant Themselves Risk to Personnel Under the  
Command of the Participant 
Risk Tolerance Acceptable  Unacceptable Acceptable  Unacceptable 
Group 
Context & Risk A B C A B C A B C A B C 
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.63 0.56 0.70 0.37 0.44 0.30 0.47 0.56 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.60 
3 0.16 0.00 0.30 0.84 1.00 0.70 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.95 1.00 0.90 
4 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.21 0.11 0.30 
5 0.47 0.56 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.68 0.67 0.70 
6 0.37 0.33 0.40 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.79 0.78 0.80 
7 0.58 0.56 0.60 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.63 0.78 0.50 0.37 0.22 0.50 
8 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.74 0.78 0.70 
9 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.84 0.89 0.80 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.74 0.78 0.80 
10 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.74 1.00 0.60 0.26 0.00 0.40 
11 0.32 0.22 0.40 0.68 0.78 0.60 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.74 0.78 0.70 
12 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.79 0.78 0.80 
13 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 0.79 0.67 0.90 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.53 0.67 0.40 0.47 0.33 0.60 
15 0.21 0.11 0.30 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.89 0.89 0.90 
16 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.05 0.00 0.10 
17 0.79 0.67 0.90 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.63 0.78 0.50 0.37 0.22 0.50 
18 0.37 0.33 0.40 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.84 0.78 0.90 
19 0.84 0.78 0.90 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.32 0.33 0.30 
20 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.84 0.89 0.80 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.84 0.78 0.90 
21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Context and Risk:  
1. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a low probability of being 
severely injured or killed. 
2. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a moderate probability 
of being severely injured or killed. 
3. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a high probability of 
being severely injured or killed 
4. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a low probability of being exposed to 
dust that may cause immediate lung damage. 
5. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a moderate probability of being 
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage. 
6. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a high probability of being exposed 
to dust that may cause immediate lung damage. 
7. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a low probability of 
developing cancer. 
8. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a moderate probability 
of developing cancer. 
9. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a high probability of 
developing cancer. 
10. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a low probability of being exposed to 
dust that may cause long term lung damage. 
11. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a moderate probability of being 
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage. 
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12. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a high probability of being exposed 
to dust that may cause long term lung damage. 
13. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a low probability of being 
severely injured or killed 
14. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a moderate probability of 
being severely injured or killed. 
15. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a high probability of being 
severely injured or killed. 
16. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a low probability of 
being severely injured or killed. 
17. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a moderate 
probability of being severely injured or killed. 
18. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a high probability of 
being severely injured or killed. 
19. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a low probability of 
being severely injured or killed. 
20. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a moderate probability 
of being severely injured or killed. 
21. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a high probability of 
being severely injured or killed. 
Group:  
A. Total study population 
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response whilst 
working under a different IC  
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency response 
whilst working under a different IC  
 
8.5 Probability of firefighter injury during emergency response 
To determine the probability of firefighter injury during emergency response, a 
retrospective analysis of Western Australian fire service safety and incident reports between 
January 1st 2001 and January 1st 2015 was conducted (Penney, 2019). A retrospective analysis 
of Western Australian fire service safety and incident reports between January 1st 2001 and 
January 1st 2015 was conducted.  Initial analysis enabled the calculation of conditional 
probability given a reportable incident occurs, and likelihood on the basis of activity, risk 
source and nature of injury reported. The results are detailed in Tables 8.4-8.6. Each table is 
ordered from highest to lowest frequency. 
Table 8.4. Analysis by activity. 
Activity (A) Count P(A|B) Occurrence per year Likelihood 
Firefighting 327 0.491 21.800 Almost certain 
RCR 110 0.165 7.333 Almost certain 
Bushfire fighting 99 0.149 6.600 Almost certain 
Rescue 36 0.054 2.400 Almost certain 
Driving 30 0.045 2.000 Almost certain 
Breathing Apparatus 20 0.030 1.333 Almost certain 
Suicide Response 15 0.023 1.000 Almost certain 
Hazmat 12 0.018 0.800 Moderate 
Environmental 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
DBA 5 0.008 0.333 Moderate 
Not reported 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Storm 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
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Table 8.5. Analysis by risk source. 
Risk source (A) Count P(A|B) Occurrence per year Likelihood 
Physical Strain 215 0.323 14.333 Almost certain 
Exposure - asbestos 120 0.180 8.000 Almost certain 
Exposure - psychological 95 0.143 6.333 Almost certain 
Impact 49 0.074 3.267 Almost certain 
Exposure - smoke 37 0.056 2.467 Almost certain 
Exposure - biohazard 24 0.036 1.600 Almost certain 
Exposure - hazmat fire 24 0.036 1.600 Almost certain 
Equipment failure 21 0.032 1.400 Almost certain 
Exposure - chemical 20 0.030 1.333 Almost certain 
Thermal 16 0.024 1.067 Likely 
Operator error 11 0.017 0.733 Moderate 
Animal 7 0.011 0.467 Moderate 
Communications 5 0.008 0.333 Moderate 
Environmental 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Impaired Vision 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Other person 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Blast/Explosion 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Entrapment 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Exposure - noise 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Violence 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Electrical 1 0.002 0.067 Rare 
Not reported 1 0.002 0.067 Rare 
 
Table 8.6. Analysis by injury. 
Nature of injury (A) Count P(A|B) 
Occurrence 
per year 
Likelihood 
Inhalation 163 0.245 10.867 Almost certain 
Psychological 96 0.144 6.400 Almost certain 
Nil 70 0.105 4.667 Almost certain 
Back 56 0.084 3.733 Almost certain 
Knee 42 0.063 2.800 Almost certain 
Eye 32 0.048 2.133 Almost certain 
Heat illness 30 0.045 2.000 Almost certain 
Shoulder 26 0.039 1.733 Almost certain 
Leg 16 0.024 1.067 Almost certain 
General 15 0.023 1.000 Likely 
Head / spinal 13 0.020 0.867 Likely 
Ankle  11 0.017 0.733 Moderate 
Arm 11 0.017 0.733 Moderate 
Finger 9 0.014 0.600 Moderate 
Face 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
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Foot 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Multiple 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Neck 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Hand 7 0.011 0.467 Moderate 
Elbow 6 0.009 0.400 Moderate 
Ear 5 0.008 0.333 Moderate 
Absorption 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Not reported 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Wrist 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Chest 3 0.005 0.200 Unlikely 
Groin 3 0.005 0.200 Unlikely 
Hip  3 0.005 0.200 Unlikely 
Abdominal 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Ingestion 2 0.003 0.133 Rare 
Thermal 1 0.002 0.067 Rare 
 
By frequency, firefighting was almost three times more likely to result in a reportable event 
compared to any other activity with an occurrence of 21.8 times per year. Road crash rescue 
(RCR) response resulted in 7.3 reportable events per year whilst bushfire fighting resulted in 6.6 
reportable incidents per year. This result suggests additional attention should be provided in 
training personnel and developing suitable risk mitigation procedures the activities most likely to 
give rise to a reportable incident, for example, firefighting, RCR and bush firefighting. 
In terms of risk source, Physical Strain is almost 1.8 times more likely to result in a reportable 
event compared to other risk sources. This is consistent with the physically demanding nature of 
firefighting (DFES, 2013) and is comparable to overexertion/strain injury rates in United States 
firefighters (FEMA, 2011).  
Exposure to various hazards including asbestos, chemicals and biohazards collectively 
accounts for more reports than any other risk source (total of 225 incidents with a conditional 
probability of 0.338). Such exposures are impossible to eradicate due to the inherent nature of 
all hazards emergency response. However, the likelihood of adverse outcomes can be partly 
mitigated through procedural and tactical measures. Such an approach is best illustrated using 
a bow tie analysis (Robinson et al., 2010) as shown in Figure 8.1. In this manner both pre-exposure 
and post exposure controls or barriers can be implemented holistically to reduce the likelihood 
and severity of adverse consequences. The bow tie analysis also facilitates the illustration of 
relationships between various barriers. Figure 8.1 provides a simple example of this in the 
firefighting context. Where a relationship exists between barriers, the influence of the preceding 
barrier may be either agonistic or antagonistic on the effectiveness of the following barrier. For 
example, inappropriate or insufficient research and data may lead to inappropriate 
organisational policy. This, in turn, can result in inappropriate training which will ultimately weaken 
risk management at all operational and organisational levels. The combined effect of the 
barriers and intrinsic relationships can ultimately affect the severity of realised consequences. 
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Figure 8.1. Simplified bow tie analysis contextualised to firefighting operations 
Just as firefighting is extremely physically demanding, it is also psychologically demanding 
with exposure to psychological trauma identified as the second most common risk source 
resulting in reportable events. Other researchers (Carll, 2007; Trappler, 2014) concur that care 
must be taken in addressing risks arising from exposures of a psychological nature in firefighting 
which are unique to the emergency service profession. Just as education, awareness and 
resilience training is important prior to exposure to events of a psychological nature, specific 
psychological management programs and counselling are required post exposure.  
Analysis by injury yields results that, in limited circumstances, appear to conflict with other 
available data sets. Inhalation ‘injuries’ are the most probable of all classified injuries to occur. 
However, this may be explained by the fact that all reported incidences of “inhalation” of 
smoke or other chemicals were captured in this category, regardless of whether acute injury 
occurred. Psychological ‘injuries’ were the second most common reported injury and this is 
consistent with the analysis of risk source data. Surprisingly thermal injuries, being those resulting 
from heat transfer were the least probable (0.002 conditional probability). This conflicts with 
data reported by FEMA (2011, 2012) which identifies a significantly higher thermal injury 
occurrence rate. The number of thermal injuries reported in this study may be lower than the 
true number of injuries because many incidents may remain unreported. The probability of 
“Nil” injuries occurring represents “Near Misses” where no injury was actually sustained and is 
the third highest amongst reported injuries sustained. Again, this figure may be lower than the 
true number of near misses that occur during incidents because of a lack of report completion 
when near misses occur. 
Table 8.7 reports the conditional probability of a specific injury occurring given an injury 
occurs during the specified activity.  Across all activities, the “Nil” injury or ‘near miss’ is 
prevalent. This is consistent with previous findings and suggests a large number of incidents 
occur with the potential to cause injury, but do not actually cause injury in the specific case 
reported. Psychological injuries are also well represented throughout the reports, particularly 
where the potential or realisation of human trauma is present (for instance Road Crash Rescue 
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and Suicide Response). In the case of reported injuries during Suicide Response it is suggested 
it is likely the “Not Reported” values should also be psychological injuries even though they 
have not been documented as such in the relevant reports. 
Table 8.7. Conditional probability of specific injury during incident operations. 
Operation Injury Conditional Probability 
Breathing apparatus 
operations 
Nil 0.300 
Back 0.150 
Knee 0.150 
Head / spinal 0.100 
Heat illness 0.100 
Neck 0.100 
Ankle 0.050 
Shoulder 0.050 
Bushfire fighting operations Eye 0.253 
Knee 0.141 
Nil 0.131 
Back 0.081 
Inhalation 0.061 
Leg 0.061 
Ankle 0.051 
Shoulder 0.051 
Foot 0.030 
Heat illness 0.030 
Finger 0.020 
Neck 0.020 
Arm 0.010 
Chest 0.010 
Elbow 0.010 
Face 0.010 
Multiple 0.010 
Psychological 0.010 
Wrist 0.010 
Direct brigade alarm response Eye 0.800 
Knee 0.200 
Driving operations Nil 0.800 
Back 0.033 
Ear 0.033 
Leg 0.033 
Psychological 0.033 
Shoulder 0.033 
Wrist 0.033 
Firefighting operations Inhalation 0.434 
Back 0.092 
 Heat illness 0.067 
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Knee 0.064 
Nil 0.064 
Shoulder 0.046 
Head / spinal 0.034 
Leg 0.028 
Arm 0.024 
Multiple 0.018 
Foot 0.015 
Hand 0.015 
Ear 0.012 
Psychological 0.012 
Ankle 0.009 
Elbow 0.009 
Eye 0.009 
Finger 0.009 
Neck 0.009 
Abdominal 0.006 
Chest 0.006 
Hip 0.006 
Face 0.003 
Groin 0.003 
Thermal 0.003 
Hazardous material 
operations 
General 0.500 
Inhalation 0.417 
Heat illness 0.083 
Road crash rescue operations Psychological 0.600 
Back 0.100 
General 0.082 
Face 0.045 
Absorption 0.018 
Inhalation 0.018 
Shoulder 0.018 
Ankle 0.009 
Arm 0.009 
Finger 0.009 
Groin 0.009 
Hand 0.009 
Heat illness 0.009 
Hip 0.009 
Ingestion 0.009 
Knee 0.009 
 Multiple 0.009 
Neck 0.009 
Nil 0.009 
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Wrist 0.009 
Rescue (other than RCR) 
operations 
Psychological 0.306 
Inhalation 0.194 
Back 0.083 
Nil 0.083 
Absorption 0.056 
Shoulder 0.056 
Ankle 0.028 
Elbow 0.028 
Groin 0.028 
Hand 0.028 
Ingestion 0.028 
Knee 0.028 
Not reported 0.028 
Wrist 0.028 
Suicide response operations Psychological 0.800 
Not reported 0.200 
 
Analysis reveals thermal injuries account for a relatively insignificant conditional probability 
of only 0.003 during Firefighting activities only. No thermal burns are reported during Bushfire or 
other response. This is in stark contradiction to the probability of thermal injuries reported in 
United States statistics (FEMA, 2012). However, it is hypothesised that this may be due to under 
reporting of thermal injuries, or due to thermal injuries being referred to as injuries to specific 
body parts without reference to the burn trauma, or due to differences in firefighting tactics 
between Australia and the United States which may result in different mechanisms and 
frequencies of injury.  
For example, inhalation injuries appear over-represented in the data which is considered 
surprising given the significant respiratory protection available to responding crews(DFES, 2013, 
2014 & 2015a). Analysis of descriptions with the reports suggests a significant proportion of 
inhalation exposures may be due to partial-face fitting respiratory protection masks that do 
not completely prevent ingress of smoke and other products of combustion. This has been 
rectified since the study commenced, through the implementation of full face respirators 
available for firefighting personnel. The conditional probability of heat illness occurrence also 
warrants attention with prevalence amongst all operations and responses that require the 
responder to wear structural firefighting Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Wearing PPE 
requires significant physical effort. 
Review of the conditional probabilities detailed above should assist incident controllers 
having enhanced evidence based awareness of potential consequences and likelihoods prior 
to their occurrence during an emergency incident. Analysis of the conditional probability of 
injury given an injury occurs during each of the specific operations will also facilitate the review 
and improvement of strategic and tactical planning; personnel relief requirements; the 
potential effectiveness of PPE; and even guide the potential development of targeted 
prophylactic physical training programs. 
Table 8.8 provides useful data to facilitate the development of evidence based risk 
mitigation strategies prior to and on the incident ground. Physical Strain recurrently accounts 
for high, if not the highest, level of Risk Source giving rise to a reportable incident across almost 
all activities. This finding is consistent with the previous results of both this study and FEMA (2011) 
and reaffirms the notion that firefighting is extremely physical in nature. By comparison, Moore-
Merrill et al. (2008) reported that physical strain was the second highest contributing factor to 
firefighter injury in the United States (the first being a lack of situational awareness). 
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Table 8.8. Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during incident 
operations. 
Operation Injury Conditional Probability 
Breathing apparatus operations Physical Strain 0.550 
Impact 0.150 
Entrapment 0.100 
Equipment failure 0.100 
Communications 0.050 
Electrical 0.050 
Bushfire fighting operations Physical Strain 0.515 
Exposure - smoke 0.253 
Exposure - chemical 0.061 
Impact 0.051 
Thermal 0.051 
Exposure - asbestos 0.030 
Equipment failure 0.020 
Exposure - psychological 0.010 
Violence 0.010 
Firefighting operations Physical Strain 0.358 
Exposure - asbestos 0.315 
Impact 0.104 
Exposure - hazmat fire 0.073 
Exposure - smoke 0.037 
Thermal 0.034 
Equipment failure 0.024 
Communications 0.012 
Exposure - chemical 0.009 
Exposure - psychological 0.009 
Blast/Explosion 0.006 
Exposure - noise 0.006 
Operator error 0.006 
Not reported 0.003 
Violence 0.003 
Hazardous material operations Exposure - chemical 0.583 
Exposure - asbestos 0.333 
Physical Strain 0.083 
Road crash rescue operations Exposure - psychological 0.600 
Physical Strain 0.209 
Exposure - biohazard 0.164 
Exposure - asbestos 0.018 
 Impact 0.009 
Rescue (other than RCR) 
operations 
Exposure - psychological 0.306 
Physical Strain 0.278 
Exposure - asbestos 0.194 
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Exposure - biohazard 0.111 
Impact 0.056 
Equipment failure 0.028 
Exposure - chemical 0.028 
 
Psychological Exposure was also well represented in the data, particularly amongst 
incident response involving human life and trauma including Road Crash Rescue and Suicide 
Response. This again supports previous findings of the study. 
Exposure to various contaminants was also prevalent throughout the majority of fields. This 
may be significant as potential effects may be mitigated through appropriate strategic and 
tactical response; appropriate PPE and suitable decontamination procedures (DFES, 2015 & 
2015a). 
Breathing Apparatus operations are amongst the most hazardous of all firefighting 
activities. These operations involve the use of self-contained breathing apparatus in 
atmospheres not conducive to life due to the presence of smoke, heat, oxygen deficiency 
and/or excessive temperature [28]. During Breathing Apparatus operations, teams of two 
firefighters will work in close proximity to, or inside, burning structures. Typically they rely on a 
single line of firefighting hose for fire protection. The margin for error is therefore understandably 
narrow and the severity of potential consequences comparatively high (as reported in Table 
7.9). Breathing apparatus operations are extremely physical in nature and this is represented 
by a conditional probability of 0.55 that the responsible risk source for the reportable event will 
be Physical Strain. Analysis also revealed a conditional probability of Impacts being the 
responsible risk source for the reportable incident of 0.15. It is suggested Impacts (as compared 
with Explosion / Blasts) are more likely to occur within a burning structure. Subsequently, this 
figure may be reduced through the defining of organisational risk acceptance thresholds. In 
turn, this would facilitate a reduction in the potential for incident controllers committing crews 
to internal firefighting in the absence of life involvement because of a perceived internal or 
external obligation to do so. 
Table 8.9 provides the comparisons between actual reported consequence severity and 
potential consequence severity for each Activity. Analysis reveals the conditional probability 
of moderate to catastrophic potential consequence severity is higher than actual reported 
consequence severity across all Activity groups. In part this may be explained by the lack of 
subsequent reports or follow up detail for consequences that may have a long period of 
latency (for instance psychological exposures, or exposures to contaminants), or for injuries 
that are initially reported but worsen over time. Results of this analysis also support previous 
findings of the prevalence of “Nil” reported injuries in that there is a high conditional probability 
of ‘near misses’ within the incidents reported. 
 
Table 8.9. Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during operations 
Operation Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Breathing apparatus 
operations 
Insignificant 0.300 0.000 
Minor 0.700 0.150 
Moderate 0.000 0.400 
Major 0.000 0.250 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.200 
Bushfire fighting operations Insignificant 0.818 0.000 
 Minor 0.131 0.505 
Moderate 0.040 0.101 
Major 0.010 0.212 
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Catastrophic 0.000 0.182 
Driving operations Insignificant 0.967 0.133 
Minor 0.033 0.100 
Moderate 0.000 0.100 
Major 0.000 0.167 
Catastrophic - - 
Firefighting operations Insignificant 0.933 0.031 
Minor 0.034 0.147 
Moderate 0.021 0.199 
Major 0.012 0.098 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.526 
Hazardous materials 
operations 
Insignificant 1.000 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.000 
Moderate 0.000 0.000 
Major 0.000 0.083 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.917 
Road crash rescue operations Insignificant 0.973 0.000 
Minor 0.018 0.073 
Moderate 0.009 0.218 
Major 0.000 0.027 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.682 
Rescue (other than RCR) 
operations 
Insignificant 0.972 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.111 
Moderate 0.028 0.306 
Major 0.000 0.056 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.528 
Suicide response operations Insignificant 1.000 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.133 
Moderate 0.000 0.000 
Major 0.000 0.000 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.867 
 
Further analysis reveals that, based on actual consequence severity, there was a 
conditional probability of zero (0.000) for a consequence of catastrophic severity occurring 
across the entire Activity range. This result is not consistent with numerous international studies 
(FEMA, 2011 & 2012; Moore-Merrell et al., 2008) and whilst acknowledging the differences in 
incidents responded to in different jurisdictions, this result potentially suggests Western 
Australian firefighting strategies are safer than those utilised by international counterparts. By 
comparison, a mean potential consequence of catastrophic severity revealed a conditional 
probability across all Activities of 0.408 (standard deviation of 0.328). These results represent a 
significant potential for increased severe injury, permanent disability and even death amongst 
the study group, and should be considered in the establishment of the internal context for risk 
management during dynamic emergency operations. 
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8.6 Implications for frontline firefighters and IMT’s 
In the absence of any similar studies within Australasian fire services, this chapter provides 
important qualitative and quantitative data that can be used to improve risk management 
during dynamic emergency operations. When considered together with literature reviewed, 
the results of the first study explicitly reject any notion of the validity of “dynamic risk 
management” being a stand-alone process for managing risk during emergency situations. 
For best practice to be realised, the architectural structure or process of risk management as 
defined in ISO31000 cannot change. The context in which risk management is completed may 
vary in dynamic emergency situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms; however, 
it is this unique and dynamic context of emergency situations that only further requires the risk 
management process to be completed in its entirety each and every time risk is assessed and 
subsequently managed.  
The data presented in this chapter identified recurrent thermoregulatory and critical 
incident related risk trends across all activity groups.  These trends are significant because they 
are associated with greater potential for serious consequences of hospitalisation or long term 
disability compared to less severe, but more frequently occurring, physical strain related 
injuries.  In terms of affecting risk management during frontline operations, these results suggest 
Incident Controllers need to take enhanced steps to mitigate thermoregulatory related and 
physical strain related risks.  Proactive management may include enhanced mobilisation and 
rotation of personnel at incidents to reduce physical loading, whilst the risks may be reactively 
managed through implementation of active recovery procedures and medical monitoring of 
crews at incidents by qualified medical practitioners to ensure it is safe for them to continue 
working.   Both during and post the emergency phase of incidents, the Incident Controller 
should ensure crew mental welfare is managed to reduce the exposures to psychological 
events.   
During almost all types of operational response the potential for major or catastrophic 
adverse outcomes is present.   The potential consequence is consistently greater than the 
actual consequence realised in the data analysed.  This may be explained by the mitigating 
effects of post event barriers (PPE, physical conditioning of personnel, etc.) or simply the 
personnel involved escaped more serious injury due to a combination of events that led to 
them being close to the impact, as opposed to being in the direct line of impact.  In light of 
this finding it is important that incident controllers and operational personnel remain vigilant to 
the potentially ‘normalising’ effect of recurrent exposure to potentially catastrophic, albeit low 
frequency, situations.     
8.7 Implications for urban planners 
Firefighters will put themselves in harms way to protect vulnerable communities. Through 
careful and appropriate urban design that considers potential wildfire behaviour, 
defendability of communities, evacuation requirements and firefighter tenability using 
evidence based fire engineering analysis, urban planners can enhance the safety of 
communities in areas prone to wildfire and the firefighters that protect them. 
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9. Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
This section details the key outcomes from each Chapter. 
9.2 Key outcomes for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s 
 
1. Vegetation structure plays a critical role in the development and severity of 
wildfires.  During periods of elevated fire weather conditions, mega-wildfires in 
through continuous vegetation structures (particularly in forest and woodlands), 
no amount of resources or water (see Chapters 4-6) will be able to suppress the 
head fire.  Firefighting strategies in these situations should therefore focus on areas 
of opportunity where vegetation structure, particularly surface, near surface and 
elevated fuels are limited and the vegetation geometry does not support a 
continuous wildfire front.  The removal of fuel immediately adjacent to assets and 
communities through ‘dry’ firefighting strategies such as backburning (see 
Chapter 4) may need to be considered early in firefighting campaigns. 
 
1. Chapter 2 covers the basic modelling of wildfire development and behaviour.  As 
the suitability of firefighting strategies are gauged against these inputs it is essential 
that all firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s alike not only understand the 
presented models, but are effective in accurately applying them.  Incorrect 
predictions may result in inappropriate strategies being devised, leaving frontline 
personnel exposed to overwhelming wildfire conditions with potentially fatal 
consequences (see Chapters 5 and 7).  Whilst fire behaviour specialists are 
required to accurately and competently predict wildfire behaviour, all personnel 
from firefighters to the IMT should be able to verify predictions thereby increasing 
the margin for safety for both firefighters and the community. 
 
1. When considering the defendability of urban areas where the geometry of 
vegetation fuel beds prevents landscape scale wildfire behaviour: 
i. The case studies presented in Chapter 3 indicate potential significant over-
estimation of radiant heat flux using the approach outlined in AS3959 in 
cases involving non-combustible obstructions and point-source ignition 
fires for a minimum of 20m separation from the fire front. This is significant as 
it is in this distance that wildfire flame radiation is considered to have its 
greatest impact (Cohen & Butler, 1996; Newman et al, 2013). Such 
situations are common in urban environments. The results demonstrate the 
importance of appropriately considering fuel geometry, wildfire behaviour, 
and the effect of shielding structures when calculating radiant heat 
impacts on buildings and emergency responders within urban 
environments where vegetation fuel bed geometry prevents wildfires 
reaching landscape proportions.  
ii. Over estimation of potential radiant heat flux impacts could, in turn, result 
in firefighters not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend homes 
as a result of over-estimation of wildfire behaviour that indicates 
suppression efforts are not suitable, resulting in avoidable house loss and 
impacts on communities. This may occur as firefighting suppression 
thresholds are related to wildfire behaviour parameters throughout 
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jurisdictions internationally. Where inappropriate predictions fail to consider 
vegetation geometry that does not support the assumptions of landscape 
wildfire modelling, otherwise defendable areas may be left unguarded 
due inappropriate evaluation of suppression strategies. 
 
1. Wildfires, particularly mega wildfires such as those experienced in late 2019 and 
early 2020 throughout Australia are dynamic and complex disasters that require 
significant interstate and international resourcing over prolonged durations.  When 
such events occur they will inevitably impact life and property as well as 
overwhelming firefighting efforts.  Chapter 4 discussed the strategies available to 
firefighters, their limitations, and where the evidence suggests they may be 
successful.  Detailed and accurate planning is required to be completed by IMT’s 
and fire behaviour specialists to ensure firefighting operations are suitable and to 
minimise the potential for firefighter injury.  When applied correctly and in the right 
context, the findings of new research including Table 4.15 and the RUIM may assist 
IMT’s to achieve this. 
2. As will be the case in many landscape scale wildfires and mega wildfires, detailed 
predictions and analysis of wildfire behaviour in itself is insufficient.  Care must be 
taken to bridge the theory – practice gap and ensure planning is operationally 
relevant.  The research presented in this chapter demonstrates that even in mild 
conditions, the head fire will often be unstoppable where it occurs in continuous 
vegetation fuel bed geometry.  This is further supported by the findings presented 
in Chapters 5 and 6.The use of existing wildfire scars and prescribed burns for 
wildfire suppression can only be considered opportunistic and with marginal 
chance of success unless the burn scar is both recent (within 2-3 years) and 
significant in area. As climate change continues to result in worsening fire 
conditions, frontline firefighters, IMT’s and fire behaviour specialists need to apply 
increased scrutiny to fuel bed structure and geometry, focusing suppression efforts 
where fuels are discontinuous and broken. 
 
1. It is concerning that existing operational wildfire suppression thresholds do not 
systematically or quantifiably take account of wildfire behaviour (RoS, I and LF) 
combined with the associated potential radiant heat flux received by firefighters 
attempting suppression activities in a landscape scale wildfire scenario.  Current 
fire behaviour-linked suppression guidelines do not specifically address the 
tenability of environmental conditions in the proximity of the flaming zone where 
firefighters are often working to suppress the fire.  Once tenability thresholds are 
considered it is evident that offensive, direct attack on the head of large wildfires 
is extremely hazardous to firefighters under all but the mildest of conditions. 
2. Consideration of radiant heat flux also reveals how truly dangerous defensive rural 
urban interface firefighting is.  Firefighters exposed to head fire fronts will potentially 
be subjected to levels of radiant heat that are capable of causing severe 
incapacitating burns in as little as five seconds in elevated fire weather conditions 
and higher fuel loads.   Incident Controllers and fire crew leaders must therefore 
carefully consider whether properties and the occupants that shelter insider them 
are defendable or whether the credible risk to their own crews is too high.  As 
discussed in Chapter 7, firefighters have a personal risk tolerance higher than that 
of their commanding officers, this means that frontline firefighters are more likely 
than their ranking officers to commit themselves to defending occupants from 
insuppressible wildfire fronts.  This is  potentially due to firefighters’ own personal 
expectations that they should put themselves in personal danger to protect and 
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rescue civilians, whist officers also consider the responsibility of keeping their crews 
safe and potential greater reaching consequences on the firefighter’s family 
should they be severely injured or killed during wildfire suppression operations 
(Penney, 2019).   
3. As opposed to being part of an RUI strategy, sheltering inside or behind firefighting 
appliances during the passage of a wildfire front should be considered an 
absolute last resort only.  Instead, firefighters should seek refuge in suitable 
structures well before the expected impact of the wildfire front and emerge to 
salvage property where they are able to do so.  Committing to a RUI defense by 
positioning firefighters in between a landscape scale forest wildfire front and 
private property or critical infrastructure with the expectation that suppression 
efforts will be either safe or successful is at best, reckless.  Even the intervention of 
aerial firefighting suppression is unlikely to be sufficient to make this approach safe 
or effective.  Given the extreme danger associated with RUI firefighting, it should 
be considered only as a contingency plan except in extreme circumstances 
where large populations of vulnerable communities including school, nursing 
homes and hospitals cannot be safely evacuated prior to the arrival of the wildfire 
front. 
 
1. Put simply, the effectiveness of suppression by applying water to landscape scale 
forest and woodlands fires drops significantly as the active flame depth of the 
head fire increases.  By understanding this concept, as well as how vegetation 
structure influences fire behaviour and fire front geometry, IMT’s and firefighters 
can more realistically assess the potential for suppression success.  At the same 
time, if fire behaviour specialists understand these relationships, they are better 
prepared to describe the fire behaviour in terms that are meaningful for the IMT 
and frontline firefighters.  The use of guiding analysis such as that presented in this 
and other chapters may assist IMT’s determine that suppression strategies are 
unlikely to succeed and resources would be better spent in evacuations or 
allowing crews more time to prepare to defend vulnerable assets. 
 
 
1. The findings of this chapter should be a stark reminder to firefighters of the 
limitations of vehicle mounted sprinkler protection systems.  Whilst vehicle 
protection systems including sprinklers may be successful in increasing the 
survivability of mild burnovers against which they’ve been tested, existing 
specifications are unlikely to afford sufficient protection against the wildfires 
modelled in Chapter 5. An unrealistic expectation of vehicle protection system 
performance may contribute to firefighters having a false sense of safety and 
security, and thereby being more likely to commit to suppression strategies in 
untenable circumstances. 
2. The solution to these issues may, in part, rest with: 
i. Updated wildfire suppression training for firefighters clearly identifying the 
limitations of vehicle protection systems and effects of vehicle orientation 
during burnover events; 
ii. Greater acknowledgement by IMT’s of the physical limits of wildfire 
suppression and an earlier consideration of defensive firefighting strategies 
with opportunistic ‘surgical’ offensive tactics; 
iii. Increased fire services investment in wildfire appliance design with a focus 
on passive design protection elements that mirror AS3959, particularly 
surrounding glazing and cabin construction. 
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1. In the absence of any similar studies within Australasian fire services, this chapter 
provides important qualitative and quantitative data that can be used to improve 
risk management during dynamic emergency operations. When considered 
together with literature reviewed, the results of the first study explicitly reject any 
notion of the validity of “dynamic risk management” being a stand-alone process 
for managing risk during emergency situations. For best practice to be realised, 
the architectural structure or process of risk management as defined in ISO31000 
cannot change. The context in which risk management is completed may vary in 
dynamic emergency situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms; 
however, it is this unique and dynamic context of emergency situations that only 
further requires the risk management process to be completed in its entirety each 
and every time risk is assessed and subsequently managed.  
2. The data presented in this chapter identified recurrent thermoregulatory and 
critical incident related risk trends across all activity groups.  These trends are 
significant because they are associated with greater potential for serious 
consequences of hospitalisation or long term disability compared to less severe, 
but more frequently occurring, physical strain related injuries.  In terms of affecting 
risk management during frontline operations, these results suggest Incident 
Controllers need to take enhanced steps to mitigate thermoregulatory related 
and physical strain related risks.  Proactive management may include enhanced 
mobilisation and rotation of personnel at incidents to reduce physical loading, 
whilst the risks may be reactively managed through implementation of active 
recovery procedures and medical monitoring of crews at incidents by qualified 
medical practitioners to ensure it is safe for them to continue working.   Both during 
and post the emergency phase of incidents, the Incident Controller should ensure 
crew mental welfare is managed to reduce the exposures to psychological 
events.   
3. During almost all types of operational response the potential for major or 
catastrophic adverse outcomes is present.   The potential consequence is 
consistently greater than the actual consequence realised in the data analysed.  
This may be explained by the mitigating effects of post event barriers (PPE, physical 
conditioning of personnel, etc.) or simply the personnel involved escaped more 
serious injury due to a combination of events that led to them being close to the 
impact, as opposed to being in the direct line of impact.  In light of this finding it is 
important that incident controllers and operational personnel remain vigilant to 
the potentially ‘normalising’ effect of recurrent exposure to potentially 
catastrophic, albeit low frequency, situations.     
 
 
9.3  Implications for fire behaviour specialists and urban planners 
 
1. To partially address the issues identified in AS3959 and increase the accuracy of 
modelled wildfire outputs the following is recommended: 
iii. Classification of vegetation based solely on qualitative descriptors should 
not over-ride the wildfire behaviour model applied to the scenario without 
due consideration of the wildfire behaviour expected to occur through 
the vegetation.  Using the case study previously provided as an example, 
whilst the vegetation could reasonably be classified as Class A Forest or 
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Class B Woodlands, applying the Noble et al wildfire behaviour model to 
either of these options without modifying the deemed fuel loads would 
significantly result in over-estimation of wildfire outputs.  In urban areas 
where vegetation geometry restricts wildfire growth, a more appropriate 
and accurate approach is to assess the fuel load utilising Vesta Fuel 
Hazard Scores and apply the correct vegetation availability factor.  
Further guidance on this can be found in Chapters 2 and 3; and 
iv. Practitioners (both from fire services and land use planning perspectives) 
involved in modelling wildfire and calculating potential impacts require a 
sound understanding of the respective models and their limitations.  
Caution should be applied when attempting to ‘simplify’ complex 
equations, models or engineering concepts in standards, guidance 
material or documents for use by lay persons or in land use planning 
decisions.  The profession of wildfire engineering is in its infancy and job 
titles do not necessarily equate to the knowledge and skills required to 
complete the required technical analysis or make informed and accurate 
decisions.  This can be in part be remedied by professionalization / 
accreditation of the sector and greater recognition of the role of fire 
safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds in it. 
 
1. Perhaps the greatest implications of Chapter 2 for urban planners applies to 
assessments of potential wildfire behaviour in urban areas where the landscape 
scale wildfire behaviour assumed in AS3959 and many of the planning guidelines 
is not possible.  Where vegetation fuel bed geometry (refer back to Chapter 1) 
prevents the development of a quasi-steady RoS (refer to section 2.3 of this 
chapter), as reported in recent studies (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), failure to 
adequately adjust inputs may result in the significant over-calculation of potential 
wildfire behaviour.  This can be in part be remedied by deference in such instances 
to suitably qualified fire safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds that can 
provide quantified analysis and an appropriate level of fire safety engineering rigor 
to design solutions. 
 
1. Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, public open 
space, road reserves, and residential areas within urban areas. In turn, land that is 
actually suitable for development may be identified as being subject to 
overestimated wildfire impact which restricts or prohibits development altogether. 
Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a small unmanaged vacant 
residential lot is modelled as supporting a landscape scale wildfire, in turn 
restricting or prohibiting development on adjacent and near-by lots. 
2. Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire resistant construction 
standards of affected dwellings and structures that hinders development through 
either misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels of wildfire 
impact, or through making development cost-prohibitive as a result of the level of 
wildfire resistant engineering and construction required. 
3. In addition to the inherent safety factor incorporated within the vegetation 
availability factor previously discussed, the methodologies proposed also retain 
the assumption of a flame emissivity ε = 0.95, being representative of a landscape 
scale wildfire with an active uniform flame front depth greater than 2 m, and even 
potentially greater than 10 m (Poon, 2003; Sullivan, 2009). In cases where the active 
flame front will not reach this depth, it may also be suitable to reduce the emissivity. 
It is important to note that whilst the vegetation factor and modified view factor 
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model are applicable to all fuel types (forest, woodland, shrub, scrub, grassland, 
etc.), the point source acceleration model presented in Chapter 3 is suitable for 
treed forest and woodland structures only, as fire growth in other fuel structures 
may be significantly faster. 
4. The models presented in Chapter 3 are not intended to address the potential 
radiant heat flux arising from surrounding buildings being involved in fire. In part, 
this is inherently considered within AS3959 through the requirement that associated 
structures on the same parcel of land and within 6m of the dwelling subject to 
enhanced construction standards, must also be constructed to that same 
standard. In new estates, all dwellings within the land development should be 
constructed to the required standard of wildfire resistance, in theory significantly 
reducing the potential for mass conflagration spreading between multiple houses. 
Due to the differences in wildfire and structural fire behaviour and radiation models 
as well as the difference in building and structure performance once impacted by 
wildfire, it is suggested that a high level of technical expertise is required to 
complete this process. 
 
1. By understanding wildfire behaviour and wildfire suppression strategies, urban 
planners can significantly influence the defendability and resilience of 
communities to wildfire impacts through appropriate design of development at 
the RUI.  The research and increased analysis presented in this chapter enables 
wildfire impacts and potential suppression to be considered at the design stage of 
RUI development.  Evidence based design that incorporates minimum measures 
for evacuations and eliminates the unrealistic expectation that firefighters will be 
able to defend every property will lead to more appropriate passive6 wildfire 
resilient design 
2. The use of design wildfires, Wildfire Engineering Briefs and Wildfire Engineering 
Reports, similar to the standard fire engineering processes within the urban fire 
engineering profession will only further increase the standard of safety in bushfire 
prone areas.  These are detailed and complex technical documents however that 
required a high degree of technical knowledge and proficiency from both the 
engineer and the agencies involved. 
 
1. Current wildfire planning guidelines and policy in Australia  typically set deemed 
to satisfy set the ‘acceptable’7 threshold for development at 10kW-2 (NSWRFS, 
2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for vulnerable, critical or hazardous land use8 and 
between 19kWm-2 to 29kWm-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for standard 
development such as subdivision.  As detailed in this chapter, 10kWm-2 is 
considered critical conditions for firefighters in structural PPC and breathing 
apparatus, with retreat required in less than 60 seconds.  At the same level, for a 
healthy person without protective equipment, incapacitating burns are predicted 
in approximately 60 seconds, with severe pain and first degree burns expected to 
occur after substantially less exposure.  By adopting these thresholds, communities 
are effectively being designed to be undefendable by firefighters.  At 29kWm-2, 
firefighters in structural PPC and breathing apparatus are likely to face 
 
6 Passive systems do not require action or maintenance.  For instance, ensuring road 
design allows sufficient evacuation opportunity without additional control measures is a 
passive measure that can be supported by appropriate and timely community evacuation 
messages.  Firefighters being required to suppress a wildfire is an active intervention.  
7 Planning approval will typically be provided. 
8 Vulnerable land use includes schools, nursing homes, tourism etc.   
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incapacitating burns in less than 30 seconds.  This realisation is also significant for 
firefighters and IMT’s who are considering firefighting defense of threatened 
communities who must consider whether they are expected to, or are indeed 
themselves expecting to do the impossible and un-survivable. 
2. The solution from an urban planning perspective may rest in several approaches 
that require consideration on a case by case basis: 
i. If development is required to be actively defendable by firefighters during 
the passage of a wildfire front, the maximum radiant heat impact at any 
point within the development needs to be within the window of safe and 
effective wildfire suppression.  In turn, this arguably either requires extensive 
and permanent vegetation modification and fuel reduction around the 
development, or appropriate landscaping that forms part of a passive 
wildfire engineered design; 
ii. If development does not require active firefighter defense then the actual 
level of wildfire radiant heat impact can, in theory, be addressed by the 
application of enhanced wildfire resilient engineering construction such as 
that detailed in AS3959.  In turn, this may also allow the fire truck related 
road access standards to such as those described in existing guidelines 
(NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017; GSA, 2012; ) to be revisited; 
iii. Development of an evidence based performance based wildfire urban 
planning code, similar to that of the Building Code of Australia and that 
adopted by Tasmania (2017).  This would need to go beyond the existing 
and largely subjective planning guidelines and carry throughout the 
planning and building legislation and process, as is the case in Victoria 
(VSG, 2019); 
iv. Professionalisation and regulation of the wildfire engineering industry.  
Whilst the existing Bushfire Planning and Design (BPAD) accreditation 
scheme is the first step in this process, the technical knowledge and 
expertise required of wildfire engineers arguably requires greater 
accreditation and regulation.  
 
1. The data and results presented in this chapter reinforce the implications for Urban 
Planners discussed in Chapter 5.   
 
1. The data and results presented in this chapter reinforce the implications for Urban 
Planners discussed in Chapter 5.   
 
Firefighters will put themselves in harms way to protect vulnerable communities. Through 
careful and appropriate urban design that considers potential wildfire behaviour, 
defendability of communities, evacuation requirements and firefighter tenability using 
evidence based fire engineering analysis, urban planners can enhance the safety of 
communities in areas prone to wildfire and the firefighters that protect them. 
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